2 avril 2011

Riposte à l'autodafé du Coran

PhiGéo
Huit employés étrangers de l’ONU ont été tués dans l’attaque de leurs bureaux par des manifestants à Mazar-I-Sharif, en Afghanistan, a annoncé un porte-parole de la police régionale. Deux d’entre eux ont été décapité, a-t-il précisé plus tard. Selon les informations de l’AFP, cinq gardes népalais, employés par l’ONU, font partie des victimes. Trois manifestants afghans auraient également été tués.
Un porte-parole de l’ONU à New York a confirmé l’attaque, indiquant qu’il y avait “des morts” dans les rangs de l’ONU, sans en préciser le nombre.
Une manifestation pour protester contre l’autodafé récent d’un Coran aux Etats-Unis a mal tourné. La manifestation a commencé vers 13h30, après la traditionnelle prière du vendredi, et les manifestants ont attaqué le siège de l’Unama (Mission d’assistance de l’ONU en Afghanistan) aux environs de 15 heures, avant d’y pénétrer, selon le porte-parole de la police.
Mazar-I-Sharif est l’une des sept zones choisies par le président Hamid Karzaï et la coalition internationale pour inaugurer le processus dit de “transition”. Les forces étrangères y transmettront la responsabilité de la sécurité dès le 1er juillet aux forces afghanes.

Source : Afp-Europe1 

THERESE ZRIHEN-DVIR, Regard d'un Ecrivain sur le Monde -

Tripoli rejette une offre de cessez-le-feu des insurgés - L'Express

PhiGéo


La situation en Libye se complexifie avec le rejet des offres de cessez-le-feu par le colonel Kadhafi.La désorganisation des rebelles compense la supériorité qu'apporte les bombardements des alliés. Un bras de fer s'engage...

1 avril 2011

Noble Ends: Torture and The Ethics of Counter-Terrorism

PhiGéo


Noble ends: Torture And the ethics of counter-terrorism

Marc Imbeault
Royal Military College Saint-Jean


In Daniel Lagacé-Roy and Bernd Horn (Eds.),
The War on Terror – Ethical Considerations
(2008) Proceedings from the 7th Canadian Conference on Ethical Leadership held at the Royal Military College of Canada, 28-29 November 2006, Volume I, Winnipeg, Canadian Academy Press, 2008, pp. 97-106.


“Let us leave aside all speculation about princes and look only at the realities.” [Translation]
       Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, XV

The issue central to this presentation can be summarized in the following question: "What is the value of the moral justifications for the use of torture in the fight against terrorism?" The enemy facing the West has clearly stated that he would not shrink from using any means to achieve his ends. In a videotaped message broadcast just after the attacks of September 11, 2001, Osama Bin Laden explicitly threatened to destroy America. The many attacks that followed show that this warning must be taken seriously. It would accordingly be a serious mistake to minimize the threat that looms over America and over the West in general, in order to oppose the exceptional security measures taken by Western countries in the wake of September 11. 

Terrorist organizations do not hesitate to justify the use of the most violent means, and they have no respect for the most fundamental human rights: for them, the end justifies the means.[1] The issue is whether Western countries, and specifically the United States, are justified in adopting a comparable stance and using morally reprehensible means such as disinformation, lies, corruption or torture to defend themselves. We will limit our discussion here to a single aspect of this issue: the use of torture in the interrogation of individuals suspected of terrorism.

I will leave aside for the moment the legal definitions of torture. Discussion of these definitions may be useful and important, but does not concern ethics as such. Ethical principles outweigh, if one can use the term, legal principles, and their field of application is broader. I will accordingly use the word "torture" in the context of interrogation sessions during which physical or psychological pain is inflicted on someone in order to obtain important information.


The ethical justification for the use of torture
in counter-terrorism


The justifications of torture generally have to do with the exceptional nature and urgency of the situation. 

The exception

The exceptional nature of the fight against terrorism can be examined on two levels. The first concerns individual members of a terrorist organization. The second concerns the overall situation created by the use of terror.

Through membership in a terrorist organization, individuals place themselves in an exceptional situation in which the rights normally granted to prisoners of war cannot apply. Terrorists are not part of a regular army, and their operations are closer to those of spies than those of soldiers.[2] This is why terrorists are not considered combatants within the meaning normally used in the treaties and conventions banning torture. It would thus be normal for them to be treated differently from other combatants when captured. According to this approach, the type of action undertaken by terrorists – subversive strikes – exclude them de facto from the protection of treaties such as the Geneva Conventions. The same type of action, however, justifies the claim that they cannot receive the legal protection normally enjoyed by citizens in a state founded upon law. Terrorism itself is deemed to have created the global context that justifies the suspension of suspects' rights. Individuals suspected of being part of terrorism, or of assisting it in any way, thus no longer belong to humanity. It is therefore possible – and at times even necessary – to torture them if that makes it possible to obtain information.

Urgency

The prevention of terrorist attacks is also a matter of urgency. It may be that the investigators do not have much time to interrogate a suspect and that the use of torture is deemed to be the only way of obtaining information quickly. The example most often used is that of the ticking time bomb. In such a case, a serious, imminent threat would clearly justify the use of torture. It is important to prevent a bomb from exploding if it could kill thousands of people.

Many authors have used the rationales of urgency and of the exceptional nature of the fight against terrorism to justify torture. Here, I will discuss the argument used by a characteristic representative of this approach: "An Ethical Defense of Torture in Interrogation" by Fritz Allhoff[3]. In the same vein as Michael Levin and Alan Dershowitz, who justify torture when it is the only way of averting a serious, imminent threat, Allhoff offers a process of reflection on the conditions which can morally justify the use of this practice.[4]

In his article, Allhoff first maintains that torture must be placed in the context of a dilemma between the rights of the individuals being interrogated and those of the people one is trying to protect. To illustrate his idea, Allhoff asks us to imagine a police officer in a face-off with a gangster who is on the point of killing the five witnesses to one of his crimes. The police officer would be justified in opening fire on the gangster to save the witnesses, since the rights of the gangster are outweighed by their rights. This example clearly indicates that, in Allhoff's view, it is at times necessary to violate one right in order to defend another. In his view, the same is true in cases of the rights of terrorism suspects in relation to the rights of their potential victims.

“Therefore, I think that a strong case can be made for the idea that torture can be justified, even if it entails rights violations, so long as we find ourselves in such a quandary that rights will end up being broken whether torture occurs or not. In these situations, some rights violation is bound to occur regardless, so we might as well either serve the greater good or else aim to minimize the overall violation of rights…. Either goal suggests the permissibility of torture[5].”

Once torture in general is justified as a lesser evil in certain circumstances,[6] Allhoff wonders under what specific conditions it can be used. He identifies four which, if they are all met, could justify torturing a suspect in order to obtain information. He summarizes this contention as follows:

“I think that the conditions necessary to justify torture are: the use of torture aims at acquisition of information, the captive is reasonably thought to have the relevant information, the information corresponds to a significant and imminent threat, and the information could likely lead to the prevention of the threats. If all four of these conditions are satisfied, then torture would be morally permissible[7].”

In order to be able to assert that torture is legitimate, it must thus be used solely to obtain important information that would make it possible to forestall an imminent strike. It is also stated that there must be good reason to believe that the suspect who will be tortured does indeed have the information. Allhoff concludes this development with a description of a paradigmatic example:

“For example, imagine that we have just captured a high-ranking official with an internationally known terrorist group and that our intelligence has revealed that this group has planted a bomb in a crowded office building that will likely explode tomorrow. This explosion will generate excessive civilian casualties and economic expense. We have a bomb squad prepared to move on the location when it is given, and there is plenty of time for them to disarm the bomb before its explosion tomorrow. We have asked this official for the location of the bomb, and he has refused to give it. Given these circumstances (which satisfy all four of my criteria), I think that it would be justifiable to torture the official in order to obtain the location of the bomb[8].”

After identifying the conditions under which the use of torture is justified, the only remaining question is to specify what type of torture is acceptable. The principle that guides Allhoff here is that exaggerated means should not be used. He states, for example, that if merely depriving someone of a meal is enough to make him talk, it is not necessary – not morally acceptable – to pull out his nails. The rest is appropriate.


The excesses of abstract knowledge


The type of argumentation advanced by Allhoff has the value of highlighting the dilemma which could potentially be faced by current Western political leaders. However, the method he uses does not support conclusions of any kind regarding the morality of torture. This method is founded essentially on imagination and has validity only in an abstract world where theoreticians can define data as they wish, without referring to actual historical events other than in anecdotal form. Not that anecdotes are worthless; on the contrary, they may draw attention to an important aspect of a problem and in this sense play a not inconsiderable heuristic role.

Abstract scenarios also have the drawback of catching a thought "in a trap," so to speak, and dragging it to conclusions which run counter to the most fundamental intuitions, such as the revulsion we feel regarding the use of torture. To return to the examples put forward by Allhoff, it is clearly difficult to maintain that a police officer would be refused permission to shoot a gangster who was on the point of murdering five innocent people in a cowardly way. It is also difficult to claim that a high-ranking terrorist should not be tortured if he has crucial information that would prevent large-scale attacks. However, although it is possible to imagine such examples, they do not have much connection with reality. Allhoff's reasoning is accordingly valid from the point of view of pure logic, albeit fragile in terms of applied ethics. It presupposes that we know a priori (before the fact) what we in reality know only a posteriori (after the fact). We are routinely confronted with this confusion when we hear that such and such an incident could have been – and thus should have been – avoided. The police are often criticized for not having arrested a criminal before he or she committed a crime. However, the same police are equally often blamed for abusing their powers by making arbitrary arrests. The truth is that one cannot arrest everyone who poses a threat of committing an offence. (In other words, maybe everyone?) This is why the work of the security services more often resembles art than science. Basing ethical considerations on a "thought experiment" which is rooted as much in the imagination as in reality thus appears to be a risky undertaking, from both a theoretical and a practical standpoint.[9]

Let us take a concrete example which is familiar to everyone and has the advantage of being real: that of the attacks of September 11, 2001. Once they had occurred, it was fairly easy to demonstrate that they could have been avoided and to criticize the American security services as incompetent, stupid or naïve – to the point that some propagandists maintain that the attacks were desired by the American authorities themselves. Preventing them would in fact have been so easy that there was no explanation for how they could have occurred, other than with the complicity of the CIA or the FBI!  Here, however, we must be careful not to confuse what is possible with what is real. The fact that something is a possibility does not make it a reality: that something is possible does not necessarily imply that it exists. The possibility that al‑Qaeda was conspiring to bring down the towers of the World Trade Center was serious; the fact that some people were taking flying lessons but had no interest in landing manœuvres was not, prior to September 11, 2001, a sufficient reason to arrest them. It must not be forgotten that the success of this operation lay precisely in the unheard-of nature of the attack and accordingly its element of surprise. The same attack would probably not be possible today, due to the simple fact that passengers on a hijacked aircraft no longer react as they reacted then to an attempted hijacking, precisely because of the attacks of September 11. 

But even if torture is morally unjustifiable, could one not maintain that it may be politically justifiable, if one admits – and this is a theory that I endorse – that the political sphere is separate from the moral sphere?

The rejection of torture on the grounds that it is immoral does not mean that states must automatically prohibit the practice thereof. It is in fact impossible to reduce political activity to morality alone. There are specifically political imperatives under which the use of torture can be examined in a different light and, generally speaking, the use of morally repugnant expedients, such as lies, misinformation or corruption. At this point, I would like to conclude these thoughts in order to put into perspective what we have just asserted from a moral standpoint. 


Violence: the quintessence of politics?


Analyzing the issue of torture from a political perspective means evaluating its relevance in terms of costs and benefits to society. Torture may then become one of the means used by power to achieve its ends. Is not violence central to politics?[10] There is truly a paradox between the specific means and the ends of politics: between peace or concord, which is the aim of politics, and the violence it uses to achieve that end.[11] The Prince, as Machiavelli said, must learn "to be evil, and use or not use this art, depending on necessity. [Translation]"[12]  He must be at times a lion and at times a fox, meaning that he must use force and trickery wisely depending on the circumstances.

Drawing on the lessons of the past, Adam Roberts summarizes the current situation in the following passage:

“All societies encounter problems when fighting an invisible, brutal enemy who may have numerous secret sympathizers. Under such circumstances, most states, even democratic ones, use some form of imprisonment without trial. This entails serious risks: first, the risk of arresting and detaining the wrong people; second, that detainees are mistreated. In both cases, the danger lies in creating martyrs and thus feeding terrorism [Translation][13].”

As we have seen here, the analysis of torture benefits from being placed in a historical perspective. Alfred McCoy demonstrates convincingly in his book A Question of Torture[14] that this practice yields significant results only on a large scale. The Battle of Algiers provides a well-known instance of this. In 1957, the French army and intelligence services tortured thousands of people in the Algerian capital and managed to obtain sufficient valid information to nullify the attempted strikes by the terrorist organizations that were active at the time. These results were obtained by amassing substantiating information obtained through torture. It would undoubtedly have been possible to achieve this through other means, but that would have required the work of interrogators who were skilled, well trained and educated, whereas practitioners with very ordinary abilities proved sufficient to handle the traditional techniques characteristic of so-called "robust" interrogation. From this point of view, the use of torture is tempting and appears, at least at first sight, to be relatively inexpensive.

In order to correctly assess the cost of torture, however, both the short-term and long-term costs must be considered.  In the short term, with the exception of doctors who can supervise the process and prevent premature death, torture can be carried out by personnel with little training and cheap instruments – such as the infamous gégène. The cost of torture is thus relatively low compared to the cost of training sophisticated interrogators and analysts who do not use such means to obtain information. It should not be forgotten, however, that torture comes with a high political cost. In the long term, the use of torture can have severe consequences for the troops of a country that engages in it, on those of the enemy and on public opinion.

Let us begin with the impact on the troops of the country concerned. It is pointless to authorize only a few individuals to carry out torture, for a limited period of time and with limited methods. Such authorizations have invariably presaged the swift generalization of torture throughout security systems, without which it is ineffective. The generalized use of torture, however, has a devastating effect on troops, the main problem being that the enemy, who is no longer regarded as a human being, is initially despised and then inevitably underestimated. This is one of the worst catastrophes that can befall a fighting organization.

Among the enemy, the use of torture intensifies the process of fanaticization that feeds the war. It is not difficult to understand the reaction of a people whose "children" are tortured. In the case of the Battle of Algiers, torture had the effect of dramatically exacerbating the resentment felt by Algerians toward all French people and broke off the last channels of communication which might perhaps have led to a moderate negotiated solution[15].

Ultimately, the most serious consequence of the use of torture is its effect on public opinion. The favourable light in which America was viewed by world public opinion in the wake of the September 11 attacks has given way to mistrust, even hatred, since the mistreatment to which prisoners have been subjected at Guantanamo in Cuba and at Abu Ghraib in Iraq became known. Controlling public opinion is not easy, and America is having difficulty refurbishing its image, despite the expenditure of millions of dollars. The same was true for France after the Battle of Algiers. Even today, the dishonour of the French torturers casts a shadow over the country's reputation.

While torture can accordingly not be excluded from the political arsenal, its very high cost in the medium and long term must be emphasized. The fact that the techniques used do not entail excessive expense masks the high cost associated with the political consequences of its use. Torture accordingly cannot be recommended, even from a strictly political standpoint. The first great counter-terrorism expert, Joseph Fouché, Duke of Otranto and Chief of Police under Napoleon, explicitly advised against it. On the other hand, unalloyed idealism can no more lead effectively to victory than can cynical realism. What is essential is the ability to manipulate both and to maintain a sense of proportion. Security systems that are based exclusively on benevolent humanism will be swiftly subverted by the enemy and they will be unable to anticipate threats or to neutralize them. It is thus essential to find a middle way between the two extremes, one of which would be a policy totally devoid of moral principles and the other a policy totally devoid of flexibility.


References

ALEM, Jean-Pierre. L’espionnage, histoire, méthodes, Paris, Lavauzelle, 1987.

ALLHOFF, Fritz. "An Ethical Defense of Torture in Interrogation," in Ethics of Spying, under the direction of Jan Goldman and Martin Gordon, Toronto, The Scarecrow Press, 2006, pp. 126-40.

FOUCHÉ, Joseph. Mémoires de Joseph Fouché duc d’Otrante, lecture by Michel Vovelle, Paris, Imprimerie nationale, 1992.

FREUND, Julien. L’essence du politique, Paris, Sirey, 1965.

IGNATIEFF, Michael. "Lesser Evils," website of the John F. Kennedy School of Government, www.ksg.harvard.edu.

IMBEAULT, Marc. "Emmanuel Kant: The Morality of Duty," in Philosophie: Éthique et politique, published under the supervision of Yvon Paillé, Laval, Études Vivantes, HRW, 1999, pp. 102‑3.

IMBEAULT, Marc, and MONTIFROY, Gérard. Géopolitique et pouvoirs,  Lausanne, L’Âge d’Homme, 2003.

IMBEAULT, Marc, and TROTTIER, Yves. Limites de la violence, Québec City, Presses de l’Université Laval, 2006.

KANT, Emmanuel. "Of a claimed right to lie out of humanity," translated by Luc Ferry in   Philosophical Works, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, Paris, Gallimard, 1985, vol. 3, pp. 433-41.

LA TOURANE, Sébastien de. Julien Freund : penseur « machiavélien » de la politique, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2004.

MACHIAVELLI, Niccolò. The Prince, French translation by Jean Anglade, Paris, Livre de Poche, 1972.

MADELIN, Louis. Fouché, 1759-1820, Paris, Plon, 1955.

McCOY, Alfred W.  A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation, from the Cold War to the War on Terror. New York, Metropolitan Books, 2006.

PFAFF, Tony. "Bungee Jumping off the Moral Highground: Ethics of Espionage in the Modern Age," in Ethics of Spying, under the supervision of Jan Goldman and Martin Gordon, Toronto, The Scarecrow Press, 2006, pp. 66-103.

POSNER, Richard A. Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National Emergency, Oxford University Press, 2006.

RICOEUR, Paul. “Le paradoxe politique” [The Political Paradox], in Histoire et vérité, Paris, Seuil, 1955, pp. 260-85.

ROBERTS, Adam. "La ‘guerre contre le terrorisme’ dans une perspective historique" [the war on terror from a historical perspective], in Justifier la guerre? De l’humanitaire au contre-terrorisme, under the supervision of Gilles Andréani and Pierre Hassner, Paris, Presses de la fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 2005, p. 162.


[1] The scenes of decapitation broadcast over the Internet demonstrate the barbarism of which terrorist organizations are capable. It should be noted that this behaviour is nothing new among those who engage in terror. The heads of the enemies of the French Revolution were displayed to the crowd after they had been guillotined. In the late 1980s, a CIA agent, William Buckley, was filmed being tortured to death by Hezbollah in Beirut. The videotapes were subsequently sent to U.S. embassies.
[2] Tony Pfaff, for example, supports the idea that those who decide to play the terrorists' game must expect to suffer the consequences, and that this anticipation itself constitutes the basis for a justification of the methods employed by the security services. Pfaff does not, however, go so far as to explicitly justify the use of torture. Cf. "Bungee Jumping off the Moral Highground: Ethics of Espionage in the Modern Age," in Ethics of Spying, Toronto, The Scarecrow Press, 2006, pp. 66-103.
[3] Allhoff, Fritz, "An Ethical Defense of Torture in Interrogation," Ethics of Spying, pp. 126-40.
[4] Richard Posner advocates an interpretation of the U.S. Constitution that opens the door to the use of torture in the counter-terrorism context. He maintains that it may be justifiable from a moral and political standpoint. Cf. Posner, Richard, Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National Emergency, Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 9-10.
[5] Ethics of Spying, p. 132.
[6] In the same vein, there is the article by Michael Ignatieff entitled "Lesser Evils," available on the website of the John F. Kennedy School of Government, www.ksg.harvard.edu.
[7] Ethics of Spying, p. 134.
[8] Ethics of Spying, p. 134.
[9] The argument based on a probability of a future good is also inherently based on a serious ethical problem. In an article entitled "Of a claimed right to lie out of humanity," Kant answered one of his critics, Benjamin Constant, who maintained that duties were not absolute and that exceptions were necessary in order to make life in society possible. Constant maintained, a little like Allhoff, that brigands should not have the same rights as others, specifically with regard to the truth. He accordingly suggested that it was acceptable to lie to one of them if the lie could avert a greater evil – such as murder. Kant rightly notes that telling the truth to a criminal would not necessarily entail a crime, whereas the fact of lying – to anyone – always constitutes wrongdoing. The obligation to tell the truth is a categorical imperative of universal validity. Kant continues that lies are themselves a crime and that the fact of trying to justify one by hypotheses about what will happen if it is not committed has no moral value. He concludes by affirming that the fact of lying ruins a community's trust, which is basic to all contracts and that it accordingly destroys society instead of making it possible, as Constant recommended. This conclusion has the advantage of being clear and simple. Cf. Kant, Emmanuel, "Of a claimed right to lie out of humanity," translated by Luc Ferry in Philosophical Works, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, Paris, Gallimard, 1985, vol. 3, pp. 433-41. For a more detailed discussion of this volume, readers are referred to the chapter entitled "Emmanuel Kant: The Morality of Duty," in Philosophie: Éthique et politique, published under the supervision of Yvon Paillé, Laval, Études Vivantes, HRW, 1999, pp. 102-3.
[10] This question refers to a statement to that effect by Julien Freud in L’essence du politique, (Paris: Sirey, 1965). 
[11] Paul Ricœur, "Le paradoxe politique" in Histoire et vérité, (Paris: Seuil, 1955), 260-85.
[12] Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, translated into French by Jean Anglade, (Paris: Livre de Poche, 1972), 80.
[13] Adam Roberts, "La ‘guerre contre le terrorisme’ dans une perspective historique," in Justifier la guerre ? De l’humanitaire au contre-terrorisme, Gilles Andréani and Pierre Hassner, eds., (Paris :Presses de la fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 2005), 162.
[14] Alfred W McCoy, A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation, from the Cold War to the War on Terror. (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006).

[15] We have discussed elsewhere the causes and consequences of the Algerian war and the justifications of violence generated by that war. See : Marc Imbeault and Gérard A. Montifroy, Géopolitique et pouvoirs, (Lausanne: L’Âge d’Homme, 2003). Also : Marc Imbeault and Yves Trottier. Limites de la violence, (Quebec City : Presses de l’Université Laval, 2006).

Photograpies du Sénégal et du Mali

PhiGéo


Vous trouverez une sélection de photos récentes de Dakar et de Bamako et de ses environ sur ma page FaceBook. Il suffit de cliquer sur le badge FaceBook situé sur la colonne de droite pour avoir accès à ma page.

18 mars 2011

Arab Uprisings Cast Harsh Light on C.I.A. Relationships / Les relations douteuses de la CIA avec les dictatures

PhiGéo

Les soulèvements populaires dans le monde arabe pourraient-ils être l'occasion de mettre un frein aux relations entre les services secrets américains et les dictatures... Il est, en effet, pour le moins gênant de voir - par exemple - la plus grande démocratie du monde empêtrée dans un programme d'échanges de prisonniers avec les pires "voyous politiques" de la planète. En s'appuyant sur des régimes autoritaires, l'Occident, en plus de se déshonorer, donne aux extrémistes un puissant instrument de propagande (dont ils se servent d'ailleurs habilement). 
A-t-on bien calculer l'intérêt de l'Occident en aidant tous ces dictateurs à se maintenir ?

11 mars 2011

Nouvelle fatwa contre les poulets Doux, KFC, Carrefour et assimilés

PhiGéo

Une controverse est en train de se développer sur le "faux" halal fabriqué en France et exporté dans le monde arabe, notamment en Arabie Saoudite. L'article de Al Kanz cite une fatwa qui n'est pas aussi sévère que le titre du texte le laisse entendre mais qui, par contre, n'est pas sans rappeler les prouesses des anciens savants scolastiques.

Nouvelle fatwa contre les poulets Doux, KFC, Carrefour et assimil�s

Websites for Counter-Terrorism Research / Liens sur le contre-terrorisme

PhiGéo


Dans le premier numéro du 5e volume de Perspectives on Terrorism se trouve une compilation commenté des principaux sites web sur le terrorisme et le contre-terrorisme. Voici le résumé de l'article :



"Since 9/11 the field of (Counter-) Terrorism Studies has expanded exponentially. With the simultaneous expansion of  Internet-based resources, it has become almost impossible to maintain an overview of the field – the more so  as a variety of sub-fields have emerged, dealing with specific aspects of the phenomenon of terrorism. Any researcher dealing with (counter-)terrorism issues on a regular basis would be aided by a guide of web links directing him or her to areas relevant for particular research needs. However, since the knowledge requirements of researchers differ, there can be no universal list that satisfies  all.[1]  The following short list is admittedly subjective, serving my individual research needs. They are all from Open Sources. I have grouped them in 15 fairly general categories; much more specialised categories could be selected. By visiting these sites and exploring what is available on each of them, the reader might get further ideas as to where to look to satisfy his or her specific needs. Most of these websites have their own list of additional web resources which can also be very useful. In the following, I will introduce each category with some explanatory notes."

Excellent outil de travail pour tous ceux qui s'intéressent au sujet.

7 mars 2011

Kadhafi au Journal du Dimanche

PhiGéo



Kadhafi soutient qu’il y avait des cellules dormantes d’Al-Qaïda en Lybie et qu’elles ont fait surface lors de la révolution de jasmin. Les membres de ces cellules dormantes ont d’après lui donnés des pilules halucinogènes aux jeunes libyens. Ces derniers ont pris goût à ces pilules. Les terroristes ont également attaqués les casernes et les postes de polices pour s’emparer des armes et les distribués aux jeunes qu'ils ont drogués... C’est ce qui se serait passé à Benghazi et Al-Baida notamment. «Les leaders de ces cellules venaient d’Irak, d’Afghanistan ou même d’Algérie. Certains ont été relâchés de la prison de Guantanamo. » 


C'est pourquoi Khadafi prétend combattre le terrorisme en Lybie. Il prétend ne pas s'en prendre à son peuple mais aux membres des cellules terroristes d'Al-Quaïda. S'il y a eu des victimes civiles, ce uniquement à titre de dommages collatéraux, comme pour les Occidentaux en Irak ou en Afghanistan. 

Il met en garde l’Europe contre l’immigration de milliers de gens et l’installation de Ben Laden chez lui si jamais il tombait :

« Le régime ici, en Libye, va bien. Il est stable. Je veux bien me faire comprendre: si on menace, si on déstabilise, on ira à la confusion, à Ben Laden, à des groupuscules armés. Voilà ce qui va arriver. Vous aurez l’immigration, des milliers de gens qui iront envahir l’Europe depuis la Libye. Et il n’y aura plus personne pour les arrêter. Ben Laden viendra s’installer en Afrique du Nord et laissera le mollah Omar en Afghanistan et au Pakistan. Vous aurez Ben Laden à vos portes. [...] En Tunisie et en Égypte il y a un vide politique. Les islamistes peuvent déjà entrer par là. Il y aura un djihad islamique en face de vous, en Méditerranée. Ils attaqueront la 6e flotte américaine, il y a aura des actes de piraterie ici, à vos portes, à 50 km de vos frontières. Les gens de Ben Laden viendront imposer des rançons sur terre, et sur mer. On reviendra au temps de Barberousse, des pirates, des Ottomans qui imposaient des rançons sur les bateaux. Ce sera vraiment une crise mondiale et une catastrophe pour tout le monde. Cette catastrophe va s’étendre du Pakistan, de l’Afghanistan, et viendra jusqu’en Afrique du Nord. » 

5 mars 2011

Yemeni Cleric's Online Jihad Continues / Al-Awlaki toujours diffusé par YouTube

PhiGéo

Les vidéos d'Al-Awlaki prônant le jihad contre les États-Unis et où il affirme, par exemple, que les citoyens américains sont des cibles d'attaques légitimes sont toujours disponibles sur YouTube.

4 mars 2011

Popular Movements and the Role of al-Qaeda / Al-Qaida et les soulèvements populaires

PhiGéo


Jamestown Foundation Special Commentary - 3 March 2011


Dans ce texte de Murad Batal al-Shishani il apparaît assez clairement que les mouvements sociaux à l'oeuvre actuellement dans le monde arabe sont à la fois une bénédiction et une interrogation pour les leaders du jihad. L'auteur cite, par exemple, Ayman al-Zawahiri et d'autres idéologues pour montrer comment la ruine des régimes qui assuraient la stabilité (autrement dit, selon eux, la continuité de l'emprise de l'Occident) est une bonne chose de leur point de vue. Mais, il montre aussi comment les valeurs et les comportements de la jeunesse qui a renversé ces mêmes régimes sont différents de leur valeurs et de leur comportements.


Il y a cependant encore plusieurs points d'ombres. La confusion qui règne sur le terrain ne permet pas encore de juger de la validité de la conclusion principale de l'auteur. Celle-ci consiste dire que les craintes d'une reprise en main par les islamistes est un mythe puisque la jeunesse éduqué de la classe moyenne qui a menée la "révolution" ne peut pas s'y laisser prendre. À suivre.
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Popular Movements in the Middle East and the Role of al-Qaeda


In light of recent developments in the Arab political scene, Salafi-jihadists have been notably absent from the major uprisings taking place namely the "Jasmine Revolution" in Tunisia, the "Lotus Revolution" in Egypt, and even the ongoing Libyan uprising. After scrutinizing jihadist web forums, most discussions regarding Egypt and Tunisia seem to react to events without taking credit for them, a common practice for jihadists who usually place al-Qaeda and Salafi-jihadists trademarks on them. Furthermore the “official” reaction from al-Qaeda leaders has been late in coming. The organization’s second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri spoke, although a bit late, about the turmoil in Egypt. Al-Qaeda rhetoric promoting violent jihad, seems to have had very little affect among young Arabs and Muslims in Cairo and other Arab streets. Peaceful political activism proved, so far, to be more effective than al-Qaeda-style actions.


Al-Zawahiri and the Trust of the New Arab Street

The Salafi-jihadist movement has in fact delivered messages in several forms regarding the developments in the Arab world. Most significantly was a massage from al-Zawahiri who has released, so far, three parts of his message to the Egyptian people entitled “Part Three: Message of Hope and Good Tidings to Our People in Egypt". Al-Zawahiri reflected in his message, particularly in the second part, al-Qaeda’s opinion concerning the new inclination among Arab youth towards peaceful political activism instead of the al-Qaeda-style way of change i.e. violent jihad.

Al-Zawahiri, aiming to present the “soft and political” face of al-Qaeda, warned against expansion by using the “al-Tatarrus” concept (literally shielding) meaning that being Muslims among kaffer enemies should not keep jihadists from attacking them, despite possible “collateral” Muslims casualties. Many al-Qaeda attacks were in fact justified using this concept, including the September 11 attacks. Al-Zawahiri followed by stating that:

"[...] there are some operations that are truly or falsely attributed to the mujahidin targeting Muslims in mosques, markets other gathering spots. Regardless of the truth or falsity of these operations being attributed to the mujahidin, I and my brothers in al-Qaeda strongly condemn these attacks whether committed by the mujahdin or by others [...] Sheikh Osama [Bin Laden] -may Allah protect him- delegated me to emphasize the [importance] of this matter. Hence I advise every mujahid to plan his operation very keenly to avoid injuring anyone who should not be hurt, [according to Islam] whether he is a Muslim or a non Muslim […] and to use all caution in [using] al-Tatarrus".

Most studies pointed to the “killing of civilians” as a major issue that prompted al-Qaeda to lose ground and standing in the Muslim world, which makes al-Zawahiri’s remarks significant. His statement shows that al-Qaeda is losing its recruitment ability among the Arab youth, which prompted him to focus on certain issues in his message such as the legitimacy of killing civilians.

Attempts to promote this strategy were also stated in a booklet entitled “The Popular Revolution and the Fall of the Corrupt Arab System” written by Aṭīahllah Abū ‘Abd ar-Rahman (nom de guerre), a jihadist whose writings have been recommended by al-Zawahiri. Abd ar-Rahman has asked jihadists in Egypt to deal softly with the public, to avoid “intellectual confrontations”, and to focus on treating people politely. In doing so, al-Qaeda is seeking to gain the trust of the new Arab street. However, al-Qaeda literature remains in the “pre-Arab-revolutions” era, focused on the importance and priority of jihad against the West, and the United States in particular, while portraying them as occupiers and looters of Muslims world. This ideology reflects typical jihadist thought, it also shows how al-Qaeda is banking on the failure of the West in supporting the popular movements in Arab world.       

Jihad Against the West

Abu Munther Shanqiti, whose name suggests that he is Mauritanian, has recently emerged as an influential jihadist ideologue. Apart from describing him as "a member of the Sharia’a Committee" of the Minbar al-Tawhid w al-Jihad website belonging to well-known jihadist scholar Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, there is not much information about al-Shanqiti.  However his writings, letters, and fatwas suggest that he is an ideologue who is gaining influence. He issued a fatwa calling for the killing of Christian pastors in Egypt, after a series of bombings last December against Copts in Alexandria, Egypt. He has also authored a long letter, entitled “al-Intsar ll-Sujana’a al-Abrar fi Fitnat al-Hiwar” (Advocating the righteous prisoners in affliction of dialogue), which was addressed to the Mauritanian authorities as “a dialogue between the government and the armed groups in the prisons” (http://www.tawhed.ws/a?a=shanqeet).

Furthermore, most of al-Shanqiti’s writings focus on Egypt. He has recently written several letters tackling the Egyptian protests in addition to Tunisia’s revolution.  However in one of his letters entitled "the revolution against Mubarak," he rejected the calls against taking part in the demonstrations against the Egyptian regime. This letter was expanded by al-Shanqiti, in response to a question about developments in Egypt and republished under the title "What is the rule of participation in the revolution in Egypt now?”
Al-Shaniqiti’s letter on Egypt explains how jihadists should react to the developments in Egypt and shows which opportunities could emerge for al-Qaeda and other affiliated jihadists in light of Hosni Mubarak’s fall from power.

Al-Shanqiti concedes from the beginning the failure of jihadists to bring down the Egyptian regime: "We must acknowledge that removing the ruling regime in Egypt is a matter that could not be done [even] by the largest jihadist organizations, so if these demonstrators succeed in toppling it, it will be a great victory for Islam and Muslims (Brynjar Lia, Jihadis Debate Egypt (1) + (2), http://www.jihadica.com, February 4). He deemed it a victory because the West, and the United States in particular, relied on the Egyptian regime to implement their policies in the Middle East. “If the Egyptian regime fell, Allah willing, the West will lose one of its most important agents in the region [… while] the Americans will have to deal in different ways with the peoples of the region...and if the Egyptian regime fell, Allah willing, perhaps several other Arab regimes will follow”.

While al-Shanqiti predicted that "the fall of Egypt" would be similar to the September 11 attacks in terms of scale, he also pointed out the necessity of a revolution in Egypt for jihadists and his disdain for the Mubarak regime: "if ten or even a hundred of the best Mujahedeen conducted martyrdom operations in order to destroy Mubarak and his regime I would not see anything wrong in that, because of [these operations] would be in the interest of Islam and Muslims and would mean a defeat to the enemies of religion".

The "Myth" of Fearing an Islamist Takeover

Al-Shanqiti in his letter, particularly when speaking about the Egyptian regime’s relations with the West, sought to encourage similar violent behaviour in line with al-Qaeda and other affiliated groups, against the “tyrant regime supported by the infidel West”. Although al-Qaeda is out of the current political scene in Arab world, they do represent at the same time, a political alternative if the revolutionary movements fail in Arab world.

As the demonstrations break out demanding change and political reform in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and throughout the greater Middle East the fear of a "fundamentalist" power grab, has made headlines in the West.  This fear might have already been implemented into Western foreign policy given that several governments including the United States have mistakenly been prioritizing “stability” rather than “democracy”. Former French Foreign minister Michèle Alliot-Marie, who recently resigned, even suggested sending French police units to help Tunisian police forces suppress demonstrators, before her government refused to receive ousted president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali on its territory. If the French had intervened, the protesting youngsters would have seen Salafi-jihadist ideology as the only alternative. The youth which organized and led the demonstrations in Tunisia, and Egypt, as well as other neighboring countries, are for the most part politically unaffiliated; they are middle class, educated, believe in civil liberties, human rights, and are able to communicate through new social media networks like "Twitter" and "Facebook". It was obvious that Islamists were not dominating these protests, which makes any policy aimed to hinder reform, out of fear of Islamists rule, unjustified, and against Western interests.

For instance, when Egyptian authorities cut off the Internet and launched a violent campaign to quell the demonstrations, many protestors called on the U.S. State Department, and President Obama, to pressure the Egyptian government against censorship. If U.S. policy in Egypt had sought to maintain stability at the expense of political reform, the vast majority of Egypt’s otherwise apolitical youth might have felt "betrayed", and could then have viewed the Salafi-jihadists’s argument that the West supports only tyrant regimes as being justified. 

Several studies do reject the correlation between political reform and the rise of Islamist militant groups, but only a few studies reject the correlation between frustration and political violence, thus making democracy the only guarantee against radicalization in the Arab world.

Murad Batal al-Shishani is an Islamic groups and terrorism issues analyst based in London. He is a specialist on Islamic Movements in Chechnya and in the Middle East. He is a regular contributor to several publications in both Arabic and English. He is also author of the book “The Islamic Movement in Chechnya and the Chechen-Russian Conflict 1990-2000”, Amman, 2001 (in Arabic), and "Iraqi Resistance: National Liberation vs. Terrorism: A Quantitative Study," November 2005 Iraqi Studies Series, Issue 5, Gulf Research Center-Dubai.

Suspect in Frankfurt shooting confesses to targeting U.S. military / L'attentat de Francfort visait l'armée américaine

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L'attentat qui a causé la mort de deux aviateurs américains à Francfort, Nicolas Alden et Zachary Cuddeback, serait le fait d'un extrémiste musulman. Du moins, c'est la conclusion qu'on l'on peut tirer de l'article de MSNBC : "Suspect in Frankfurt shooting confesses to targeting U.S. military, official says". Il se serait radicalisé récemment auprès du Sheik Abdellatif et de Pierre Vogel. Ce dernier est connu pour s'être converti à l'islam radical en 2001 après une carrière dans la boxe (6-1-0). Il aura peut-être interprété le jihad comme une continuation du pugilat par d'autres moyens. Quant au premier, le Sheik Abellatif, il est connu en Allemagne pour ses tirades contre l'Occident. 


On pourra lire aussi, sur le même sujet, l'article du journal Le Temps.
http://www.letemps.ch/Page/Uuid/489d2238-45de-11e0-9ec5-3e361c02cb8f

3 mars 2011

Site du Laboratoire d'étude sur les politiques publiques

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Le Laboratoire d'étude sur les politiques publiques (LEPPM) et la mondialisation de l'École nationale d'administration publique vient de lancer un nouveau site où l'on peut consulter l'ensemble de ses publications. Il s'agit, par exemples, de rapports évolutifs qui analysent l'impact de la mondialisation sur différents aspects de la société québécoise. L'accent est mis sur les politiques publiques. On peut trouver aussi des fiches de lectures sur les mêmes thèmes que les rapports évolutifs.

Le site proposent aussi l'accès à des cahiers de recherches plus étoffés que les rapports évolutifs. "L'objectif [de ces cahiers] est d'exposer plus en profondeur une problématique particulière (examen de politiques, réflexion prospective, analyses conceptuelles, etc.)."

D'autres rubriques présentent d'autres informations utiles aux citoyens et aux chercheurs que les impacts de la mondialisation sur le Québec intéressent.


Les informations sont regroupés autour de six grands thèmes : la culture, l'économie, l'environnement, l'éducation, la santé et la sécurité. À sujet, on pourra lire des rapports sur les réseaux de coopération policière internationale à l'ère de la mondialisation, les enjeux sécuritaires et les grands événements politiques internationaux, la cybercriminalité et le cybersécurité, l'arme biologique et ses vecteurs, les menaces asymétriques et les initiatives du Québec en matière de lutte contre la criminalité transfrontalière ainsi que les menaces asymétriques et le Québec, pour ne citer que quelques exemples.


Le site du LEPPM est une mine de renseignements et d'analyses en français, facilement accessible et présentée avec beaucoup de rigueur.

ENAP - Bienvenue sur le nouveau site du LEPPM!

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