PhiGéo
Dans sa revue de presse de la Conférence des associations de la Défense, le directeur exécutif, Alain Pellerin, place en tête de liste l'annonce par Leon Panetta d'un échéancier pour le retrait des troupes américaines d'Afghanistan.
Aucun message portant le libellé Muslim Brotherhood. Afficher tous les messages
Aucun message portant le libellé Muslim Brotherhood. Afficher tous les messages
7 février 2012
Revue de presse de la CAD
Dans sa revue de presse de la Conférence des associations de la Défense, le directeur exécutif, Alain Pellerin, place en tête de liste l'annonce par Leon Panetta d'un échéancier pour le retrait des troupes américaines d'Afghanistan.
13 janvier 2012
Muslim Brotherhood hails ties with US
PhiGéo
Une visite du Deputy Secretary of State (l'adjoint du Secrétaire à la Défense) américain William Burns aux bureaux des Frères musulmans (FM) au Caire en Égypte mercredi a permis aux deux partis de préciser leurs positions respectives sur ce que devraient être les relations entre les États-Unis et l'Égypte.
Les FM ont souligné le déséquilibre de la position traditionnelle des États-Unis dans la région et l'importance de la prise en compte du "printemps arabe". Cette allusion aux "printemps arabe" veut-elle dire que ce mouvement allait dans le sens des visées historiques des FM ?
Les FM ont souligné le déséquilibre de la position traditionnelle des États-Unis dans la région et l'importance de la prise en compte du "printemps arabe". Cette allusion aux "printemps arabe" veut-elle dire que ce mouvement allait dans le sens des visées historiques des FM ?
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| William Burns et le maréchal Hussein Tantawi - Photo AFP / Bureau militaire égyptien |
Il ressort de l'article du Daily News Egypt que les États-Unis souhaitent établir des relations "normales" avec les Frères musulmans dorénavant bien installer comme puissance politique dominante en Égypte.
L'article fait aussi mention de l'influence des salafistes purs et durs:
"Wednesday's meeting comes as Egyptians voted in the final phase of staggered elections to elect a lower house of parliament.
Egypt's two main Islamist parties have obtained a crushing lead in the seats declared so far, reflecting a regional trend since Arab Spring uprisings overthrew secular authoritarian regimes.
The Brotherhood, Egypt's best organized political movement, was widely expected to triumph in the polls through the FJP.
But the surge by Al-Nour and the high visibility of salafi movements have raised fears among increasingly marginalized liberals about civil liberties and religious freedom."
19 novembre 2011
Egyptian Islamists Rally in Cairo Against Military
PhiGéo
Dans un article du New York Times, Mayy el Sheikh et Liam Stack décrivent la manifestation d'hier au Caire et fournissent quelques éléments de compréhension.
Dans un article du New York Times, Mayy el Sheikh et Liam Stack décrivent la manifestation d'hier au Caire et fournissent quelques éléments de compréhension.
La manifestation était importante en nombre et en portée. Plus de 10,000 personnes occupaient la place Tahir et, surtout, une bonne partie d'entre eux étaient partisans ou sympathisants de groupes islamistes ou salafistes comme les Frères musulmans ou d'autres groupes moins importants mais plus radicaux.
Ce qui a déclenché le mouvement est une déclaration des autorités militaires :
"That truce fell apart, on the eve of parliamentary elections, after the military council spelled out for the first time its intention to preserve a decisive role for itself in Egyptian politics far into the future, elevating itself above civilian control and imposing rules to protect individual and minority rights. [...] All said [les manifestants] they came to protest because of the provisions about the role of the military in its constitutional ground rules. One provision would give the military a special political role as guardian of “constitutional legitimacy,” which many consider a license to intervene at will in any matter. Other provisions would protect its budget from civilian supervision and grant the military broad authority over foreign policy as well."
La manifestation pourrait bien indiquer le début d'un bras de fer entre le pouvoir (militaire) et les Frères musulmans :
“Each side is drawing a line in the sand over its future role in the political process,” said Prof. Emad Shahin, an Egyptian scholar at Notre Dame who was in Tahrir Square on Friday. “The military forces would like to secure an exit from the transitional period with some kind of assurances of their future role in the political scene, and the Islamists think that this could put a check on their power even if they win in clean and fair elections.”
Egyptian Islamists Rally in Cairo Against Military - NYTimes.com
Ce qui a déclenché le mouvement est une déclaration des autorités militaires :
"That truce fell apart, on the eve of parliamentary elections, after the military council spelled out for the first time its intention to preserve a decisive role for itself in Egyptian politics far into the future, elevating itself above civilian control and imposing rules to protect individual and minority rights. [...] All said [les manifestants] they came to protest because of the provisions about the role of the military in its constitutional ground rules. One provision would give the military a special political role as guardian of “constitutional legitimacy,” which many consider a license to intervene at will in any matter. Other provisions would protect its budget from civilian supervision and grant the military broad authority over foreign policy as well."
La manifestation pourrait bien indiquer le début d'un bras de fer entre le pouvoir (militaire) et les Frères musulmans :
“Each side is drawing a line in the sand over its future role in the political process,” said Prof. Emad Shahin, an Egyptian scholar at Notre Dame who was in Tahrir Square on Friday. “The military forces would like to secure an exit from the transitional period with some kind of assurances of their future role in the political scene, and the Islamists think that this could put a check on their power even if they win in clean and fair elections.”
Egyptian Islamists Rally in Cairo Against Military - NYTimes.com
10 septembre 2011
Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood: Internal Divisions and External Challenges in the Post-Mubarak Era
PhiGéo
"As seen in several recent defections of high profile Brothers, the MB’s actions are emblematic of how out of touch and bureaucratic the Ikhwan leadership has become after decades of struggle against the Egyptian state (Al-Ahram Weekly [Cairo], July 2). These defections reflect not only the increasing ability of dissenters to establish themselves outside of the MB, but also the internal struggle “between three different generations in the Brotherhood: the leadership, mid-management and the young people who were part of the revolution and gained media exposure” (Al-Ahram Weekly [Cairo], July 2). In nearly every case, these defectors have highlighted the MB’s difficult position, balancing the increasingly liberal views of a younger generation against an old guard whose conservatism is both an anchor for the organization and a source of criticism and fear from outsiders."
Black consacre enfin d'assez longs développements à l'opposition entre al-Quaida et Frères musulmans. Si les deux organisations partagent des objectifs semblables, les moyens qu'ils entendent utiliser pour les atteindre différents le plus souvent, pour ne pas dire tout le temps depuis plusieurs années. C'est notamment le cas en ce qui concerne le dirigeant actuel d'al-Quaida, Ayman al-Zawahiri qui s'est souvent attaqué au Frères en les accusant de révisionnisme. Pour lui, l'attentisme, pour ne pas dire l'immobilisme des Frères est une erreur stratégique impardonnable. Voici un extrait du texte de Black sur l'opposition entre les deux organisations :
"In an effort to prove its hostility toward al-Qaeda, the MB’s official website maintains a regularly updated page entitled “MB vs. Qaeda,” providing readers with ideological, strategic, and tactical insights into the rivalry. While al-Qaeda and the Brotherhood share a strategic objective, their interpretations of that objective and the means by which to achieve it place them at odds. [3] Where the Brotherhood sees change as a long term, bottom-up and largely peaceful endeavor, al-Qaeda pursues it through the violent activities of a faithful vanguard. Although Abdullah Azzam was a key member of the Brotherhood, his view of violent jihad as fard al-ayn (“an individual duty”) has not been adopted by the mainstream MB. [4] Al-Qaeda and other Salafi-Jihadis, however, rely on Azzam’s writings as foundational to their justification of jihad. While the Brotherhood supported elements of the Iraq insurgency and HAMAS’ attacks against Israel, the MB has largely sworn off of violent tactics in pursuit of political and social goals."
Andrew Black dans le Terrorism Monitor publie une étude sur l'évolution des Frères musulmans en Égypte dans le contexte du mouvement de démocratisation du monde arabe et de la disparition du chef historique d'al-Quaida.
En gros, Black affirme que les Frères sont tiraillés par deux tendances : la première est de participer au mouvement mais de manière prudente et sans aspirer à exercer le pouvoir, l'autre est de s'impliquer davantage dans l'action et d'essayer de prendre le pouvoir quitte à libéraliser davantage le programme. Ces deux vecteurs contradictoires entraînent certains membres à faire défection et à se lancer en politique active pour profiter du vent de changement qui frappe l'Égypte, alors que les autres se tiennent en retrait et préfèrent la politique des petits pas.
Voici comment Black présentent les expériences douloureuses du HAMAS en Palestine et du FIS en Algérie qui poussent l’establishment des Frères à être prudent :
"While becoming more active politically, the Brotherhood has been forced to remain adaptable to daily events in Egypt while continuing to strike a balance between its progressive and traditional members. In developing its political strategy, the MB leadership claims to have learned the importance of moderation from recent history - namely the 2005 elections when the success of Brotherhood-endorsed candidates provoked a harsh crackdown by the state. To avoid contentiousness, the MB has announced that it will only be running for a minority position in the new parliament. The MB has stated unequivocally that no member will be permitted to compete in the presidential contest and that MB members are only permitted to join the FJP. The rationale for this, according to Khairat al-Shater, a Brotherhood leader and reputed strongman, is based on the experiences of the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria and HAMAS in the Palestinian Territories: “We cannot turn a blind eye to the Gazan and Algerian scenarios. When Islamists there reached power quickly, the military establishment turned against them” (al-Masry al-Youm [Cairo], June 20). Moreover, as Mubarak was forced from power, the Brotherhood was rumored to have negotiated with the military the Brotherhood’s withdrawal from the revolution in return for formal recognition of its political party (al-Masry al-Youm, April 1)."
"While becoming more active politically, the Brotherhood has been forced to remain adaptable to daily events in Egypt while continuing to strike a balance between its progressive and traditional members. In developing its political strategy, the MB leadership claims to have learned the importance of moderation from recent history - namely the 2005 elections when the success of Brotherhood-endorsed candidates provoked a harsh crackdown by the state. To avoid contentiousness, the MB has announced that it will only be running for a minority position in the new parliament. The MB has stated unequivocally that no member will be permitted to compete in the presidential contest and that MB members are only permitted to join the FJP. The rationale for this, according to Khairat al-Shater, a Brotherhood leader and reputed strongman, is based on the experiences of the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria and HAMAS in the Palestinian Territories: “We cannot turn a blind eye to the Gazan and Algerian scenarios. When Islamists there reached power quickly, the military establishment turned against them” (al-Masry al-Youm [Cairo], June 20). Moreover, as Mubarak was forced from power, the Brotherhood was rumored to have negotiated with the military the Brotherhood’s withdrawal from the revolution in return for formal recognition of its political party (al-Masry al-Youm, April 1)."
Plus loin, Black parle des défections et de la difficile gestion des idées libérales qui animent la nouvelle génération de Frères:
"As seen in several recent defections of high profile Brothers, the MB’s actions are emblematic of how out of touch and bureaucratic the Ikhwan leadership has become after decades of struggle against the Egyptian state (Al-Ahram Weekly [Cairo], July 2). These defections reflect not only the increasing ability of dissenters to establish themselves outside of the MB, but also the internal struggle “between three different generations in the Brotherhood: the leadership, mid-management and the young people who were part of the revolution and gained media exposure” (Al-Ahram Weekly [Cairo], July 2). In nearly every case, these defectors have highlighted the MB’s difficult position, balancing the increasingly liberal views of a younger generation against an old guard whose conservatism is both an anchor for the organization and a source of criticism and fear from outsiders."
Black consacre enfin d'assez longs développements à l'opposition entre al-Quaida et Frères musulmans. Si les deux organisations partagent des objectifs semblables, les moyens qu'ils entendent utiliser pour les atteindre différents le plus souvent, pour ne pas dire tout le temps depuis plusieurs années. C'est notamment le cas en ce qui concerne le dirigeant actuel d'al-Quaida, Ayman al-Zawahiri qui s'est souvent attaqué au Frères en les accusant de révisionnisme. Pour lui, l'attentisme, pour ne pas dire l'immobilisme des Frères est une erreur stratégique impardonnable. Voici un extrait du texte de Black sur l'opposition entre les deux organisations :
"In an effort to prove its hostility toward al-Qaeda, the MB’s official website maintains a regularly updated page entitled “MB vs. Qaeda,” providing readers with ideological, strategic, and tactical insights into the rivalry. While al-Qaeda and the Brotherhood share a strategic objective, their interpretations of that objective and the means by which to achieve it place them at odds. [3] Where the Brotherhood sees change as a long term, bottom-up and largely peaceful endeavor, al-Qaeda pursues it through the violent activities of a faithful vanguard. Although Abdullah Azzam was a key member of the Brotherhood, his view of violent jihad as fard al-ayn (“an individual duty”) has not been adopted by the mainstream MB. [4] Al-Qaeda and other Salafi-Jihadis, however, rely on Azzam’s writings as foundational to their justification of jihad. While the Brotherhood supported elements of the Iraq insurgency and HAMAS’ attacks against Israel, the MB has largely sworn off of violent tactics in pursuit of political and social goals."
Les querelles entre al-Quaida et Frères musulmans sont certainement bien réelles mais elles ne doivent pas nous cacher l'entente plus profonde et plus significative selon moi sur les buts recherchés par les deux mouvements : la reconquête des terres musulmanes perdues et le rétablissement de la loi coranique dans l’empire ainsi reconstitué. Objectifs auquel on peut en ajouter un autre, encore plus lointain, d'universalisation de la foi. Ils se querelleront donc entre eux mais s'uniront devant l'ennemi commun à l'instant décisif.
The Jamestown Foundation: Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood: Internal Divisions and External Challenges in the Post-Mubarak Era
The Jamestown Foundation: Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood: Internal Divisions and External Challenges in the Post-Mubarak Era
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