9 avril 2011

The Inheritance of Rome

PhiGéo
Une histoire de Rome et du Moyen-âge qui met en perspective l'oeuvre de Charlemagne et celle de Mahomet. 


Times Higher Education
Books by academics reviewed by academics

Book of the week: The Inheritance of Rome 

05 February 2009 

Power, Tom Palaima learns, was easily gained but damned hard to keep

In The Inheritance of Rome, the latest volume in the Penguin History of Europe series, Chris Wickham lays out, in 23 chapters, 600 years of early medieval political, social, economic and religious history. He begins with a concise description of the culture and belief systems of the late Roman Empire and the crises that led to its dissolution, then goes on to cover post-Roman Western Europe between 550 and 750, the Byzantine and Arab empires between 550 and 1000, and Carolingian and post-Carolingian Europe between 750 and 1000.
Realising that the early Middle Ages offer "few household names for a wider public", Wickham provides "political narratives" for each subperiod and explores "the social and cultural (including religious) environment[s] inside which men and women made political choices". He gives us a good feel for these environments by making the most of the uneven evidence for economic exchange networks, political and social hierarchy, religious beliefs and practices and intellectual life.
By judicious selection of primary texts and by paying attention to the increasingly sophisticated interpretation of material remains, Wickham places us in many different early medieval worlds. In chapter ten, which he calls the book's central chapter, he studies the political messages of Emperor Justinian's church of Hagia Sophia in Constantinople (537), Caliph al-Walid I's Great Mosque in Damascus (716), the Northumbrian palace at Yeavering (c600), Pope Paschal I's church of Santa Prassede in Rome (c820) and the Carolingian palaces at Aachen and Ingelheim in the late 8th and 9th centuries.
Wickham then takes up archaeological evidence for the other end of the social spectrum, how village layouts attest to what he later calls "the caging of the peasantry" between 800 and 1000. His phrase for this process of trapping lowly land-workers within the self-contained power structures of local regions is a translation of the French term encellulement. He uses a pejorative image because of his sympathy for the nameless human beings in medieval times who never wrote or read a word, who never fought in aristocratic armies, who never designed or visited palatial buildings.
Wickham draws on Beowulf, the Deeds of Charlemagne, accounts of visitors to Damascus and an 11-page eulogy of Hagia Sophia in Prokopios' On Buildings to explain the ceremonial uses of his culture-defining buildings and their effects on visitors. Rome, Constantinople and the West used these structures in connection with wide streets, forum areas, theatres, amphitheatres, "processions and public participation". Arab states "did not use processions as a major part of their political legitimisation", opting for the "relatively unhierarchical space" of the mosque's courtyard with its "emphasis on the community of believers".
Of course, as Wickham points out, al-Walid was asserting Muslim supremacy by building the Damascus mosque on top of the demolished cathedral of the largely Christian city. The Deeds of Charlemagne describes imaginatively a visit of Byzantine ambassadors to the palace of the emperor. Its spatial layout, furniture and wall decorations asserted Carolingian supremacy to outsiders. Paschal I, too, was "reasserting papal centrality... inside and against a world with different political configurations".
Wickham drives home the lesson that power is not so hard to get, if you are intelligent, observant, ruthless and lucky, but it is damned hard to sustain and pass on. This holds true for individuals and for the elites who control the fates of cities, regions, nation-states or empires.
A second lesson is that those who acquire power must be ingenious at justifying their right to keep and use it. However this is done, in each era the anonymous masses suffer the consequences. The third lesson is that power is a zero-sum game. Wickham admits that The Inheritance of Rome offers "less about the peasant majority than there might have been", but is clear on how those with power extract it from others.
There are historical surprises. Constantinople, thanks to its massive fortifications facing the Balkans and the protection the Bosphorus Strait provided against land attacks from Anatolia, managed to retain its eastern empire in some form throughout the period. The empire lost "two thirds of its land and three quarters of its wealth" between 610 and the 630s. With the loss of Egypt to Persian and then Arab armies, Constantinople no longer could provide free grain to its people. Its population fell from about 500,000 to between 40,000 and 70,000. It was still the largest city in Europe. Where did all those people go?
But less is sometimes more. Between 669 and 687, the Anatolian imperial heartland was reorganised into four military districts called "themes". Soldiers were rewarded with land, and their produce was their pay. Cities were weakened or vanished altogether in outlying areas subject to raids. Social status outside Constantinople was determined not so much by wealth or birth, but by "office in the army or administration".
Constantinople itself gained in relative importance. During the period of Byzantine revival (850 to 1000), its elites reinforced their power in ceremonies so elaborate that Wickham asks, "Can all this really have taken place, for every feast in every year, with all these people^^?" The answer is "yes", and these displays validated the political and religious hierarchies.
As a scholar interested in kingship ideology and the power structures of Greek Bronze Age palatial societies, I found chapter 16, "The Carolingian century, 751-887", especially interesting because of Wickham's analysis of how power in the Carolingian state was formed, increased, conveyed and eventually lost.
First, Pippin gained power by force, but only after securing the nihil obstat of Pope Zacharias and later a public ritual legitimisation by Pope Stephen II. Both popes served as vital sources of what Wickham calls "external, non-Frankish, moral power".
Second, Charlemagne's aggressive military campaigns generated the wealth he needed to act as king and then emperor. He acquired booty from the pagan cult-site of Irminsul in Saxony and revenues from Lombardy, and absorbed Bavaria by threat of force. Lastly, he attacked the Avars on the Hungarian plain and brought back enormous riches from their royal residence.
Third, Charlemagne consolidated and controlled power by distributing honores, offices and land allotments. He granted use of land as beneficia, keeping ownership so he could reclaim it if the recipient acted contrary to royal wishes.
Fourth, he instituted a cultural programme through legislative acts aimed at correctio, the cultivation of cultivated, restrained behaviour by those in power. Justice, harmony and the avoidance of hatred were key public virtues.
Fifth, he promoted reciprocal gift exchanges. And sixth, he sent out royal agents, missi, to correct abuses. Charlemagne's son and successor, Louis the Pious, placed strong emphasis on the moral behaviour of aristocrats and public officials.
The Carolingian system did not recreate Gibbon's happy age of the Antonines. Wickham points out that missi were often sent out to put a stop to abuses by other missi, and judicial corruption was widespread. Yet, as Wickham explains, aristocrats "are always violent, corrupt and greedy, but they were at least aware of public responsibility [and]... linked it to their desire for personal salvation after death". The peasantry had hope of protection because local powers had to pay attention to kings. For les miserables, this period was probably better than most, and then the cage doors were slammed shut.
When I finished The Inheritance of Rome, which Wickham dedicates to the students with whom he studied ancient and medieval history at the University of Birmingham from 1976 to 2005, I thought, "Lucky students" and "Lucky us now, too."
The Author
Chris Wickham is the Chichele professor of medieval history at the University of Oxford and fellow of All Souls College.
Prior to this, he spent nearly 30 years at the University of Birmingham. Wickham says that although academia was not a conscious career choice for him, he "fell quite quickly" into it, and was always aware that his specialist subject would be "something that wasn't Britain".
He specialises in medieval Italy, in particular Tuscany and central Italy, but he is also very interested in comparative history.
When asked what he enjoys about Italy, he says that it has "an interesting political engagement". He also takes pleasure in travelling around the Mediterranean in general, and particularly likes the region's landscape.
Back at home, he has three cats, Fluffy, Wamba and Victoria, who have had one of Wickham's books dedicated to them, "to the great amusement of the Italians".
The Inheritance of Rome: A History of Europe from 400 to 1000
By Chris Wickham
Allen Lane, 688pp, £35.00
ISBN 9780713994292
Published 29 January 2009
Reviewer :
Tom Palaima is professor of Classics, University of Texas at Austin.

Source
Times Higher Education - Book of the week: The Inheritance of Rome

8 avril 2011

Relais pour la vie / Relay for Life

PhiGéo



Dear Friends,

Join me in the fight against cancer by pledging me for my participation in the Canadian Cancer Society Relay For Life!
The Canadian Cancer Society Relay For Life is an overnight non-competitive relay that celebrates cancer survivors and pays tribute to the lives of loved ones. It involves teams of 10 people who take turns walking, running or strolling around a track to raise money to support the work of the Canadian Cancer Society. It's a night of fun, friendship and fundraising to beat cancer. Every step you take in Relay raises money to help the Canadian Cancer Society save lives.
Funds raised through Relay For Life make a difference. They help the Canadian Cancer Society fund the most promising research projects in the country, provide information services and support programs in the community and advocate for public policies that prevent cancer and help those living with it. Join the Fight by pledging my participation in Relay For Life – just click the link at the bottom of this message to view my personal page and look for the blue button to support me in this event. Online pledging is secure and it saves the Society money by reducing administrative costs. No amount is too small, or too big. And with a donation of $10 or more, you will receive a tax receipt immediately by e-mail.

Thanks,

M.I.

Chère amies,


Participez avec moi à la lutte contre le cancer en commanditant ma participation au Relais pour la vie de la Société canadienne du cancer!
Le Relais pour la vie de la Société canadienne du cancer est un relais amical de nuit qui rend hommage aux survivants du cancer ainsi qu'aux êtres chers qui ont été emportés par la maladie. Il réunit des équipes de 10 personnes qui se relaient en marchant autour d'une piste afin de soutenir la cause de la Société canadienne du cancer. C'est un événement sous le signe du plaisir et de l'amitié qui permet d'amasser des fonds pour vaincre le cancer. En prenant part au Relais, d’une manière ou d’une autre, vous contribuez à recueillir des fonds qui permettront à la Société canadienne du cancer de sauver des vies.
Les fonds recueillis grâce au Relais pour la vie font une différence. Ils permettent à la Société canadienne du cancer de financer les projets de recherche les plus prometteurs, d'offrir des services d'information et des programmes de soutien dans la communauté, et de promouvoir l'adoption de politiques en vue de réduire le risque de cancer et d'améliorer la qualité de vie des personnes touchées par la maladie. Joignez-vous au combat en commanditant ma participation au Relais pour la vie –  il suffit de cliquer sur le lien au bas de ce courriel pour accéder à ma page personnelle; recherchez le bouton bleu afin d’appuyer ma participation à l’évènement. Les dons en ligne sont sûres et permettent à la Société canadienne du cancer d’économiser en réduisant ses frais d’administration. Aucun montant n’est trop petit ou trop élevé. Et pour tout don de 10 $ ou plus, vous recevrez immédiatement un reçu officiel par courriel.
Merci,


M.I.



http://www.facebook.com/marc.imbeault


http://convio.cancer.ca/site/PageServer?pagename=RFL_CAN_home_accueil&s_locale=en_CA

6 avril 2011

Revue Défense Nationale / On Command

PhiGéo

La Revue Défense Nationale vient de faire paraître un article de Marc Imbeault et Michel Maisonneuve intitulé : "Du commandement : approche philosophique".


This is the first part of a Canadian study of command, initially based on philosophical notions of hierarchy, power, willingness and cohesion. The concept is then interpreted in the context of the professional military ethic. Finally, the authors examine the notion of authority based on the concept of recognition.


Il s’agit de la première partie d’une étude sur le commandement d’abord défini philosophiquement à partir des notions de hiérarchie, de puissance, de volonté et de cohésion. Il est situé et interprété ensuite dans le contexte de l’éthique professionnelle militaire. La notion d’autorité est examinée enfin à partir du concept de reconnaissance.




Revue D�fense Nationale

3 avril 2011

Les armes des anti-kadhafistes pourraient finir dans les mains d'al-Qaida

PhiGéo
Le colonel Kadhafi n'avait peut-être pas tort lorsqu'il affirmait que les "rebelles" étaient en réalité des militants d'Al-Qaïda...
Source : Le PointLes armes envoy�es aux anti-kadhafistes pourraient finir dans les mains d'al-Qaida, actualit�A ou�dire : Le Point

Libye et Côte d'Ivoire dans une perspective historique

PhiGéo

Dans ce texte de Bernard Lugan, les événements qui se déroulent actuellement en Libye et en Côte d'Ivoire sont analysés par un spécialiste de l'histoire de l'Afrique. L'angle sous lequel l'auteur aborde ces questions révèle des enjeux que le public en Occident n'a pas souvent l'occasion de considérer.

SAMEDI 2 AVRIL 2011


Libye et Côte d’Ivoire : « bons » démocrates contre « méchants » dictateurs ?

Communiqué de Bernard Lugan du 2 avril 2011


En Côte d’Ivoire comme en Libye, ce ne sont pas de « bons » démocrates qui combattent de « méchants » dictateurs, mais des tribus ou des ethnies qui s’opposent en raison de fractures inscrites dans la longue durée.


La Libye est essentiellement constituée de deux provinces désertiques, la Tripolitaine et la Cyrénaïque reliées par une route côtière le long de laquelle ont lieu des escarmouches sans contact direct que les journalistes qualifient pompeusement de « combats ». Dans chacune des deux provinces domine une coalition tribale. De l’indépendance acquise en 1951 jusqu’à la prise du pouvoir par le colonel Kadhafi en 1969, ce fut la Cyrénaïque qui exerça le pouvoir. La Tripolitaine domina ensuite.


La révolte est un soulèvement ancré en Cyrénaïque, plus particulièrement autour des villes de Benghazi et de Dernah. Les autorités françaises ont reconnu ses dirigeants comme les seuls représentants du « peuple de Libye ». Un peu comme si la Catalogne s’étant soulevée contre Madrid, Paris reconnaissait les délégués de Barcelone comme seuls représentants du peuple espagnol…


Réduits à leurs seules forces, les rebelles de Cyrénaïque ont montré qu’ils sont incapables de conquérir la Tripolitaine et même de tenir leurs positions. Il n’y a donc que deux solutions à cette guerre :


1) La « coalition » intervient en force, jusqu’à terre, comme le font actuellement les forces spéciales américaines et cela pour permettre aux rebelles d’avancer afin d’en finir avec le colonel Kadhafi. Le problème est que le mandat de l’ONU n’autorise pas les « puissances du bien et de la morale » à s’immiscer aussi profondément dans la guerre civile libyenne.


2) Comme le demande l’Union africaine depuis le premier jour, une négociation devra débuter car l’aviation de l’Otan interdira de toutes les façons aux forces du colonel Kadhafi de reconquérir la Cyrénaïque.


En Côte d’Ivoire où l’affrontement n’est pas tribal mais ethnique, le pays est plus que jamais coupé en deux et, comme il fallait hélas s’y attendre, les massacres y prennent une ampleur cataclysmique. Une offensive éclair dont on connaîtra bientôt les détails et les parrains a permis aux forces nordistes d’arriver jusqu’à Abidjan. Cependant, même si l’avantage militaire des partisans d’Alassane Ouattara était confirmé, la crise ivoirienne n’en serait pas réglée pour autant. En effet, si pour la presse occidentale cette victoire annoncée est vue comme celle du président « démocratiquement élu » contre le président illégitime, pour les 46% de la population ayant voté Laurent Gbagbo, l’explication est autre : aidé par la France et les Etats-Unis, l’ensemble nordiste musulman a repris vers l’océan une expansion bloquée durant la parenthèse coloniale.


De fait, la coupure Nord-Sud entre le monde sahélien, ouvert et traditionnellement structuré en chefferies d’une part, et le monde littoral, forestier à l’Ouest, lagunaire à l’Est, peuplé d’ethnies politiquement cloisonnées d’autre part, est la grande donnée géopolitique régionale. L’actualité confirmant la géographie et l’histoire, les solutions qui ne prendraient pas en compte cette réalité ne sauraient régler la crise en profondeur.
SourceLe blog officiel de Bernard Lugan

2 avril 2011

Riposte à l'autodafé du Coran

PhiGéo
Huit employés étrangers de l’ONU ont été tués dans l’attaque de leurs bureaux par des manifestants à Mazar-I-Sharif, en Afghanistan, a annoncé un porte-parole de la police régionale. Deux d’entre eux ont été décapité, a-t-il précisé plus tard. Selon les informations de l’AFP, cinq gardes népalais, employés par l’ONU, font partie des victimes. Trois manifestants afghans auraient également été tués.
Un porte-parole de l’ONU à New York a confirmé l’attaque, indiquant qu’il y avait “des morts” dans les rangs de l’ONU, sans en préciser le nombre.
Une manifestation pour protester contre l’autodafé récent d’un Coran aux Etats-Unis a mal tourné. La manifestation a commencé vers 13h30, après la traditionnelle prière du vendredi, et les manifestants ont attaqué le siège de l’Unama (Mission d’assistance de l’ONU en Afghanistan) aux environs de 15 heures, avant d’y pénétrer, selon le porte-parole de la police.
Mazar-I-Sharif est l’une des sept zones choisies par le président Hamid Karzaï et la coalition internationale pour inaugurer le processus dit de “transition”. Les forces étrangères y transmettront la responsabilité de la sécurité dès le 1er juillet aux forces afghanes.

Source : Afp-Europe1 

THERESE ZRIHEN-DVIR, Regard d'un Ecrivain sur le Monde -

Tripoli rejette une offre de cessez-le-feu des insurgés - L'Express

PhiGéo


La situation en Libye se complexifie avec le rejet des offres de cessez-le-feu par le colonel Kadhafi.La désorganisation des rebelles compense la supériorité qu'apporte les bombardements des alliés. Un bras de fer s'engage...

1 avril 2011

Noble Ends: Torture and The Ethics of Counter-Terrorism

PhiGéo


Noble ends: Torture And the ethics of counter-terrorism

Marc Imbeault
Royal Military College Saint-Jean


In Daniel Lagacé-Roy and Bernd Horn (Eds.),
The War on Terror – Ethical Considerations
(2008) Proceedings from the 7th Canadian Conference on Ethical Leadership held at the Royal Military College of Canada, 28-29 November 2006, Volume I, Winnipeg, Canadian Academy Press, 2008, pp. 97-106.


“Let us leave aside all speculation about princes and look only at the realities.” [Translation]
       Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, XV

The issue central to this presentation can be summarized in the following question: "What is the value of the moral justifications for the use of torture in the fight against terrorism?" The enemy facing the West has clearly stated that he would not shrink from using any means to achieve his ends. In a videotaped message broadcast just after the attacks of September 11, 2001, Osama Bin Laden explicitly threatened to destroy America. The many attacks that followed show that this warning must be taken seriously. It would accordingly be a serious mistake to minimize the threat that looms over America and over the West in general, in order to oppose the exceptional security measures taken by Western countries in the wake of September 11. 

Terrorist organizations do not hesitate to justify the use of the most violent means, and they have no respect for the most fundamental human rights: for them, the end justifies the means.[1] The issue is whether Western countries, and specifically the United States, are justified in adopting a comparable stance and using morally reprehensible means such as disinformation, lies, corruption or torture to defend themselves. We will limit our discussion here to a single aspect of this issue: the use of torture in the interrogation of individuals suspected of terrorism.

I will leave aside for the moment the legal definitions of torture. Discussion of these definitions may be useful and important, but does not concern ethics as such. Ethical principles outweigh, if one can use the term, legal principles, and their field of application is broader. I will accordingly use the word "torture" in the context of interrogation sessions during which physical or psychological pain is inflicted on someone in order to obtain important information.


The ethical justification for the use of torture
in counter-terrorism


The justifications of torture generally have to do with the exceptional nature and urgency of the situation. 

The exception

The exceptional nature of the fight against terrorism can be examined on two levels. The first concerns individual members of a terrorist organization. The second concerns the overall situation created by the use of terror.

Through membership in a terrorist organization, individuals place themselves in an exceptional situation in which the rights normally granted to prisoners of war cannot apply. Terrorists are not part of a regular army, and their operations are closer to those of spies than those of soldiers.[2] This is why terrorists are not considered combatants within the meaning normally used in the treaties and conventions banning torture. It would thus be normal for them to be treated differently from other combatants when captured. According to this approach, the type of action undertaken by terrorists – subversive strikes – exclude them de facto from the protection of treaties such as the Geneva Conventions. The same type of action, however, justifies the claim that they cannot receive the legal protection normally enjoyed by citizens in a state founded upon law. Terrorism itself is deemed to have created the global context that justifies the suspension of suspects' rights. Individuals suspected of being part of terrorism, or of assisting it in any way, thus no longer belong to humanity. It is therefore possible – and at times even necessary – to torture them if that makes it possible to obtain information.

Urgency

The prevention of terrorist attacks is also a matter of urgency. It may be that the investigators do not have much time to interrogate a suspect and that the use of torture is deemed to be the only way of obtaining information quickly. The example most often used is that of the ticking time bomb. In such a case, a serious, imminent threat would clearly justify the use of torture. It is important to prevent a bomb from exploding if it could kill thousands of people.

Many authors have used the rationales of urgency and of the exceptional nature of the fight against terrorism to justify torture. Here, I will discuss the argument used by a characteristic representative of this approach: "An Ethical Defense of Torture in Interrogation" by Fritz Allhoff[3]. In the same vein as Michael Levin and Alan Dershowitz, who justify torture when it is the only way of averting a serious, imminent threat, Allhoff offers a process of reflection on the conditions which can morally justify the use of this practice.[4]

In his article, Allhoff first maintains that torture must be placed in the context of a dilemma between the rights of the individuals being interrogated and those of the people one is trying to protect. To illustrate his idea, Allhoff asks us to imagine a police officer in a face-off with a gangster who is on the point of killing the five witnesses to one of his crimes. The police officer would be justified in opening fire on the gangster to save the witnesses, since the rights of the gangster are outweighed by their rights. This example clearly indicates that, in Allhoff's view, it is at times necessary to violate one right in order to defend another. In his view, the same is true in cases of the rights of terrorism suspects in relation to the rights of their potential victims.

“Therefore, I think that a strong case can be made for the idea that torture can be justified, even if it entails rights violations, so long as we find ourselves in such a quandary that rights will end up being broken whether torture occurs or not. In these situations, some rights violation is bound to occur regardless, so we might as well either serve the greater good or else aim to minimize the overall violation of rights…. Either goal suggests the permissibility of torture[5].”

Once torture in general is justified as a lesser evil in certain circumstances,[6] Allhoff wonders under what specific conditions it can be used. He identifies four which, if they are all met, could justify torturing a suspect in order to obtain information. He summarizes this contention as follows:

“I think that the conditions necessary to justify torture are: the use of torture aims at acquisition of information, the captive is reasonably thought to have the relevant information, the information corresponds to a significant and imminent threat, and the information could likely lead to the prevention of the threats. If all four of these conditions are satisfied, then torture would be morally permissible[7].”

In order to be able to assert that torture is legitimate, it must thus be used solely to obtain important information that would make it possible to forestall an imminent strike. It is also stated that there must be good reason to believe that the suspect who will be tortured does indeed have the information. Allhoff concludes this development with a description of a paradigmatic example:

“For example, imagine that we have just captured a high-ranking official with an internationally known terrorist group and that our intelligence has revealed that this group has planted a bomb in a crowded office building that will likely explode tomorrow. This explosion will generate excessive civilian casualties and economic expense. We have a bomb squad prepared to move on the location when it is given, and there is plenty of time for them to disarm the bomb before its explosion tomorrow. We have asked this official for the location of the bomb, and he has refused to give it. Given these circumstances (which satisfy all four of my criteria), I think that it would be justifiable to torture the official in order to obtain the location of the bomb[8].”

After identifying the conditions under which the use of torture is justified, the only remaining question is to specify what type of torture is acceptable. The principle that guides Allhoff here is that exaggerated means should not be used. He states, for example, that if merely depriving someone of a meal is enough to make him talk, it is not necessary – not morally acceptable – to pull out his nails. The rest is appropriate.


The excesses of abstract knowledge


The type of argumentation advanced by Allhoff has the value of highlighting the dilemma which could potentially be faced by current Western political leaders. However, the method he uses does not support conclusions of any kind regarding the morality of torture. This method is founded essentially on imagination and has validity only in an abstract world where theoreticians can define data as they wish, without referring to actual historical events other than in anecdotal form. Not that anecdotes are worthless; on the contrary, they may draw attention to an important aspect of a problem and in this sense play a not inconsiderable heuristic role.

Abstract scenarios also have the drawback of catching a thought "in a trap," so to speak, and dragging it to conclusions which run counter to the most fundamental intuitions, such as the revulsion we feel regarding the use of torture. To return to the examples put forward by Allhoff, it is clearly difficult to maintain that a police officer would be refused permission to shoot a gangster who was on the point of murdering five innocent people in a cowardly way. It is also difficult to claim that a high-ranking terrorist should not be tortured if he has crucial information that would prevent large-scale attacks. However, although it is possible to imagine such examples, they do not have much connection with reality. Allhoff's reasoning is accordingly valid from the point of view of pure logic, albeit fragile in terms of applied ethics. It presupposes that we know a priori (before the fact) what we in reality know only a posteriori (after the fact). We are routinely confronted with this confusion when we hear that such and such an incident could have been – and thus should have been – avoided. The police are often criticized for not having arrested a criminal before he or she committed a crime. However, the same police are equally often blamed for abusing their powers by making arbitrary arrests. The truth is that one cannot arrest everyone who poses a threat of committing an offence. (In other words, maybe everyone?) This is why the work of the security services more often resembles art than science. Basing ethical considerations on a "thought experiment" which is rooted as much in the imagination as in reality thus appears to be a risky undertaking, from both a theoretical and a practical standpoint.[9]

Let us take a concrete example which is familiar to everyone and has the advantage of being real: that of the attacks of September 11, 2001. Once they had occurred, it was fairly easy to demonstrate that they could have been avoided and to criticize the American security services as incompetent, stupid or naïve – to the point that some propagandists maintain that the attacks were desired by the American authorities themselves. Preventing them would in fact have been so easy that there was no explanation for how they could have occurred, other than with the complicity of the CIA or the FBI!  Here, however, we must be careful not to confuse what is possible with what is real. The fact that something is a possibility does not make it a reality: that something is possible does not necessarily imply that it exists. The possibility that al‑Qaeda was conspiring to bring down the towers of the World Trade Center was serious; the fact that some people were taking flying lessons but had no interest in landing manœuvres was not, prior to September 11, 2001, a sufficient reason to arrest them. It must not be forgotten that the success of this operation lay precisely in the unheard-of nature of the attack and accordingly its element of surprise. The same attack would probably not be possible today, due to the simple fact that passengers on a hijacked aircraft no longer react as they reacted then to an attempted hijacking, precisely because of the attacks of September 11. 

But even if torture is morally unjustifiable, could one not maintain that it may be politically justifiable, if one admits – and this is a theory that I endorse – that the political sphere is separate from the moral sphere?

The rejection of torture on the grounds that it is immoral does not mean that states must automatically prohibit the practice thereof. It is in fact impossible to reduce political activity to morality alone. There are specifically political imperatives under which the use of torture can be examined in a different light and, generally speaking, the use of morally repugnant expedients, such as lies, misinformation or corruption. At this point, I would like to conclude these thoughts in order to put into perspective what we have just asserted from a moral standpoint. 


Violence: the quintessence of politics?


Analyzing the issue of torture from a political perspective means evaluating its relevance in terms of costs and benefits to society. Torture may then become one of the means used by power to achieve its ends. Is not violence central to politics?[10] There is truly a paradox between the specific means and the ends of politics: between peace or concord, which is the aim of politics, and the violence it uses to achieve that end.[11] The Prince, as Machiavelli said, must learn "to be evil, and use or not use this art, depending on necessity. [Translation]"[12]  He must be at times a lion and at times a fox, meaning that he must use force and trickery wisely depending on the circumstances.

Drawing on the lessons of the past, Adam Roberts summarizes the current situation in the following passage:

“All societies encounter problems when fighting an invisible, brutal enemy who may have numerous secret sympathizers. Under such circumstances, most states, even democratic ones, use some form of imprisonment without trial. This entails serious risks: first, the risk of arresting and detaining the wrong people; second, that detainees are mistreated. In both cases, the danger lies in creating martyrs and thus feeding terrorism [Translation][13].”

As we have seen here, the analysis of torture benefits from being placed in a historical perspective. Alfred McCoy demonstrates convincingly in his book A Question of Torture[14] that this practice yields significant results only on a large scale. The Battle of Algiers provides a well-known instance of this. In 1957, the French army and intelligence services tortured thousands of people in the Algerian capital and managed to obtain sufficient valid information to nullify the attempted strikes by the terrorist organizations that were active at the time. These results were obtained by amassing substantiating information obtained through torture. It would undoubtedly have been possible to achieve this through other means, but that would have required the work of interrogators who were skilled, well trained and educated, whereas practitioners with very ordinary abilities proved sufficient to handle the traditional techniques characteristic of so-called "robust" interrogation. From this point of view, the use of torture is tempting and appears, at least at first sight, to be relatively inexpensive.

In order to correctly assess the cost of torture, however, both the short-term and long-term costs must be considered.  In the short term, with the exception of doctors who can supervise the process and prevent premature death, torture can be carried out by personnel with little training and cheap instruments – such as the infamous gégène. The cost of torture is thus relatively low compared to the cost of training sophisticated interrogators and analysts who do not use such means to obtain information. It should not be forgotten, however, that torture comes with a high political cost. In the long term, the use of torture can have severe consequences for the troops of a country that engages in it, on those of the enemy and on public opinion.

Let us begin with the impact on the troops of the country concerned. It is pointless to authorize only a few individuals to carry out torture, for a limited period of time and with limited methods. Such authorizations have invariably presaged the swift generalization of torture throughout security systems, without which it is ineffective. The generalized use of torture, however, has a devastating effect on troops, the main problem being that the enemy, who is no longer regarded as a human being, is initially despised and then inevitably underestimated. This is one of the worst catastrophes that can befall a fighting organization.

Among the enemy, the use of torture intensifies the process of fanaticization that feeds the war. It is not difficult to understand the reaction of a people whose "children" are tortured. In the case of the Battle of Algiers, torture had the effect of dramatically exacerbating the resentment felt by Algerians toward all French people and broke off the last channels of communication which might perhaps have led to a moderate negotiated solution[15].

Ultimately, the most serious consequence of the use of torture is its effect on public opinion. The favourable light in which America was viewed by world public opinion in the wake of the September 11 attacks has given way to mistrust, even hatred, since the mistreatment to which prisoners have been subjected at Guantanamo in Cuba and at Abu Ghraib in Iraq became known. Controlling public opinion is not easy, and America is having difficulty refurbishing its image, despite the expenditure of millions of dollars. The same was true for France after the Battle of Algiers. Even today, the dishonour of the French torturers casts a shadow over the country's reputation.

While torture can accordingly not be excluded from the political arsenal, its very high cost in the medium and long term must be emphasized. The fact that the techniques used do not entail excessive expense masks the high cost associated with the political consequences of its use. Torture accordingly cannot be recommended, even from a strictly political standpoint. The first great counter-terrorism expert, Joseph Fouché, Duke of Otranto and Chief of Police under Napoleon, explicitly advised against it. On the other hand, unalloyed idealism can no more lead effectively to victory than can cynical realism. What is essential is the ability to manipulate both and to maintain a sense of proportion. Security systems that are based exclusively on benevolent humanism will be swiftly subverted by the enemy and they will be unable to anticipate threats or to neutralize them. It is thus essential to find a middle way between the two extremes, one of which would be a policy totally devoid of moral principles and the other a policy totally devoid of flexibility.


References

ALEM, Jean-Pierre. L’espionnage, histoire, méthodes, Paris, Lavauzelle, 1987.

ALLHOFF, Fritz. "An Ethical Defense of Torture in Interrogation," in Ethics of Spying, under the direction of Jan Goldman and Martin Gordon, Toronto, The Scarecrow Press, 2006, pp. 126-40.

FOUCHÉ, Joseph. Mémoires de Joseph Fouché duc d’Otrante, lecture by Michel Vovelle, Paris, Imprimerie nationale, 1992.

FREUND, Julien. L’essence du politique, Paris, Sirey, 1965.

IGNATIEFF, Michael. "Lesser Evils," website of the John F. Kennedy School of Government, www.ksg.harvard.edu.

IMBEAULT, Marc. "Emmanuel Kant: The Morality of Duty," in Philosophie: Éthique et politique, published under the supervision of Yvon Paillé, Laval, Études Vivantes, HRW, 1999, pp. 102‑3.

IMBEAULT, Marc, and MONTIFROY, Gérard. Géopolitique et pouvoirs,  Lausanne, L’Âge d’Homme, 2003.

IMBEAULT, Marc, and TROTTIER, Yves. Limites de la violence, Québec City, Presses de l’Université Laval, 2006.

KANT, Emmanuel. "Of a claimed right to lie out of humanity," translated by Luc Ferry in   Philosophical Works, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, Paris, Gallimard, 1985, vol. 3, pp. 433-41.

LA TOURANE, Sébastien de. Julien Freund : penseur « machiavélien » de la politique, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2004.

MACHIAVELLI, Niccolò. The Prince, French translation by Jean Anglade, Paris, Livre de Poche, 1972.

MADELIN, Louis. Fouché, 1759-1820, Paris, Plon, 1955.

McCOY, Alfred W.  A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation, from the Cold War to the War on Terror. New York, Metropolitan Books, 2006.

PFAFF, Tony. "Bungee Jumping off the Moral Highground: Ethics of Espionage in the Modern Age," in Ethics of Spying, under the supervision of Jan Goldman and Martin Gordon, Toronto, The Scarecrow Press, 2006, pp. 66-103.

POSNER, Richard A. Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National Emergency, Oxford University Press, 2006.

RICOEUR, Paul. “Le paradoxe politique” [The Political Paradox], in Histoire et vérité, Paris, Seuil, 1955, pp. 260-85.

ROBERTS, Adam. "La ‘guerre contre le terrorisme’ dans une perspective historique" [the war on terror from a historical perspective], in Justifier la guerre? De l’humanitaire au contre-terrorisme, under the supervision of Gilles Andréani and Pierre Hassner, Paris, Presses de la fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 2005, p. 162.


[1] The scenes of decapitation broadcast over the Internet demonstrate the barbarism of which terrorist organizations are capable. It should be noted that this behaviour is nothing new among those who engage in terror. The heads of the enemies of the French Revolution were displayed to the crowd after they had been guillotined. In the late 1980s, a CIA agent, William Buckley, was filmed being tortured to death by Hezbollah in Beirut. The videotapes were subsequently sent to U.S. embassies.
[2] Tony Pfaff, for example, supports the idea that those who decide to play the terrorists' game must expect to suffer the consequences, and that this anticipation itself constitutes the basis for a justification of the methods employed by the security services. Pfaff does not, however, go so far as to explicitly justify the use of torture. Cf. "Bungee Jumping off the Moral Highground: Ethics of Espionage in the Modern Age," in Ethics of Spying, Toronto, The Scarecrow Press, 2006, pp. 66-103.
[3] Allhoff, Fritz, "An Ethical Defense of Torture in Interrogation," Ethics of Spying, pp. 126-40.
[4] Richard Posner advocates an interpretation of the U.S. Constitution that opens the door to the use of torture in the counter-terrorism context. He maintains that it may be justifiable from a moral and political standpoint. Cf. Posner, Richard, Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National Emergency, Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 9-10.
[5] Ethics of Spying, p. 132.
[6] In the same vein, there is the article by Michael Ignatieff entitled "Lesser Evils," available on the website of the John F. Kennedy School of Government, www.ksg.harvard.edu.
[7] Ethics of Spying, p. 134.
[8] Ethics of Spying, p. 134.
[9] The argument based on a probability of a future good is also inherently based on a serious ethical problem. In an article entitled "Of a claimed right to lie out of humanity," Kant answered one of his critics, Benjamin Constant, who maintained that duties were not absolute and that exceptions were necessary in order to make life in society possible. Constant maintained, a little like Allhoff, that brigands should not have the same rights as others, specifically with regard to the truth. He accordingly suggested that it was acceptable to lie to one of them if the lie could avert a greater evil – such as murder. Kant rightly notes that telling the truth to a criminal would not necessarily entail a crime, whereas the fact of lying – to anyone – always constitutes wrongdoing. The obligation to tell the truth is a categorical imperative of universal validity. Kant continues that lies are themselves a crime and that the fact of trying to justify one by hypotheses about what will happen if it is not committed has no moral value. He concludes by affirming that the fact of lying ruins a community's trust, which is basic to all contracts and that it accordingly destroys society instead of making it possible, as Constant recommended. This conclusion has the advantage of being clear and simple. Cf. Kant, Emmanuel, "Of a claimed right to lie out of humanity," translated by Luc Ferry in Philosophical Works, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, Paris, Gallimard, 1985, vol. 3, pp. 433-41. For a more detailed discussion of this volume, readers are referred to the chapter entitled "Emmanuel Kant: The Morality of Duty," in Philosophie: Éthique et politique, published under the supervision of Yvon Paillé, Laval, Études Vivantes, HRW, 1999, pp. 102-3.
[10] This question refers to a statement to that effect by Julien Freud in L’essence du politique, (Paris: Sirey, 1965). 
[11] Paul Ricœur, "Le paradoxe politique" in Histoire et vérité, (Paris: Seuil, 1955), 260-85.
[12] Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, translated into French by Jean Anglade, (Paris: Livre de Poche, 1972), 80.
[13] Adam Roberts, "La ‘guerre contre le terrorisme’ dans une perspective historique," in Justifier la guerre ? De l’humanitaire au contre-terrorisme, Gilles Andréani and Pierre Hassner, eds., (Paris :Presses de la fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 2005), 162.
[14] Alfred W McCoy, A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation, from the Cold War to the War on Terror. (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006).

[15] We have discussed elsewhere the causes and consequences of the Algerian war and the justifications of violence generated by that war. See : Marc Imbeault and Gérard A. Montifroy, Géopolitique et pouvoirs, (Lausanne: L’Âge d’Homme, 2003). Also : Marc Imbeault and Yves Trottier. Limites de la violence, (Quebec City : Presses de l’Université Laval, 2006).

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