PhiGéo
Andrew Black dans le Terrorism Monitor publie une étude sur l'évolution des Frères musulmans en Égypte dans le contexte du mouvement de démocratisation du monde arabe et de la disparition du chef historique d'al-Quaida.
En gros, Black affirme que les Frères sont tiraillés par deux tendances : la première est de participer au mouvement mais de manière prudente et sans aspirer à exercer le pouvoir, l'autre est de s'impliquer davantage dans l'action et d'essayer de prendre le pouvoir quitte à libéraliser davantage le programme. Ces deux vecteurs contradictoires entraînent certains membres à faire défection et à se lancer en politique active pour profiter du vent de changement qui frappe l'Égypte, alors que les autres se tiennent en retrait et préfèrent la politique des petits pas.
Voici comment Black présentent les expériences douloureuses du HAMAS en Palestine et du FIS en Algérie qui poussent l’establishment des Frères à être prudent :
"While becoming more active politically, the Brotherhood has been forced to remain adaptable to daily events in Egypt while continuing to strike a balance between its progressive and traditional members. In developing its political strategy, the MB leadership claims to have learned the importance of moderation from recent history - namely the 2005 elections when the success of Brotherhood-endorsed candidates provoked a harsh crackdown by the state. To avoid contentiousness, the MB has announced that it will only be running for a minority position in the new parliament. The MB has stated unequivocally that no member will be permitted to compete in the presidential contest and that MB members are only permitted to join the FJP. The rationale for this, according to Khairat al-Shater, a Brotherhood leader and reputed strongman, is based on the experiences of the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria and HAMAS in the Palestinian Territories: “We cannot turn a blind eye to the Gazan and Algerian scenarios. When Islamists there reached power quickly, the military establishment turned against them” (al-Masry al-Youm [Cairo], June 20). Moreover, as Mubarak was forced from power, the Brotherhood was rumored to have negotiated with the military the Brotherhood’s withdrawal from the revolution in return for formal recognition of its political party (al-Masry al-Youm, April 1)."
Plus loin, Black parle des défections et de la difficile gestion des idées libérales qui animent la nouvelle génération de Frères:
"As seen in several recent defections of high profile Brothers, the MB’s actions are emblematic of how out of touch and bureaucratic the Ikhwan leadership has become after decades of struggle against the Egyptian state (Al-Ahram Weekly [Cairo], July 2). These defections reflect not only the increasing ability of dissenters to establish themselves outside of the MB, but also the internal struggle “between three different generations in the Brotherhood: the leadership, mid-management and the young people who were part of the revolution and gained media exposure” (Al-Ahram Weekly [Cairo], July 2). In nearly every case, these defectors have highlighted the MB’s difficult position, balancing the increasingly liberal views of a younger generation against an old guard whose conservatism is both an anchor for the organization and a source of criticism and fear from outsiders."
Black consacre enfin d'assez longs développements à l'opposition entre al-Quaida et Frères musulmans. Si les deux organisations partagent des objectifs semblables, les moyens qu'ils entendent utiliser pour les atteindre différents le plus souvent, pour ne pas dire tout le temps depuis plusieurs années. C'est notamment le cas en ce qui concerne le dirigeant actuel d'al-Quaida, Ayman al-Zawahiri qui s'est souvent attaqué au Frères en les accusant de révisionnisme. Pour lui, l'attentisme, pour ne pas dire l'immobilisme des Frères est une erreur stratégique impardonnable. Voici un extrait du texte de Black sur l'opposition entre les deux organisations :
"In an effort to prove its hostility toward al-Qaeda, the MB’s official website maintains a regularly updated page entitled “MB vs. Qaeda,” providing readers with ideological, strategic, and tactical insights into the rivalry. While al-Qaeda and the Brotherhood share a strategic objective, their interpretations of that objective and the means by which to achieve it place them at odds. [3] Where the Brotherhood sees change as a long term, bottom-up and largely peaceful endeavor, al-Qaeda pursues it through the violent activities of a faithful vanguard. Although Abdullah Azzam was a key member of the Brotherhood, his view of violent jihad as fard al-ayn (“an individual duty”) has not been adopted by the mainstream MB. [4] Al-Qaeda and other Salafi-Jihadis, however, rely on Azzam’s writings as foundational to their justification of jihad. While the Brotherhood supported elements of the Iraq insurgency and HAMAS’ attacks against Israel, the MB has largely sworn off of violent tactics in pursuit of political and social goals."
Les querelles entre al-Quaida et Frères musulmans sont certainement bien réelles mais elles ne doivent pas nous cacher l'entente plus profonde et plus significative selon moi sur les buts recherchés par les deux mouvements : la reconquête des terres musulmanes perdues et le rétablissement de la loi coranique dans l’empire ainsi reconstitué. Objectifs auquel on peut en ajouter un autre, encore plus lointain, d'universalisation de la foi. Ils se querelleront donc entre eux mais s'uniront devant l'ennemi commun à l'instant décisif.
The Jamestown Foundation: Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood: Internal Divisions and External Challenges in the Post-Mubarak Era
