The Moral Implication of the Ultimate War

Abu Musab al Suri

International Society for Military Ethics
University of San Diego - 2009

Marc Imbeault, Ph.D.

Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean
Royal Military College Saint-Jean

Division of Continuing Studies
Division des études permanentes


Translated from French by Marie-Claude Leblanc

“I wish by God that America will regret bitterly that they provoked me and others to combat her with pen and sword.[1]”

Abu Musab al-Suri

1. Virtue, terror and salvation

This presentation aims at clarifying the concept of ultimate war in the context of counterterrorism and of contemporary « war on terrorism ». Jihadist thought requires special attention along the same lines. I would like to analyze jihadist strategy dating from the last few years, particularly the theses of Abu Musab al-Suri, who proposes a “Post 9/11” approach in his Call to Global Islamic Resistance, published on the Internet in 2005 and sometimes compared to Hitler’s Mein Kampf [2].

Al-Suri’s approach not only intersects many patterns of classic extreme left-wing revolutionary thought, but is also inspired by the extreme right. Total demonization of the enemy and the complete justification for his annihilation clearly demonstrate up to what point the movement confronting the Western world is serious. But there is more: the doctrine of al-Suri and that of other jihadists magnify the idea of the ultimate combat, a war which will decide forever the destiny of mankind, thus justifying the use of all means, even legal. The moral sense of this absolute and final sanctification of war is what I would like to cover in my paper.

I would like to start with a brief historical overview. When eighteenth century revolutionaries started implementing the “Great Terror” and the word “terrorist” first appeared in modern vocabulary, their intention was to establish the reign of virtue. In his famous 1794 speech entitled “On the Principles of Political Morality” Robespierre explains that without terror, virtue is powerless.[3] This type of reasoning gained widespread acceptance and its legacy can be traced in the writings of present-day jihadist ideologists.

Revolutionaries of all times strongly believe that their political projects have an unsurpassing moral legitimacy.

To this blend of the ethical and the political, contemporary revolutionaries add religion. It is interesting to note however that at the peak of his power, Robespierre had implemented to the Republic the cult of the Supreme Being. From that point on, the Revolution became not only a moral and political cause, but also a religious one. The comparison with contemporary revolutionaries must be qualified, since Robespierre’s attempt was to create a new cult, while Islamists build on a well established religion.

Therefore, our first conclusion is the following: the revolutionary movement that the Western world faces today in what we call “counter-terrorism” must be understood from three hermeneutical keys: virtue, terror and salvation.

2. A Call to Global Islamic Resistance

I would now like to take a closer look at some of the governing ideas of jihadist ideology as they are presented in the writings of some leading strategists, and more specifically al-Suri.

Let’s start with the notion of jihad.

Jihad is an element of the Muslim religion that literally means “struggle” or “effort”. There are several types of jihad. For example, it can refer to the purely spiritual effort of the believer seeking self-control, a form of yoga (the word is from W. Phares in War of Ideas) practiced by Muslims wanting to deepen their religious faith. But the most meaningful definition for Jihad today is “war among other nations[4]” for Allah and his glory. Based on this last definition, contemporary jihadists have developed an ideology justifying war against the Western world, accused of threatening their faith, their believers and territories. This explains why jihad is fundamentally an ideology justifying violence. It is important to stress that it is not a religion, even if it originates from religion and that guardians of this ideology sincerely think their acting in defense of Islam.

Incidentally, it is from the combining of the religious, political and ethical realms that the problem arises. Jihadists are sincerely convinced of the goodness of their action when they kill in the name of religion. The assumption is obvious for authors like Al Shaheed Sayyid Qutb[5], Muhammad al-Salam Faraj, Sheikh Abdullah Yusuf Azzam[6] or Abu Musad al-Suri, newcomer to the ranks of great jihadist ideologists, who stated after 9/11: “I would have advised selecting international flights so that the planes could have been loaded with weapons of mass destruction. Attacking America with such weapons is difficult… but it is a necessity.[7]”

His particular case is worth taking a closer look at. Known as Abu Musad al-Suri, his real name is Mustafa bin Abd al-Qadir Setmariam Nasar. He was born in Alep, Syria, in 1958 and was involved in jihad on many levels: as a war fighter, historian, course developer and strategist. From this perspective, he can be compared to high-ranking officers of Western armies, since he is equally a man of action and a scholar. Woven in an out of his intellectual work is an acute sense of historical consciousness. He has the breadth of jihad’s history at the tip of his fingers and can accurately demonstrate its logic and development either through his writing or as an orator. He systematically sheds light on past mistakes suggesting concrete means not to repeat them, and we have to admit that this is one of his greatest strengths. Finally, his work bears the mark of an exceptional imagination, which makes it’s a dreadful, yet fascinating weapon.

Even though he is not a theologian, al-Suri often refers to the writings and teachings of the prophet Mohammed. The last thirty years of al-Suri’s action is entirely devoted to the final triumph of the Muslim religion. Yet, although al-Suri believes in the final victory, he concedes to his enemy a provisional advantage that stems from the mistakes made by the Mujahidin themselves and the collaboration of the regimes of certain Muslim countries.

Al-Suri’s 1600 pages treatise entitled Call to Global Islamic Resistance was published on the Internet in 2005, shortly before his arrest in Pakistan. In this work, he presents the history of jihad’s long-standing quest. The discussion I would like to open exclusively relates to the part of his work dealing with the last 10 years.

From al-Suri’s perspective, intensification of wars against Muslims all around the world is what characterizes the present-day situation. The 9/11 “terrorist” attacks were used as a reason for setting off the greatest manhunt in history. The worldwide operation almost succeeded at destroying the jihad’s leadership and virtually all its training camps and headquarters. Notwithstanding the fact that the only truly Islamic state, Afghanistan under Taliban rule, is now, according to him, occupied and under the control of the United States thanks to the established puppet state. In other words, victims of violence are not mainly Westerners but rather Muslims, which is why it is legitimate that they defend themselves when they have – rarely – the means to do so.

Indeed, al-Suri interprets the situation as being desperate. Moreover, he states that while there are more than a billion Muslims on earth, not more than a few thousand are willing to fight for their religion.

Having acknowledged this fact, al-Suri carries on with his reasoning laying emphasis on the fact that in spite of the enemy’s intensive attacks since 2001, the war is not definitely lost. As a jihad veteran, al-Suri suggests passing on to new generations of mujahidin a combat manual that could give them the means to reconstruct in such a way as to escape from the type of aggression lead by the coalition.

Here are in substance al-Suri’s propositions. First of all, according to al-Suri, jihadists made errors in three fields[8]:

1. Errors in curriculum and ideology;

2. Errors in structure and organization;

3. Errors in development methods and the way they were implemented.

The first type of error refers to dogmatism, a parochial approach and ignorance that damp down, paralyze and adversely affect the cause. This type of error also concerns culture of secrecy – even if sometimes necessary – sheds prejudice on communications and recruiting. To these two inconveniencies, are added the weakness of the exclusively military training that handicaps many mujahidin.

The second type of error essentially refers to the pyramidal structure of terrorist organization. In this configuration, the chain of command is perfectly clear, but there is an important weakness at the security level. When a member of the organization is arrested, the whole organization is destabilized. Al-Suri mentions, among other things, the use of torture and drugs by western intelligence services and their allies to obtain information and concludes that pyramidal-type structure cannot resist very long to the offensive lead by the West since 2001.

The third type of error refers to a series of work methods marked by amateurism, improvisation and demagogy.

But all along his explanations concerning the errors committed by the jihadist movement, al-Suri insists many times on issues related to ethics, which according to him has been the most important weakness of the movement in the past years:

“The many young men from the general and average classes of Muslims were charged with zeal, loyalty, and emotions, but they suffered from clear lack of religious knowledge and compliance as well as the rules of Islamic dealing and ethics. In addition, the cadres of jihad were suffering from lack of good knowledge in these areas. The lack of proper educational curricula led to severity and lack of mercy in the leaders of jihad”.[9]

Briefly said, it is useless to be overly zealous if incapable of discernment– and even pity when it is justified to do so. Al-Suri carries on:

“Likewise, the lack of good morals led jihadists to act in ganglike manner and not as proper jihadists. Also, most jihadists narrowed the Islamic religion to the concepts of jihad and forgot that there are other sides and aspects to Islam. They narrowed Islam to fighting, and fighting to just discharging firearms, forgetting the requirements of patience, preparation, and ethics”.[10]

al-Suri states that the lack of professionalism from which the jihadist movement suffers rests in the fact that 80% of its leaders have been either killed or arrested after the September 11 attacks, resulting, he concludes a little farther, in that the use of violence has become a matter of daily routine, an error he describes as follows :

“The appearance of the strictness during recent jihad incidents, with the adherence to violence and radicalism even in the most trivial matters.”[11]

Al-Suri questions the standard thinking by revolutionaries of all times which namely is that one must kill the enemy by all means, even legal. In this matter, he stands out from others, and from an ideological point of view, he rises above them – including Ben Laden, who is more of a calculator.

3. Opening new ways of ethical thinking?

Yet, one of the main errors identified by the author concerns the use of violence. Al-Suri insists on the importance of the moral element of mujahidin training. According to him, recourse to violence is necessary, but shouldn’t become an end in itself. His legitimating recourse to violence arises from the objective it serves - the ultimate victory of Islam in the World - which both transcends and justifies the means – violence.

Confronted with such a threat, the Western world has since 2001 reacted from a moral perspective in referring to Just War Theory. Not in the sense that the West would have fulfilled its imperatives, but rather in its attempt to justify its action by refereeing to it – most of the time implicitly.

Here are the essential elements of the Just War theory as summarized by the Canadian scholar Fen Olser Hampson:

1. Wars must [be] undertaken for a just cause in which the overriding principle is one of self-defence. A just cause therefore involves action taken in response to a physical injury (including loss of territory), an aggression against national honour, or an aggression against a neighbour.

2. Wars may be only undertaken as a form of last resort when all other means to seek redress have been exhausted.

3. Wars can only be waged by a legitimate authority, which is defined as residing in the sovereign power of the state.

4. Wars must only be undertaken following a formal declaration of war.

5. There must also be a reasonable chance or hope of success in resorting to the use of force to achieve one’s objectives. Deaths and injuries incurred in a hopeless cause are not morally justifiable.

6. The goal of war is re-establish peace and a peace that is, on balance, better than the peace (or situation), which would have prevailed, had the war not been fought.[12]

The terms of this theory cannot be applied to the threat that represents al-Suri’s strategy since it implies the relativity of the conflict between the two belligerent. Such being the case, here at least one of the two enemies considers its opponent as an absolute threat he needs not only to bring under military control on a one-time basis to gain a precise advantage, but the defeat must result in his annihilation.

The interference of religious motives in the political and ethical realms introduces the possibility of an absolute enemy. There is no politics without an enemy, but politics can recognize the enemy’s right to exist. This is not the case in wars of religion, where the enemy embodies an evil with whom any comprise is unacceptable[13].

A first conclusion seems to me that the comparison between Call to Global Islamic Resistance and Mein Kampf is – partially – awkward. It is true that there are numerous resemblances, but many of them are superficial. To the contrary, there are some fundamental discrepancies:

· The higher intellectual level of Call to Global Islamic Resistance gives al-Suri greater precision and a better assessment of the movement’s real situation and by that allowing the book to longer and deeper influence its strategy and tactics.

· The sincere religious fervor that inspired al-Suri deeply roots his undertaking in a tradition that is far more established than the chimeras that obsessed Hitler.

· The correct assessment on the importance of education, professionalism and ethics in military training make al-Suri’s text an even more dangerous weapon than Mein Kampf.

In the context of ultimate war, al-Suri’s strategy - based essentially on ethics and professionalism - seems to me, represents the greatest jihadist ideological threat. The fact that its author is presently held in an unknown location without him being able to communicate with the external world does not change anything to the reality of the threat. His work is independent from his person and it is now up to the West to take the initiative once again on the grounds that the jihad strategist has so well identified: professional military ethics.

Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu

January 2009

Bibliography

FREUND, Julien, L’essence du politique, Sirey, Paris, 1965.

HAMPSON, Fen Olser, “The Role of Ethics in the War Against Terrorism”, The 4^th Canadian Conference on Ethical Leadership, Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, 7-9 November 2001, p.4.

HITLER, Adolf, Mein Kampf, http://www.hitler.org/writings/Mein_Kampf/

IMBEAULT, Marc, MONTIFROY, Gérard, Géopolitique & Idéologies, Frison-Roche, Paris, 1996.

IMBEAULT, Marc, MONTIFROY, Gérard, Géopolitique & Pouvoirs, L’Âge d’Homme, Lausanne, 2003.

IMBEAULT, Marc, TROTTIER, Yves, Limites de la violence. Lecture d’Albert Camus, Presses de l’Université Laval, Sainte-Foy, 2006.

LACEY, Jim, editor, A Terrorist’s Call to Global Jihad. Deciphering Abu Musad al-Suri’s Islamic Jihad Manifesto, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 2008.

LACEY, Jim, editor, The Canons of Jihad. Terrorists’ Strategy for Defeating America, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 2008.

LIA, Brynjar, Architect of Global Jihad. The Life of al-Quaida Strategist Abu Mus‛ad al-Suri, Columbia University Press, New York, 2008.

MEM RI, Dossiers spéciaux No. 22, 17 novembre 2003, p.1. http://www.memri.org/bin/french/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sr&ID=SR2203

PHARES, Walid, Future Jihad. Terrorism Strategies Against the West, New York, Palmgrave Macmillan, 2005.

_____, The War of Ideas. Jihad Against Democracy. New York, Palmgrave Macmillan, 2007.

ROBESPIERRE, Maximilien, “On the Principles of Political Morality”, http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1794robespierre.html.

STOUT, Mark E., HUCKABEY, Jessica M., SCHINDLER, John R., LACEY, Jim, The Terrorist Perspectives Project. Strategic and Operational Views of Al Qaida and Associated Movements, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 2008.

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[1] “Communiqué from the Office of Abu Musad al Suri”, November 2004, in Lia Brynjar, Architect of Jihad. The Life of al-Quaida Strategist Abu Mus‛ad al-Suri, Columbia University Press, New York, 2008, p. 322.

[2] “Decades ago the world ignored Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf and Vladimir Lenin’s What Is to Be Done, with tragic consequences. Today, the jihadists have presented the world with a work of similar importance, which we ignore at our own peril.” Jim Lacey, A Terrorist’s Call to Global Jihad. Deciphering Abu Musad al-Suri’s Islamic Jihad Manifesto, Preface, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 2008, p. vi.

[3] « If virtue be the spring of a popular government in times of peace, the spring of that government during a revolution is virtue combined with terror: virtue, without which terror is destructive; terror, without which virtue is impotent. Terror is only justice prompt, severe and inflexible; it is then an emanation of virtue; it is less a distinct principle than a natural consequence of the general principle of democracy, applied to the most pressing wants of the country. » http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1794robespierre.html. The complete title in french is: Sur les principes de morale politique qui doivent guider la Convention nationale dans l’administration intérieure de la République.

[4] MEM RI, Dossiers spéciaux No. 22, 17 novembre 2003, p.1. http://www.memri.org/bin/french/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sr&ID=SR2203

[5] “As we have described earlier, there are many practical obstacles in establishing God’s rule on earth, such as the power of the state, the social system, and traditions and, in general, the whole human environment. Islam uses forces only to remove these obstacles so that there may not remain any wall between Islam and individual human beings.” Al Shaheed Sayyid Qutb, “Milestones”, The Canons of Jihad. Terrorists’ Strategy for Defeating America, Edited by Jim Lacey, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 2008, p. 24.

[6] “There is agreement among scholars that when the enemy enters an Islamic land or a land that was once part of the Islamic land, it is obligatory on the inhabitants of that place to go forth to face the enemy. But if they sit back, or are incapable, lazy, or insufficient in number, the individual obligation spreads to those around them. Then if they also fall short or sit back, it goes to those around them, and so on and so on, until the individually obligatory nature of jihad encompasses the whole world.” Sheikh Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, “Join the Caravan”, The Canons of Jihad, p. 126

[7] A Terrorist’s Call to Global Jihad, p. viii.

[8] A Terrorist’s Call to Global Jihad, p. 162

[9] A Terrorist’s Call to Global Jihad, p. 164.

[10] A Terrorist’s Call to Global Jihad, p. 164

[11] A Terrorist’s Call to Global Jihad, p. 170

[12] “The Role of Ethics in the War Against Terrorism”, The 4^th Canadian Conference on Ethical Leadership, Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, 7-9 November 2001, p.4. (Emphasis added.)

[13] On that point, I disagree with the view that the resolution of the conflict lies in the West consenting to requests set forth by Usama Bin Laden. It is undeniable that such a peacemaking effort would result in nothing else than fostering the idea that terrorism can be used as negotiating power.

Nobes Ends. Torture and the Ethics of Counter-Terrorism

Noble ends

Torture

And

the ethics of counter-terrorism

Marc Imbeault

Royal Military College Saint-Jean

“Let us leave aside all speculation about princes and look only at the realities.” [Translation]

Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, XV

The issue central to this presentation can be summarized in the following question: "What is the value of the moral justifications for the use of torture in the fight against terrorism?" The enemy facing the West has clearly stated that he would not shrink from using any means to achieve his ends. In a videotaped message broadcast just after the attacks of September 11, 2001, Osama Bin Laden explicitly threatened to destroy America. The many attacks that followed show that this warning must be taken seriously. It would accordingly be a serious mistake to minimize the threat that looms over America and over the West in general, in order to oppose the exceptional security measures taken by Western countries in the wake of September 11.

Terrorist organizations do not hesitate to justify the use of the most violent means, and they have no respect for the most fundamental human rights: for them, the end justifies the means.[1] The issue is whether Western countries, and specifically the United States, are justified in adopting a comparable stance and using morally reprehensible means such as disinformation, lies, corruption or torture to defend themselves. We will limit our discussion here to a single aspect of this issue: the use of torture in the interrogation of individuals suspected of terrorism.

I will leave aside for the moment the legal definitions of torture. Discussion of these definitions may be useful and important, but does not concern ethics as such. Ethical principles outweigh, if one can use the term, legal principles, and their field of application is broader. I will accordingly use the word "torture" in the context of interrogation sessions during which physical or psychological pain is inflicted on someone in order to obtain important information.

The ethical justification for the use of torture

in counter-terrorism

The justifications of torture generally have to do with the exceptional nature and urgency of the situation.

The exception

The exceptional nature of the fight against terrorism can be examined on two levels. The first concerns individual members of a terrorist organization. The second concerns the overall situation created by the use of terror.

Through membership in a terrorist organization, individuals place themselves in an exceptional situation in which the rights normally granted to prisoners of war cannot apply. Terrorists are not part of a regular army, and their operations are closer to those of spies than those of soldiers.[2] This is why terrorists are not considered combatants within the meaning normally used in the treaties and conventions banning torture. It would thus be normal for them to be treated differently from other combatants when captured. According to this approach, the type of action undertaken by terrorists – subversive strikes – exclude them de facto from the protection of treaties such as the Geneva Conventions. The same type of action, however, justifies the claim that they cannot receive the legal protection normally enjoyed by citizens in a state founded upon law. Terrorism itself is deemed to have created the global context that justifies the suspension of suspects' rights. Individuals suspected of being part of terrorism, or of assisting it in any way, thus no longer belong to humanity. It is therefore possible – and at times even necessary – to torture them if that makes it possible to obtain information.

Urgency

The prevention of terrorist attacks is also a matter of urgency. It may be that the investigators do not have much time to interrogate a suspect and that the use of torture is deemed to be the only way of obtaining information quickly. The example most often used is that of the ticking time bomb. In such a case, a serious, imminent threat would clearly justify the use of torture. It is important to prevent a bomb from exploding if it could kill thousands of people.

Many authors have used the rationales of urgency and of the exceptional nature of the fight against terrorism to justify torture. Here, I will discuss the argument used by a characteristic representative of this approach: "An Ethical Defense of Torture in Interrogation" by Fritz Allhoff[3]. In the same vein as Michael Levin and Alan Dershowitz, who justify torture when it is the only way of averting a serious, imminent threat, Allhoff offers a process of reflection on the conditions which can morally justify the use of this practice.[4]

In his article, Allhoff first maintains that torture must be placed in the context of a dilemma between the rights of the individuals being interrogated and those of the people one is trying to protect. To illustrate his idea, Allhoff asks us to imagine a police officer in a face-off with a gangster who is on the point of killing the five witnesses to one of his crimes. The police officer would be justified in opening fire on the gangster to save the witnesses, since the rights of the gangster are outweighed by their rights. This example clearly indicates that, in Allhoff's view, it is at times necessary to violate one right in order to defend another. In his view, the same is true in cases of the rights of terrorism suspects in relation to the rights of their potential victims.

“Therefore, I think that a strong case can be made for the idea that torture can be justified, even if it entails rights violations, so long as we find ourselves in such a quandary that rights will end up being broken whether torture occurs or not. In these situations, some rights violation is bound to occur regardless, so we might as well either serve the greater good or else aim to minimize the overall violation of rights…. Either goal suggests the permissibility of torture[5].”

Once torture in general is justified as a lesser evil in certain circumstances,[6] Allhoff wonders under what specific conditions it can be used. He identifies four which, if they are all met, could justify torturing a suspect in order to obtain information. He summarizes this contention as follows:

“I think that the conditions necessary to justify torture are: the use of torture aims at acquisition of information, the captive is reasonably thought to have the relevant information, the information corresponds to a significant and imminent threat, and the information could likely lead to the prevention of the threats. If all four of these conditions are satisfied, then torture would be morally permissible[7].”

In order to be able to assert that torture is legitimate, it must thus be used solely to obtain important information that would make it possible to forestall an imminent strike. It is also stated that there must be good reason to believe that the suspect who will be tortured does indeed have the information. Allhoff concludes this development with a description of a paradigmatic example:

“For example, imagine that we have just captured a high-ranking official with an internationally known terrorist group and that our intelligence has revealed that this group has planted a bomb in a crowded office building that will likely explode tomorrow. This explosion will generate excessive civilian casualties and economic expense. We have a bomb squad prepared to move on the location when it is given, and there is plenty of time for them to disarm the bomb before its explosion tomorrow. We have asked this official for the location of the bomb, and he has refused to give it. Given these circumstances (which satisfy all four of my criteria), I think that it would be justifiable to torture the official in order to obtain the location of the bomb[8].”

After identifying the conditions under which the use of torture is justified, the only remaining question is to specify what type of torture is acceptable. The principle that guides Allhoff here is that exaggerated means should not be used. He states, for example, that if merely depriving someone of a meal is enough to make him talk, it is not necessary – not morally acceptable – to pull out his nails. The rest is appropriate.

The excesses of abstract knowledge

The type of argumentation advanced by Allhoff has the value of highlighting the dilemma which could potentially be faced by current Western political leaders. However, the method he uses does not support conclusions of any kind regarding the morality of torture. This method is founded essentially on imagination and has validity only in an abstract world where theoreticians can define data as they wish, without referring to actual historical events other than in anecdotal form. Not that anecdotes are worthless; on the contrary, they may draw attention to an important aspect of a problem and in this sense play a not inconsiderable heuristic role.

Abstract scenarios also have the drawback of catching a thought "in a trap," so to speak, and dragging it to conclusions which run counter to the most fundamental intuitions, such as the revulsion we feel regarding the use of torture. To return to the examples put forward by Allhoff, it is clearly difficult to maintain that a police officer would be refused permission to shoot a gangster who was on the point of murdering five innocent people in a cowardly way. It is also difficult to claim that a high-ranking terrorist should not be tortured if he has crucial information that would prevent large-scale attacks. However, although it is possible to imagine such examples, they do not have much connection with reality. Allhoff's reasoning is accordingly valid from the point of view of pure logic, albeit fragile in terms of applied ethics. It presupposes that we know a priori (before the fact) what we in reality know only a posteriori (after the fact). We are routinely confronted with this confusion when we hear that such and such an incident could have been – and thus should have been – avoided. The police are often criticized for not having arrested a criminal before he or she committed a crime. However, the same police are equally often blamed for abusing their powers by making arbitrary arrests. The truth is that one cannot arrest everyone who poses a threat of committing an offence. (In other words, maybe everyone?) This is why the work of the security services more often resembles art than science. Basing ethical considerations on a "thought experiment" which is rooted as much in the imagination as in reality thus appears to be a risky undertaking, from both a theoretical and a practical standpoint.[9]

Let us take a concrete example which is familiar to everyone and has the advantage of being real: that of the attacks of September 11, 2001. Once they had occurred, it was fairly easy to demonstrate that they could have been avoided and to criticize the American security services as incompetent, stupid or naïve – to the point that some propagandists maintain that the attacks were desired by the American authorities themselves. Preventing them would in fact have been so easy that there was no explanation for how they could have occurred, other than with the complicity of the CIA or the FBI! Here, however, we must be careful not to confuse what is possible with what is real. The fact that something is a possibility does not make it a reality: that something is possible does not necessarily imply that it exists. The possibility that al‑Qaeda was conspiring to bring down the towers of the World Trade Center was serious; the fact that some people were taking flying lessons but had no interest in landing manœuvres was not, prior to September 11, 2001, a sufficient reason to arrest them. It must not be forgotten that the success of this operation lay precisely in the unheard-of nature of the attack and accordingly its element of surprise. The same attack would probably not be possible today, due to the simple fact that passengers on a hijacked aircraft no longer react as they reacted then to an attempted hijacking, precisely because of the attacks of September 11.

But even if torture is morally unjustifiable, could one not maintain that it may be politically justifiable, if one admits – and this is a theory that I endorse – that the political sphere is separate from the moral sphere?

The rejection of torture on the grounds that it is immoral does not mean that states must automatically prohibit the practice thereof. It is in fact impossible to reduce political activity to morality alone. There are specifically political imperatives under which the use of torture can be examined in a different light and, generally speaking, the use of morally repugnant expedients, such as lies, misinformation or corruption. At this point, I would like to conclude these thoughts in order to put into perspective what we have just asserted from a moral standpoint.

Violence: the quintessence of politics?

Analyzing the issue of torture from a political perspective means evaluating its relevance in terms of costs and benefits to society. Torture may then become one of the means used by power to achieve its ends. Is not violence central to politics?[10] There is truly a paradox between the specific means and the ends of politics: between peace or concord, which is the aim of politics, and the violence it uses to achieve that end.[11] The Prince, as Machiavelli said, must learn "to be evil, and use or not use this art, depending on necessity. [Translation]"[12] He must be at times a lion and at times a fox, meaning that he must use force and trickery wisely depending on the circumstances.

Drawing on the lessons of the past, Adam Roberts summarizes the current situation in the following passage:

“All societies encounter problems when fighting an invisible, brutal enemy who may have numerous secret sympathizers. Under such circumstances, most states, even democratic ones, use some form of imprisonment without trial. This entails serious risks: first, the risk of arresting and detaining the wrong people; second, that detainees are mistreated. In both cases, the danger lies in creating martyrs and thus feeding terrorism [Translation][13].”

As we have seen here, the analysis of torture benefits from being placed in a historical perspective. Alfred McCoy demonstrates convincingly in his book A Question of Torture[14] that this practice yields significant results only on a large scale. The Battle of Algiers provides a well-known instance of this. In 1957, the French army and intelligence services tortured thousands of people in the Algerian capital and managed to obtain sufficient valid information to nullify the attempted strikes by the terrorist organizations that were active at the time. These results were obtained by amassing substantiating information obtained through torture. It would undoubtedly have been possible to achieve this through other means, but that would have required the work of interrogators who were skilled, well trained and educated, whereas practitioners with very ordinary abilities proved sufficient to handle the traditional techniques characteristic of so-called "robust" interrogation. From this point of view, the use of torture is tempting and appears, at least at first sight, to be relatively inexpensive.

In order to correctly assess the cost of torture, however, both the short-term and long-term costs must be considered. In the short term, with the exception of doctors who can supervise the process and prevent premature death, torture can be carried out by personnel with little training and cheap instruments – such as the infamous gégène. The cost of torture is thus relatively low compared to the cost of training sophisticated interrogators and analysts who do not use such means to obtain information. It should not be forgotten, however, that torture comes with a high political cost. In the long term, the use of torture can have severe consequences for the troops of a country that engages in it, on those of the enemy and on public opinion.

Let us begin with the impact on the troops of the country concerned. It is pointless to authorize only a few individuals to carry out torture, for a limited period of time and with limited methods. Such authorizations have invariably presaged the swift generalization of torture throughout security systems, without which it is ineffective. The generalized use of torture, however, has a devastating effect on troops, the main problem being that the enemy, who is no longer regarded as a human being, is initially despised and then inevitably underestimated. This is one of the worst catastrophes that can befall a fighting organization.

Among the enemy, the use of torture intensifies the process of fanaticization that feeds the war. It is not difficult to understand the reaction of a people whose "children" are tortured. In the case of the Battle of Algiers, torture had the effect of dramatically exacerbating the resentment felt by Algerians toward all French people and broke off the last channels of communication which might perhaps have led to a moderate negotiated solution[15].

Ultimately, the most serious consequence of the use of torture is its effect on public opinion. The favourable light in which America was viewed by world public opinion in the wake of the September 11 attacks has given way to mistrust, even hatred, since the mistreatment to which prisoners have been subjected at Guantanamo in Cuba and at Abu Ghraib in Iraq became known. Controlling public opinion is not easy, and America is having difficulty refurbishing its image, despite the expenditure of millions of dollars. The same was true for France after the Battle of Algiers. Even today, the dishonour of the French torturers casts a shadow over the country's reputation.

While torture can accordingly not be excluded from the political arsenal, its very high cost in the medium and long term must be emphasized. The fact that the techniques used do not entail excessive expense masks the high cost associated with the political consequences of its use. Torture accordingly cannot be recommended, even from a strictly political standpoint. The first great counter-terrorism expert, Joseph Fouché, Duke of Otranto and Chief of Police under Napoleon, explicitly advised against it. On the other hand, unalloyed idealism can no more lead effectively to victory than can cynical realism. What is essential is the ability to manipulate both and to maintain a sense of proportion. Security systems that are based exclusively on benevolent humanism will be swiftly subverted by the enemy and they will be unable to anticipate threats or to neutralize them. It is thus essential to find a middle way between the two extremes, one of which would be a policy totally devoid of moral principles and the other a policy totally devoid of flexibility.

References

ALEM, Jean-Pierre. L’espionnage, histoire, méthodes, Paris, Lavauzelle, 1987.

ALLHOFF, Fritz. "An Ethical Defense of Torture in Interrogation," in Ethics of Spying, under the direction of Jan Goldman and Martin Gordon, Toronto, The Scarecrow Press, 2006, pp. 126-40.

FOUCHÉ, Joseph. Mémoires de Joseph Fouché duc d’Otrante, lecture by Michel Vovelle, Paris, Imprimerie nationale, 1992.

FREUND, Julien. L’essence du politique, Paris, Sirey, 1965.

IGNATIEFF, Michael. "Lesser Evils," website of the John F. Kennedy School of Government, www.ksg.harvard.edu.

IMBEAULT, Marc. "Emmanuel Kant: The Morality of Duty," in Philosophie: Éthique et politique, published under the supervision of Yvon Paillé, Laval, Études Vivantes, HRW, 1999, pp. 102‑3.

IMBEAULT, Marc, and MONTIFROY, Gérard. Géopolitique et pouvoirs, Lausanne, L’Âge d’Homme, 2003.

IMBEAULT, Marc, and TROTTIER, Yves. Limites de la violence, Québec City, Presses de l’Université Laval, 2006.

KANT, Emmanuel. "Of a claimed right to lie out of humanity," translated by Luc Ferry in Philosophical Works, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, Paris, Gallimard, 1985, vol. 3, pp. 433-41.

LA TOURANE, Sébastien de. Julien Freund: penseur « machiavélien » de la politique, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2004.

MACHIAVELLI, Niccolò. The Prince, French translation by Jean Anglade, Paris, Livre de Poche, 1972.

MADELIN, Louis. Fouché, 1759-1820, Paris, Plon, 1955.

McCOY, Alfred W. A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation, from the Cold War to the War on Terror. New York, Metropolitan Books, 2006.

PFAFF, Tony. "Bungee Jumping off the Moral Highground: Ethics of Espionage in the Modern Age," in Ethics of Spying, under the supervision of Jan Goldman and Martin Gordon, Toronto, The Scarecrow Press, 2006, pp. 66-103.

POSNER, Richard A. Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National Emergency, Oxford University Press, 2006.

RICOEUR, Paul. “Le paradoxe politique” [The Political Paradox], in Histoire et vérité, Paris, Seuil, 1955, pp. 260-85.

ROBERTS, Adam. "La ‘guerre contre le terrorisme’ dans une perspective historique" [the war on terror from a historical perspective], in Justifier la guerre? De l’humanitaire au contre-terrorisme, under the supervision of Gilles Andréani and Pierre Hassner, Paris, Presses de la fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 2005, p. 162.

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[1] The scenes of decapitation broadcast over the Internet demonstrate the barbarism of which terrorist organizations are capable. It should be noted that this behaviour is nothing new among those who engage in terror. The heads of the enemies of the French Revolution were displayed to the crowd after they had been guillotined. In the late 1980s, a CIA agent, William Buckley, was filmed being tortured to death by Hezbollah in Beirut. The videotapes were subsequently sent to U.S. embassies.

[2] Tony Pfaff, for example, supports the idea that those who decide to play the terrorists' game must expect to suffer the consequences, and that this anticipation itself constitutes the basis for a justification of the methods employed by the security services. Pfaff does not, however, go so far as to explicitly justify the use of torture. Cf. "Bungee Jumping off the Moral Highground: Ethics of Espionage in the Modern Age," in Ethics of Spying, Toronto, The Scarecrow Press, 2006, pp. 66-103.

[3] Allhoff, Fritz, "An Ethical Defense of Torture in Interrogation," Ethics of Spying, pp. 126-40.

[4] Richard Posner advocates an interpretation of the U.S. Constitution that opens the door to the use of torture in the counter-terrorism context. He maintains that it may be justifiable from a moral and political standpoint. Cf. Posner, Richard, Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National Emergency, Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 9-10.

[5] Ethics of Spying, p. 132.

[6] In the same vein, there is the article by Michael Ignatieff entitled "Lesser Evils," available on the website of the John F. Kennedy School of Government, www.ksg.harvard.edu.

[7] Ethics of Spying, p. 134.

[8] Ethics of Spying, p. 134.

[9] The argument based on a probability of a future good is also inherently based on a serious ethical problem. In an article entitled "Of a claimed right to lie out of humanity," Kant answered one of his critics, Benjamin Constant, who maintained that duties were not absolute and that exceptions were necessary in order to make life in society possible. Constant maintained, a little like Allhoff, that brigands should not have the same rights as others, specifically with regard to the truth. He accordingly suggested that it was acceptable to lie to one of them if the lie could avert a greater evil – such as murder. Kant rightly notes that telling the truth to a criminal would not necessarily entail a crime, whereas the fact of lying – to anyone – always constitutes wrongdoing. The obligation to tell the truth is a categorical imperative of universal validity. Kant continues that lies are themselves a crime and that the fact of trying to justify one by hypotheses about what will happen if it is not committed has no moral value. He concludes by affirming that the fact of lying ruins a community's trust, which is basic to all contracts and that it accordingly destroys society instead of making it possible, as Constant recommended. This conclusion has the advantage of being clear and simple. Cf. Kant, Emmanuel, "Of a claimed right to lie out of humanity," translated by Luc Ferry in Philosophical Works, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, Paris, Gallimard, 1985, vol. 3, pp. 433-41. For a more detailed discussion of this volume, readers are referred to the chapter entitled "Emmanuel Kant: The Morality of Duty," in Philosophie: Éthique et politique, published under the supervision of Yvon Paillé, Laval, Études Vivantes, HRW, 1999, pp. 102-3.

[10] This question refers to a statement to that effect by Julien Freud in L’essence du politique, (Paris: Sirey, 1965).

[11] Paul Ricœur, "Le paradoxe politique" in Histoire et vérité, (Paris: Seuil, 1955), 260-85.

[12] Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, translated into French by Jean Anglade, (Paris: Livre de Poche, 1972), 80.

[13] Adam Roberts, "La ‘guerre contre le terrorisme’ dans une perspective historique," in Justifier la guerre ? De l’humanitaire au contre-terrorisme, Gilles Andréani and Pierre Hassner, eds., (Paris :Presses de la fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 2005), 162.

[14] Alfred W McCoy, A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation, from the Cold War to the War on Terror. (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006).

[15] We have discussed elsewhere the causes and consequences of the Algerian war and the justifications of violence generated by that war. See : Marc Imbeault and Gérard A. Montifroy, Géopolitique et pouvoirs, (Lausanne: L’Âge d’Homme, 2003). Also : Marc Imbeault and Yves Trottier. Limites de la violence, (Quebec City : Presses de l’Université Laval, 2006).