PhiGéo
Jolie trouvaille de Thérèse Zhen-Dvir, ce vidéo où Metmati Mâamar fait une analyse critique des propos tenues par Tariq Ramadam invité d'un "talk show" français.
27 février 2011
24 février 2011
Ottawa Conference on Defence and Security / Conférence sur la défense et la sécurité d''Ottawa
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| Michael Wilson |
La Conférence sur la défense et la sécurité organisée par la Conférence des associations de la défense (CAD) et l'Institut de la CAD a lieu au Château Laurier à Ottawa.
Voici un aperçu de la première journée
Le président du Center for Stategic and International Studies, John Hamre, a parlé le premier. Il a insisté sur l'importance pour les États-Unis de répondre de manière plus responsable ("mature" en anglais) aux menaces et, éventuellement, aux attaques terroristes. Il ne faudrait pas donner une prime aux terroristes en sur-réagissant à leurs actions. D'après J. Hamre, l'mposition de mesures draconiennes en matière de contrôle commerciale, par exemple, a pour effet de punir davantage les Américains et leurs alliés que les terroristes.
Le premier panel portait sur les intérêts canado-américains en matière de sécurité, dix ans après les attentats du 11 septembre.
Les relations n'ont jamais été si bonnes. Depuis que le Canada s'est engagé en Afghanistan, la "cote" des Canadiens est à la hausse aux États-Unies. Les conférenciers soulignent, en outre, que le fonctionnement exemplaire depuis cinquante ans du NORAD fourni un modèle sur lequel se baser pour la coopération entre les deux pays en matière de sécurité. Il est d'ailleurs souligné qu'il faudrait étendre le NORAD afin de mieux structurer la défense du Nord qui devient un enjeu important pour la sécurité des deux pays avec l'ouverture du passage du Nord-Ouest et le "réchauffement de la planète". Bien qu'il n'existe pas à l'heure actuelle de menace militaire proprement dite, il y a bel et bien une course pour l'acquisition des richesses naturelles.
Mais, si les relations canado-américaines sont bonnes, la gestion des frontières est en train de devenir un "irritant" entre les deux pays. Comment assurer, en effet, la sécurité des États-Unis et du Canada tout en ne brimant pas, ou le moins possible, la libre circulation des personnes et des marchandises entre les deux pays ? (Ce thème reviendra souvent au cours des débats de cette journée.)
Malgré cette difficulté, le lieutenant-général Frank Grass donne deux exemples de coopérations en matière de sécurité qui ont bien marchés entre les deux pays : les mesures d'urgences lors de l'ouragan Gustave et le déploiement de troupes américaines à la disposition du Canada aux frontières de la Colombie-Britannique au moment des Jeux Olympiques de Vancouver.
L'ancien ambassadeur du Canada aux États-Unis, Michael Wilson, soutient, pour sa part, qu'il faut inventer un nouveau paradigme pour la gestion des frontières entre le Canada et les États-Unis. Il croit que les échanges entre les deux pays contribuent à l'amélioration de la compétitivité économique des États-Unis et que, par conséquent, il devrait être possible d'arriver à une entente.
Après avoir évoqué le complexe dossier du pipeline devant relier l'Alberta aux États-Unis et les importantes conséquences économiques et écologiques qu'il peut avoir. M. Wilson met en garde contre une éventualité qu'il juge désavantageuse pour le Canada. Celle qui entraînerait notre pays à rechercher systématiquement des débouchés extérieurs à l'Amérique du Nord pour l'exportation de ses richesses naturelles. (Peut-être désavantageuse aussi pour les États-Unies. Bien qu'il n'ait pas nommer la Chine, il est facile d'imaginer l'effet d'une conjugaison des matières premières du Canada et de la main d'oeuvre.)
Le conférencier invité au déjeuner a, pour sa part, concentrer son allocution sur le thème de l'économie. Il a plaidé en faveur d'une poursuite du mouvement lancé jadis par Brian Mulroney lors de la création de la zone de libre-échange nord-américaine. Il faudrait maintenant aller de l'avant et procéder à une intégration plus grande des économies nord-américaine, sans pour autant renoncer à notre identité nationale. Il propose par exemple la création de commissions conjointes chargées de régler les problèmes qui peuvent se poser dans la gestion des affaires entre les deux pays. Il n'a pas beaucoup élaborer sur les sujets précis que ces commissions pourraient régler, mais il est permis de penser que celui des frontières pourraient figurer dans la liste...
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| Michael Hayden |
Dans un autre domaine, celui des frontières (encore), M. Hayden soutien que le Canada peut bien prendre les décisions qu'il veut. Mais, ces décisions auront un impact sur ce que feront les États-Unis pour protéger leurs frontières.
Le sénateur canadien Colin Kenny se montre plutôt favorable à un service de renseignement extérieur pour le Canada. Par contre, il ne croit pas que le Canada devrait essayer de jouer un rôle de premier plan dans les affaires du monde : par exemple au Moyen-Orient.
Le troisième panel portait sur les préoccupations contemporaines de sécurité. Trois sujets était abordés : la montée de la puissance maritime chinoise, le rôle du Pakistan dans la guerre en Afghanistan et la sécurité dans l'Arctique.
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| Andrea Charron |
http://cda-cdai.ca/cdai/uploads/cdai/2011agenda.pdf
23 février 2011
Militias clamp down as Libya protesters close in
PhiGéo
Les combats font rage partout en Libye.
Militias clamp down as Libya protesters close in - World news - Mideast/N. Africa - msnbc.comIs Libya Headed Toward a Prolonged Civil War? / Guerre civile en Libye ?
PhiGéo
Le régime de Kadafi est durement mis à l'épreuve. Le texte de Camille Tawil décrit la situation à l'Est et à l'Ouest de la Libye. Les antécédents historiques : tentatives de rébellions ratées, contestations étouffées, activisme islamique. Le texte montre également les perspectives assombries du régime de Kadafi même s'il survivait aux troubles actuels. Il est souligné aussi les tentations que Kadafi aurait d'encourager à nouveau les actions violentes contre l'Occident...
Il est également fait mention de la déclaration du fils de Kadafi, Seif al-Kadafi, selon lequel les islamistes contrôleraient certains bastions de la rébellion. Ils auraient créé des "petits émirats" ! D'après l'auteur, le fils du dictateur voudrait avertir du danger de voir les islamistes combler le vide laisser par le départ de son père.
Quoiqu'il en soit des islamistes. Le règne de Kadafi semble tirer à fin. Le discours du 21 février respire le désespoir du tyran qui craint pour sa vie et qui sent venir la fin. La question est maintenant de savoir si l'armée va le déposer. Ou encore, si son fils - qui semble moins déconnecté de la réalité et ne souhaite peut-être pas connaître un sort comparable à celui des fils de S. Hussein - va réussir à le convaincre de quitter la Libye, ou encore si la révolte populaire l'emportera avant que ni les uns, ni les autres n'aient le temps de faire quoique ce soit. Triste sire.
Special Commentary: Is Libya Headed Toward a Prolonged Civil War?
Publication: Volume: 0 Issue: 0
February 22, 2011 05:08 PM Age: 18 hrs
It did not take long for Libya to follow the path of its neighbors, with popular uprisings in Tunisia to the west and in Egypt to the east. The Libyan ‘uprising’ which started on February 17th, continues as of the writing of this piece. (Opposition groups originally called for an uprising on the 17th, but demonstrations started two days prior in the eastern city of Benghazi, after security forces arrested activists representing the families of the 1996 Abu Slim prison massacre). Whether Colonel Qaddafi’s regime survives or not will surely become clearer in the near future, although the country currently seems to be heading towards a bloody civil war, dividing the western part of the country held by Qaddafi supporters and the eastern part by his opponents. Given the situation in Libya, what would be the implications for the region, the West and the United States?
Colonel Qaddafi, who has been in power since he led a military coup against the monarchy in 1969, has brought security and stability to his country, at the expense of real democracy. Freedom of speech and legal opposition are virtually nonexistent. Libya, in fact, has been ruled by a form of absolute rule, or dictatorship, for the past 41 years. This political stagnation was also accompanied by a lack of any real attempts to build proper, accountable institutions to run the country in a modern way. The "state of the masses", or the Jamahiriya, a political system created by Qaddafi which was supposed to create a popular government with power directly vested in the hands of the people, has been characterized as being an utter sham. Qaddafi maintains control over all facets of the ruling regime. So, his fall, or a prolonged challenge to his rule, may result in a vacuum that will not only affect Libya domestically, but its international relations as well.
The following scenarios could take place in Libya, whether Qaddafi stays or goes:
The uprising now seems to be spreading outside of the eastern regions which have traditionally been the center of power for those challenging Qaddafi’s regime, especially the Islamists. In light of that, it was no surprise that most of the troubles have, since February 17, been concentrated in the east – Benghazi, al-Bayda, Ajdabiya , as well as Darnah. The latter is known as an Islamist hub which produced the most volunteers who left Libya to join the fight against American troops in Iraq (52 fighters out of a total of 112 Libyan foreign fighters). Darnah produced more Jihadi fighters than Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, (52 to 51). However, Darnah has a population of only 80,000 compared to Riyadh’s 4.3 million, which makes it by far the biggest Arab city per capita to ‘export’ volunteer Jihadi fighters.
Seif al-Qaddafi, the son of the Libyan leader, was quick to jump on this issue in his televised speech on February 21. He accused the Islamists of controlling al-Byada and Darnah and creating Islamic ‘emirates’. This may or may not be true, but the aim of Seif’s words was clear: the vacuum left by the fall of his father’s regime will be filled by Islamic militants. However, the Islamists role in this current uprising is not clear yet, although it appears that there is a coalition of many opposition factions – national, secular and indeed Islamist – that is united in helping the ordinary citizens of Libya, especially the frustrated young generation, in its attempt to change the regime.
If the regime fails in its current bloody attempts to regain full control over the eastern cities, then Qaddafi will have been surely weakened, even if he were to survive this uprising. There have been some reports of protests taking place in western regions as well, especially in Misratah, east of Tripoli, but nothing compared to what has been happening in the east. If the uprising remains mainly confined to the east, an ever-increasing rift will reappear between those who believe that Qaddafi has allowed the western part to become more prosperous than the rebellious east, and those who support the regime. The al-Qaddadfa’s tribe, Qaddafi’s tribal base, is in Sirt, midway between the eastern and the western regions, although it is considered part of the west (Gaddafi’s wife is from al-Byada, 200 miles east of Benghazi). While many other tribes have recently defected from Qaddafi’s regime, this tribe has until now remained loyal to the Colonel. The powerful Warfalla tribe for example, to the south of Tripoli, has now sided with the opposition. This tribe had been linked to a number of army officers who tried to topple the regime in a failed coup in 1993. The officers were then arrested and members of their families were forced to execute them in public in 1997 to ‘cleanse’ the honor of the tribe. The tribe more than likely changed its allegiances as a form of retribution against the regime (http://www.libyanfsl.com).
In the chaos created by this uprising, the Islamists may try to rebuild their presence, after having been crushed by the regime in the 1990s. The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) or at least some of its factions may find the situation tempting to re-launch its work in building cells. However this tactic may not translate into a return to the armed, violent Jihad which occurred in the 1990s and which later failed to uproot the regime. In the past two years, the leaders of the LIFG have been freed from prison, and have made promises to quit their violent ambitions. However, members of the LIFG may become tempted to join a more radical faction led by Abu Yihya al-Libi, a member of al-Qaeda (Abu Yihya al-Libi joined a faction of al-Qaeda in 2007; the LIFG at that time was led by the now deceased Abu Laith al-Libi). The ruthless suppression of this uprising could further increase al-Qaeda’s recruitment ability, or that of its North African branch, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, (two entities that promote armed struggle as the only means to topple Qaddafi’s ‘apostate’ regime). However, given the recent popular and peaceful protests in Tunisia and Egypt, and the lack of al-Qaeda’s influence during these respective uprisings, this scenario might seem unlikely.
In addition, the insecurity in Libya may lead to the suspension of oil and gas exports from Libyan fields, which would have serious consequences for European markets. One scenario could be the result of terrorist attacks on the country's energy infrastructure. In Egypt, for example, gas pipelines in the Sinai linked to Jordan and Israel were attacked after the fall of President Mubarak’s regime this past month. However pipelines could also be shutdown under Colonel Qaddafi’s orders, to retaliate against US and Western interests who are pressuring the regime to allow peaceful protests. In Qaddafi’s eyes, these elements are seeking to undermine his government.
In the event that the revolution fails, Libya might once again revert back into a pariah state, sponsoring terrorist organizations. Colonel Qaddafi may be tempted to back a group aimed at attacking western targets. However, the Libyan leader must know that any attack implicating his regime will result in the downfall of his rule due to the onslaught of international pressure against him and international aid to his opponents.
18 février 2011
Bahrain forces fire on protesters; 50 injured - World news - Mideast/N. Africa - msnbc.com
PhiGéo
Après la chute des régimes du président Mubarrak en Égypte et Ben Ali en Syrie, le mouvement de "rage" qui se propageait comme une traînée de poudre dans le monde arabe se propage au Bahreïn et en Libye. La résistance des régimes de ces deux pays est toutefois plus violente. C'est probablement en Libye et au Yémen que les dictateurs sont les plus vulnérables. Au Bahreïn la monarchie pourrait se maintenir et le gouvernement tombée. À suivre...
14 février 2011
Europe : le multiculturalisme, mal imaginaire des islamophobes | Rue89
PhiGéo
L'auteur du texte en titre s'en prend tour à tour aux différents premiers ministres britanniques, mais peut-être pas pour les bonnes raisons ! Tony Blair, par exemple, a certainement commis des fautes, son discours au début de la guerre en Irak en 2003 affirmant que nous étions à "45 minutes" d'une attaque par "armes de destruction massive" était certainement exagéré. Par contre, en faire un croisé de la suspicion contre les musulmans en raison des législations anti-terroristes et aboutir en fin d'article à un amalgame entre lui, Gordon Brown, David Cameron, d'une part, et les lépinistes, d'autre part, me semble semer inutilement la confusion dans les esprits.
10 février 2011
Will Libya Be the Next? / Appel en Lybie le 17 février
PhiGéo
Dans ce texte de Camille Tawil il est fait mention de l'appel lancé au Lybien pour une grande manifestation le 17 février. Y aura-t-il un mouvement de révolte en Lybie ? C'est la question qui se pose maintenant que la Tunisie, l'Égypte et le Yémen sont secoués par des mouvements de remise en question de leurs régimes politiques.
Special Commentary: Will Libya Be the Next Tunisia or Egypt?
Dans ce texte de Camille Tawil il est fait mention de l'appel lancé au Lybien pour une grande manifestation le 17 février. Y aura-t-il un mouvement de révolte en Lybie ? C'est la question qui se pose maintenant que la Tunisie, l'Égypte et le Yémen sont secoués par des mouvements de remise en question de leurs régimes politiques.
Special Commentary: Will Libya Be the Next Tunisia or Egypt?
Camille Tawil
Jamestown Foundation – February 7, 2011
Jamestown Foundation – February 7, 2011
Libyan President Colonel Qaddafi must be feeling the heat of the recent upheavals taking place around him. He has just seen the regime of President Bin Ali in Tunisia, a country that borders Libya to the west, overthrown by a popular uprising, followed by another uprising in Egypt, on Libya's eastern border, where the regime of President Mubarak is hanging by a thread.
What are the chances of a similar uprising in Libya itself, and can Qaddafi survive it?
According to several internet postings, Libyans are being urged to participate in mass demonstrations against the regime on February 17. This date has been chosen because it marks the fourth anniversary of an incident that took place in Benghazi (the capital of eastern Libya) during which at least ten demonstrators were killed in clashes with the security forces in protests over cartoons of the prophet Muhammad (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/
As for Libya, the calls for demonstrations on February 17 were also posted by unknown groups on different internet websites, but were soon supported by well-known opposition groups, such as the National Front for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL) (http://www.libyanfsl.com/). This group was the main threat to Qaddafi's regime in the 1980s and early 1990s, but was later replaced by the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) which started a failed campaign to overthrow the regime in 1995. The main leaders of the LIFG, who were caught inside Libya or handed over to the regime during the global war on terror, have recently expressed a clear wish to reconcile with Colonel Qaddafi's government. They announced a revision of their ideology (the Corrective Studies) in the summer of 2009, in which they renounced the use of violence to overthrow the regime. Qaddafi and his administration, therefore, might feel assured that these Jihadists, many of whom have been pardoned and freed from prison during the past few years, will not side with those calling for an uprising against the government. Some members of the LIFG, however, have been voicing their rejection to the leadership’s approach, and have recently issued independent statements in support of protests against the Libyan regime. One of those LIFG leaders, with whom this author met in London and who has asked to remain anonymous, explained that “many” members of the LIFG, especially those living in exile, are preparing to form a breakaway faction from the group. The source went on to say that the “armed struggle” of the 1990s clearly failed and “we learned the lesson” from it. He added that the uprisings in both Tunisia and Egypt have shown that it is the people, not the political parties or Jihadi groups, who are the “real leaders” of these “revolutions.” Therefore, he said, “we do not want to dictate on the Libyan people what they want. We are aware that we represent only a part of the Libyan population, and we will only do what the people seem to be demanding: political freedoms, better conditions of life, stopping the corruption and ending the dictatorship (of Colonel Qaddafi).” At this point, this separate faction of the LIFG has issued two statements, the latest of which, released on January 17, threatened the regime of Colonel Qaddafi with an uprising similar to the one that overthrew the Tunisian president (http://www.muslm.net/vb/
What gave these calls for an uprising in Libya more urgency was the press release issued this week by the Libyan branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in which it added its support for the calls for the regime to start urgent reforms “before it is too late” (http://international.
The Libyan regime has, until now, been quiet, ignoring the calls for demonstrations. However, reports have indicated that activists who are thought to have been behind the internet postings against the regime, have indeed been apprehended (http://almanaramedia.
Camille Tawil is a journalist for al-Hayat newspaper in London where he has worked for the past seventeen years. He is also a frequent contributor to the Jamestown publication Terrorism Monitor and the author of the occasional paper "The al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb: Expansion in the Sahel and Challenges from Within Jihadist Circles."
7 février 2011
ISLAMIC EMIRATE / Émirat islamique
PhiGéo
Dans ce texte provenant des Talibans se mêlent des directives pour la constitution d'un nouvel émirat en Afghanistan et des considérations plus générales sur la chute des dictatures contrôlées par les États-Unis et la France. Il est intéressant de noter l'effort de planification du pouvoir islamique à l'échelle nationale que les auteurs du texte tente d'inculquer au lecteur. Il ne suffit pas de renverser les "dictateurs", il faut savoir ensuite régner avec un programme précis dépassant les slogans.
L'autre aspect du texte qui mérite l'attention est la hargne contre la France "mère de toutes le infamies" qui a soutenue Ben Ali jusqu'à la fin. Les auteurs mettent en garde contre la mainmise de l'ancienne puissance coloniale dans l'édification de la nouvelle Tunisie. D'où l'importance d'islamiser tout de suite, dès le départ, le nouveau pouvoir.
BRIEFS
Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 9 Issue: 5, February 4, 2011 04:26 PM
AFGHAN TALIBAN ISSUE GUIDELINES FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF ISLAMIC EMIRATE
One of the major weaknesses of most militant Islamist groups is their almost complete lack of a political program or consideration of how an Islamic State should be run beyond a general commitment to Shari’a and the creation of an Islamic caliphate. Details as to how this caliphate is to be administered or who is to be its leader are rarely considered by militants. The last Caliph, Abdul Mejid II, was deposed by Turkish secularist Mustafa Kemal “Ataturk” in 1924. A notable exception to this trend is Afghanistan’s Taliban movement, which actually has experience running a country, as it did in Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001. The Afghan model as pursued by the Taliban is more realistic in seeking an Emirate (a regional command) rather than a Caliphate (the latter encompassing the entire Islamic world).
Nevertheless, the Emirate is “based upon the principles of the Islamic Caliphate… in dividing the country into provinces, appointing pious and righteous governors, guiding workers to piety and justice, encouraging the establishment of a religious and worldly policy, tending to the needs of the people, instructing them in matters of religion and encouraging them to make the utmost effort in promoting virtue and preventing vice.”
Discussion of the Taliban’s administrative plans for Afghanistan has been stirred by a detailed outline of these plans in the movement’s Voice of Jihad website (January 27). The outline, written by Ikram Miyundi, was previously published in the movement’s al-Somood Magazine (Issue 55, December 25, 2010).
For guidance, the Islamic Emirate must draw on the Koran, the Sunnah (sayings and habits) of the Prophet Muhammad, the Sunnah of the Khulafa ur-Rashidun (The Caliphs of Righteousness, i.e. the first four caliphs after Muhammad), the sayings of the Companions (of the Prophet), as well as various fatwas (religious-based legal decisions) issued by respected scholars of Islam.
Administratively, the Emirate divides Afghanistan into 34 provinces, which are in turn divided into directorates and villages:
• The village is run by a leader appointed by the Emirate who is responsible for civilian and military affairs. In this he is assisted by a group of ten to 50 mujahideen.
• The directorate is administered by a governor “of known piety” who is assisted by a deputy familiar with the region. Under them are committees dealing with dispute resolution, education, development and local military affairs.
• Provincial administration is handled by a provincial governor, “a man of religion and morality who fears no one but Allah,” and a deputy. The governor directs the province’s military, civilian, financial and legal affairs and is responsible for the implementation of Shari’a laws and statutes. The governor is appointed and dismissed by the Supreme Commander after consultation with the High Shura Council.
Just below the High Shura Councils are the “Main Committees,” which in effect replace the existing ministries of the Afghan government. These include:
• The Military Committee – Overseeing the mujahideen and replacing the Ministry of Defense.
• Preaching and Guidance Committee – Senior scholars issuing fatwas and advice on matters of Islamic jurisprudence.
• Culture and Information Committee – Responsible for broadcasting statements of the Amir al-Mu’minin and other government directors. This committee is also responsible for news dissemination and refuting claims of enemies of the Emirate on internet websites.
• Political Committee – Replaces the Foreign Ministry.
• Education Committee – Responsible for spreading “Islamic and contemporary learning.”
• Financial Committee – Responsible for all financial affairs and resources.
• Committee for Prisoners and Orphans – Works for the release of mujahideen prisoners and provides resources for the upbringing of their children and the children of martyrs.
• Health Committee – Responsible for treating wounded and sick mujahideen.
• Committee for Foreign Establishments – This committee directs the operations of foreign relief and aid agencies and makes sure they do not do anything contrary to Islamic theology and beliefs.
Directing the committees is the High Shura Council, appointed by the Amir al-Mu’minin and responsible for drafting laws and regulations in accordance with Islamic principles.
At the peak of the administration is the Amir al-Mu’minin (Commander of the Faithful): “The leader is the axis around which matters pivot. He employs the community to achieve his goals and directs people to goodness and happiness. He warns them against evil and danger according to his lights.” The Amir must be male, of sound mind and emotion, and possess the qualities of knowledge, vision, strength, courage and wisdom. He must have excellent organizational skills as well as other qualities mentioned in the existing books of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) and ‘aqidah (Islamic theology).
This title, first used by the second Caliph, Umar ibn al-Khattab, has been used in various capacities by both the Sunni and Shiite communities. It became widely used by the leaders of the Sahelian sultanates in Africa (such as Darfur) and continues to be used by the Sultan of Morocco. Mullah Omar has used the title since founding the Taliban in 1994.
AL-QAEDA IN THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB SAYS MUJAHIDEEN WILL DEFEND THE TUNISIAN REVOLUTION
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has responded to the overthrow of Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali with a statement calling on Tunisians to complete their revolution and beware of the machinations of the “Jews and Crusaders” (al-Andalus Media/al-Fajr Media Center, January 26).
The statement describes the deposed Ben Ali as a taghoot, an unjust ruler who rules by laws other than those revealed by Allah. While praising the Muslims of Tunisia for removing Ben Ali (“You have revived hope in a people in despair!”), AQIM warns that the “taghooti system remains” and the beneficial results of the revolution remain prone to “theft and circumvention.” While Ben Ali has fled to Saudi Arabia (a favorite target of al-Qaeda), his “apostate regime of tyranny and corruption” remains in Tunisia’s “constitution, laws and institutions.” According to AQIM, the battle against kufr [disbelief] and transgression will be a long one, and this is only the first round.
AQIM describes the Tunisian revolution as “a devastating earthquake which reached the throne of the Taghoot Ibn Ali,” who fled in humiliation and disgrace. The revolution was a warning to other Arab rulers, an earthquake that “was felt in each and every capital city in the Arab world, frightening its rulers out of their wits and preoccupying their minds and speech.”
AQIM sees a role for armed Islamists in consolidating the revolution and defending it from America, France (“the Mother of all Evils”) and the infidel West. France in particular is singled out by AQIM, which has had a number of confrontations with French troops in the Sahel/Sahara region in the last year:
"France is the one who supported Ben Ali till his last breath, helping him to such an extent that they even offered him their expertise in quelling the revolution. The French Crusaders are the ones who supported the Taghoot regime of the criminal generals in Algeria, and they are the ones who help them to kill and suppress the Muslims there to this day. Based on these facts, we have not the slightest doubt that America and France will play the same filthy role in the future of Tunisia, unless they are repelled by the strikes of the mujahideen, the progeny of Yusuf bin Tashfin" [a reference to the great 11th century Berber king of the Almoravid dynasty that ruled North Africa and Spain].
More generally, the statement also warns that all intelligence agencies in the Arab World are “apparatuses of repression” whose role is to defend Arab rulers from their subjects: “For this reason, they will never think twice about committing the most atrocious crimes or massacres to repress a revolution or mass uprising.”
The statement also denounces the important role tourism plays in the Tunisian economy, suggesting that local Muslims were “almost like Ahl al-Dhimmah [literally ‘the people of the contract,’ i.e. non-Muslim subjects] to the Christians who invaded it under the pretext of ‘tourism’.” Ben Ali is condemned for his efforts to impose secularism in Tunisia and his repression of Islamists. In a warning that might also be intended for Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, AQIM notes that when Ben Ali’s “oppression and crimes were exposed to the world, the infidels washed their hands of him, deserted him and handed him over. The loyalty he paid to them and his many years of service to them did him no good.”
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37454&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=26&cHash=529e40e8b9
Dans ce texte provenant des Talibans se mêlent des directives pour la constitution d'un nouvel émirat en Afghanistan et des considérations plus générales sur la chute des dictatures contrôlées par les États-Unis et la France. Il est intéressant de noter l'effort de planification du pouvoir islamique à l'échelle nationale que les auteurs du texte tente d'inculquer au lecteur. Il ne suffit pas de renverser les "dictateurs", il faut savoir ensuite régner avec un programme précis dépassant les slogans.
L'autre aspect du texte qui mérite l'attention est la hargne contre la France "mère de toutes le infamies" qui a soutenue Ben Ali jusqu'à la fin. Les auteurs mettent en garde contre la mainmise de l'ancienne puissance coloniale dans l'édification de la nouvelle Tunisie. D'où l'importance d'islamiser tout de suite, dès le départ, le nouveau pouvoir.
BRIEFS
Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 9 Issue: 5, February 4, 2011 04:26 PM
AFGHAN TALIBAN ISSUE GUIDELINES FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF ISLAMIC EMIRATE
One of the major weaknesses of most militant Islamist groups is their almost complete lack of a political program or consideration of how an Islamic State should be run beyond a general commitment to Shari’a and the creation of an Islamic caliphate. Details as to how this caliphate is to be administered or who is to be its leader are rarely considered by militants. The last Caliph, Abdul Mejid II, was deposed by Turkish secularist Mustafa Kemal “Ataturk” in 1924. A notable exception to this trend is Afghanistan’s Taliban movement, which actually has experience running a country, as it did in Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001. The Afghan model as pursued by the Taliban is more realistic in seeking an Emirate (a regional command) rather than a Caliphate (the latter encompassing the entire Islamic world).
Nevertheless, the Emirate is “based upon the principles of the Islamic Caliphate… in dividing the country into provinces, appointing pious and righteous governors, guiding workers to piety and justice, encouraging the establishment of a religious and worldly policy, tending to the needs of the people, instructing them in matters of religion and encouraging them to make the utmost effort in promoting virtue and preventing vice.”
Discussion of the Taliban’s administrative plans for Afghanistan has been stirred by a detailed outline of these plans in the movement’s Voice of Jihad website (January 27). The outline, written by Ikram Miyundi, was previously published in the movement’s al-Somood Magazine (Issue 55, December 25, 2010).
For guidance, the Islamic Emirate must draw on the Koran, the Sunnah (sayings and habits) of the Prophet Muhammad, the Sunnah of the Khulafa ur-Rashidun (The Caliphs of Righteousness, i.e. the first four caliphs after Muhammad), the sayings of the Companions (of the Prophet), as well as various fatwas (religious-based legal decisions) issued by respected scholars of Islam.
Administratively, the Emirate divides Afghanistan into 34 provinces, which are in turn divided into directorates and villages:
• The village is run by a leader appointed by the Emirate who is responsible for civilian and military affairs. In this he is assisted by a group of ten to 50 mujahideen.
• The directorate is administered by a governor “of known piety” who is assisted by a deputy familiar with the region. Under them are committees dealing with dispute resolution, education, development and local military affairs.
• Provincial administration is handled by a provincial governor, “a man of religion and morality who fears no one but Allah,” and a deputy. The governor directs the province’s military, civilian, financial and legal affairs and is responsible for the implementation of Shari’a laws and statutes. The governor is appointed and dismissed by the Supreme Commander after consultation with the High Shura Council.
Just below the High Shura Councils are the “Main Committees,” which in effect replace the existing ministries of the Afghan government. These include:
• The Military Committee – Overseeing the mujahideen and replacing the Ministry of Defense.
• Preaching and Guidance Committee – Senior scholars issuing fatwas and advice on matters of Islamic jurisprudence.
• Culture and Information Committee – Responsible for broadcasting statements of the Amir al-Mu’minin and other government directors. This committee is also responsible for news dissemination and refuting claims of enemies of the Emirate on internet websites.
• Political Committee – Replaces the Foreign Ministry.
• Education Committee – Responsible for spreading “Islamic and contemporary learning.”
• Financial Committee – Responsible for all financial affairs and resources.
• Committee for Prisoners and Orphans – Works for the release of mujahideen prisoners and provides resources for the upbringing of their children and the children of martyrs.
• Health Committee – Responsible for treating wounded and sick mujahideen.
• Committee for Foreign Establishments – This committee directs the operations of foreign relief and aid agencies and makes sure they do not do anything contrary to Islamic theology and beliefs.
Directing the committees is the High Shura Council, appointed by the Amir al-Mu’minin and responsible for drafting laws and regulations in accordance with Islamic principles.
At the peak of the administration is the Amir al-Mu’minin (Commander of the Faithful): “The leader is the axis around which matters pivot. He employs the community to achieve his goals and directs people to goodness and happiness. He warns them against evil and danger according to his lights.” The Amir must be male, of sound mind and emotion, and possess the qualities of knowledge, vision, strength, courage and wisdom. He must have excellent organizational skills as well as other qualities mentioned in the existing books of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) and ‘aqidah (Islamic theology).
This title, first used by the second Caliph, Umar ibn al-Khattab, has been used in various capacities by both the Sunni and Shiite communities. It became widely used by the leaders of the Sahelian sultanates in Africa (such as Darfur) and continues to be used by the Sultan of Morocco. Mullah Omar has used the title since founding the Taliban in 1994.
AL-QAEDA IN THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB SAYS MUJAHIDEEN WILL DEFEND THE TUNISIAN REVOLUTION
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has responded to the overthrow of Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali with a statement calling on Tunisians to complete their revolution and beware of the machinations of the “Jews and Crusaders” (al-Andalus Media/al-Fajr Media Center, January 26).
The statement describes the deposed Ben Ali as a taghoot, an unjust ruler who rules by laws other than those revealed by Allah. While praising the Muslims of Tunisia for removing Ben Ali (“You have revived hope in a people in despair!”), AQIM warns that the “taghooti system remains” and the beneficial results of the revolution remain prone to “theft and circumvention.” While Ben Ali has fled to Saudi Arabia (a favorite target of al-Qaeda), his “apostate regime of tyranny and corruption” remains in Tunisia’s “constitution, laws and institutions.” According to AQIM, the battle against kufr [disbelief] and transgression will be a long one, and this is only the first round.
AQIM describes the Tunisian revolution as “a devastating earthquake which reached the throne of the Taghoot Ibn Ali,” who fled in humiliation and disgrace. The revolution was a warning to other Arab rulers, an earthquake that “was felt in each and every capital city in the Arab world, frightening its rulers out of their wits and preoccupying their minds and speech.”
AQIM sees a role for armed Islamists in consolidating the revolution and defending it from America, France (“the Mother of all Evils”) and the infidel West. France in particular is singled out by AQIM, which has had a number of confrontations with French troops in the Sahel/Sahara region in the last year:
"France is the one who supported Ben Ali till his last breath, helping him to such an extent that they even offered him their expertise in quelling the revolution. The French Crusaders are the ones who supported the Taghoot regime of the criminal generals in Algeria, and they are the ones who help them to kill and suppress the Muslims there to this day. Based on these facts, we have not the slightest doubt that America and France will play the same filthy role in the future of Tunisia, unless they are repelled by the strikes of the mujahideen, the progeny of Yusuf bin Tashfin" [a reference to the great 11th century Berber king of the Almoravid dynasty that ruled North Africa and Spain].
More generally, the statement also warns that all intelligence agencies in the Arab World are “apparatuses of repression” whose role is to defend Arab rulers from their subjects: “For this reason, they will never think twice about committing the most atrocious crimes or massacres to repress a revolution or mass uprising.”
The statement also denounces the important role tourism plays in the Tunisian economy, suggesting that local Muslims were “almost like Ahl al-Dhimmah [literally ‘the people of the contract,’ i.e. non-Muslim subjects] to the Christians who invaded it under the pretext of ‘tourism’.” Ben Ali is condemned for his efforts to impose secularism in Tunisia and his repression of Islamists. In a warning that might also be intended for Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, AQIM notes that when Ben Ali’s “oppression and crimes were exposed to the world, the infidels washed their hands of him, deserted him and handed him over. The loyalty he paid to them and his many years of service to them did him no good.”
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37454&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=26&cHash=529e40e8b9
6 février 2011
Dangerously underestimating the Muslim Brotherhood
PhiGéo
La réminiscence des événements survenus en Iran ne peut qu'inquiéter aujourd'hui lorsqu'on observe, même de loin, ce qui se passe en Égypte.
Thérèse Zviren-Dvir affichent plusieurs textes pertinents sur le sujet (http://therese-zrihen-dvir.over-blog.com/). Mais, il suffit de mentionner ici que les communistes ne se sont pas méfiés jadis et se sont retrouvés, après la dictature qu'il combattait, devant une nouvelle tyrannie,encore plus totalitaire que l'ancienne, celle des islamistes menée par ayatollah Khomenie.
Mais, c'est certainement l'Occident qui s'est le plus royalement trompé à l'époque. Sur cet épisode on se reportera à notre "De Téhéran à Prétoria : Luttes démocratiques ?" dans Géopolitique & Démocraties, Paris et Montréal, Frison-Roche et Sciences et Culutre, 1995, pp. 60-76. On lire également l'article de David Horovitz du Jerusalem Post : Dangerously underestimating the Muslim Brotherhood.
Dangerously underestimating the Muslim Brotherhood
La réminiscence des événements survenus en Iran ne peut qu'inquiéter aujourd'hui lorsqu'on observe, même de loin, ce qui se passe en Égypte.
Thérèse Zviren-Dvir affichent plusieurs textes pertinents sur le sujet (http://therese-zrihen-dvir.over-blog.com/). Mais, il suffit de mentionner ici que les communistes ne se sont pas méfiés jadis et se sont retrouvés, après la dictature qu'il combattait, devant une nouvelle tyrannie,encore plus totalitaire que l'ancienne, celle des islamistes menée par ayatollah Khomenie.
Mais, c'est certainement l'Occident qui s'est le plus royalement trompé à l'époque. Sur cet épisode on se reportera à notre "De Téhéran à Prétoria : Luttes démocratiques ?" dans Géopolitique & Démocraties, Paris et Montréal, Frison-Roche et Sciences et Culutre, 1995, pp. 60-76. On lire également l'article de David Horovitz du Jerusalem Post : Dangerously underestimating the Muslim Brotherhood.
Dangerously underestimating the Muslim Brotherhood
5 février 2011
How Iran Views the Egyptian Crisis
PhiGéo
Jamestown Foundation Special Commentary
Babak Rahimi – February 3, 2011
On the official website of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (http://khamenei.ir/), the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, an edited audio statement was posted last year addressing a Palestinian group in which the Ayatollah predicates sweeping change in the region. In the recording, he declares that “with the will of God a new Middle East is beginning to form and this Middle East is an Islamic Middle East.” With that statement, Khamenei puts an Islamist spin on the mass uprisings that have engulfed North Africa since last month. In an orchestrated way, such depictions have also been reiterated by other ruling Iranian clerics, senior army officers and representatives of the regime, who advocate the view that Egypt’s insurrection was inspired by Islamism, directed against tyrannical powers supported by the U.S. and its allies. As Ahmad Khatami, a hardliner cleric, describes it, these new uprisings signal the birth of a new order, an Islamic Middle East (Fars News, January 28).
The official response by Tehran has remained remarkably consistent. While reports of the turmoil in Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen found their way to the top of the news in the state media, official Iranian accounts have been largely framed in reference to the memory of the 1979 revolution that led to the downfall of the shah’s regime, a close ally of the U.S. (Mehr News, January 28). Similarly, a number of print media outlets closely aligned with the hardliners have described the recent uprisings as the long overdue “aftershock of the Islamic Republic” (Tehran Times, February 1). Similar references to the revolution can also be heard by Major-General Rahim Safavi, a major paramilitary figure, who identifies the 1979 Islamic Revolution as “the conceptual framework” for the popular revolts in North Africa (Press TV, February 2). The most important of the hardliner news outlets, Keyhan, describes the popular demonstrations as having shaken the “seat of the Pharaoh,” a reference to Mubarak’s regime as a modern day, ungodly power (Keyhan, January 31). Still, anti-government Egyptian protestors have also found supporters in the Iranian parliament. In the days following the unrest, 214 Iranian parliamentarians signed a statement that showed support for protestors and rejected the “malicious” intent of Western powers, namely the U.S., to prevent the uprising from taking its natural Islamic course (IRNA, February 1, Fars News, February 1). It seems as though the Islamist spin will most likely continue through this coming Friday Prayers, when the Supreme Leader will address the nation on the Egyptian uprising (Al-Manar, February 1).
Iran severed ties with Egypt in 1979, when the new Islamic Republic declared Egypt as an agent of Zionism for signing the 1978 Camp David Accords. Ever since, and especially after the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981, the Iranian regime has predicated the collapse of the Egyptian government to be followed by an “Islamic” political order. Yet despite claims by Tehran’s hardliners and some alarmist factions in Washington that the latest situation could lead to an Islamist takeover similar to the Iranian revolution with the collapse of a pro-U.S. government, today’s Egypt may more closely resemble the Iran of 2009 than that of 1979. Similar to the Iranian opposition, Egyptian protesters have demanded accountability and an end to corruption; they want change and they appear to want it now. Democracy, rather than Islamist populism, seems to be the main ideal of the Egyptian demonstrators.
This is essentially the view that is shared by the Green movement, whose leader, Mir-Hussain Mousavi, declared on the official website “Kalemeh.com” that origins of the demonstrations in Cairo, Tunis and other cities in North Africa can be traced back to the mass protests in Tehran in 2009. He further argues that “the interests behind the ideology ruling the country (Iran) do not allow realities to be presented. The loudspeakers and spokespersons of the leaders do not pay attention to the corrupt and dictatorial actions of the Egyptian pharaoh which has created this explosive situation in Egypt through arrests, interrogations, fabrication of cases, and the plundering of people through gangs and associates” (Roozonline, February 1). This presents a historic lesson for the Islamic Republic to learn, Mousavi claims, which should not go unnoticed.
While it remains to be seen if a new democratic Egypt will emerge out of the current crisis, which appears to be increasingly more violent, the latest events have been viewed by some as warning signs for the Iranian establishment. In a famous statement given in November of last year, Ayatollah Ahmad Jananti, the head of the conservative-dominated Guardian Council and a major supporter of the Ahmadinejad regime, cautioned against the country’s “seditionists,” describing them as “fire under the ashes” (Press TV, November 12, 2010; IRNA, November 11, 2010). In many ways, the anxiety of the ruling elites in Iran comes from the unpredictable nature of protest movements that continue to thunder across the region and that could turn the 2009 ashes into new flames of rage.
Babak Rahimi is an independent analyst based in New York. His current research agenda includes the Middle East, military strategy and technology, and nuclear proliferation among other defense and security issues.
4 février 2011
The Muslim Brotherhood After Mubarak | Foreign Affairs
PhiGéo
Summary:
Portraying the Muslim Brotherhood as eager and able to seize power and impose its version of sharia on an unwilling citizenry is a caricature that exaggerates certain features of the Brotherhood and underestimates the extent to which the group has changed over time.
CARRIE ROSEFSKY WICKHAM is Associate Professor of Political Science at Emory University.
La question de la reprise en main de l'Egypte par les Frères musulmans (ou par une autre organisation, mouvance ou groupe d'obédience islamiste) ne peut qu'inquiéter l'Occident. Mais, par ailleurs, il ne faudrait pas non plus caricaturer les FM et les réduire à un de simples agents de la réaction religieuse.
The Muslim Brotherhood After Mubarak | Foreign Affairs
3 février 2011
The Muslim Brotherhood and Transition in Egypt
PhiGéo
Michael W.S. Ryan, Special Commentary, Jamestown Foundation – February 2, 2011
On January 25, 2011, the Egyptian people took to the streets in sustained protest against the 30-year rule of Hosni Mubarak. One week later, President Obama declared that the orderly transition to real democracy including free and fair elections “must begin now.” Any such transition must include Mubarak’s long-time Islamist nemesis, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). By definition, free and fair elections will result in a significant role in government for the MB if the organization decides to participate, which is highly likely. Should the United States be concerned about what kind of role the MB would play?
Background
Founded in 1928 in Egypt as a Muslim revivalist organization devoted to education and charitable works, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is the oldest and most successful Islamist organization in the world. It was never simply a group for preaching Islam, however. Early in its history, it developed a secret apparatus as a military wing, which engaged in acts of terrorism against the colonial government of the time. The colonial government arranged for the Brotherhood’s founder to be murdered in 1949 apparently in retaliation for the violence of the secret apparatus, including the murder of Egypt’s prime minister in December 1948. In 1954, the Egyptian government banned the Brotherhood for attempting to assassinate the Republic’s second president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, once the Brotherhood recognized that the president had no intention of establishing a Muslim state according to MB principles. The MB was not responsible for the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981. Military officers who carried out the attack were members of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ). The EIJ, whose members included Ayman al-Zawahiri, considered the MB compromised. At that point, Hosni Mubarak, who just barely avoided being killed with Sadat, became the President of Egypt. He took office with the clear concept that Islamist groups of all stripes posed existential threats to his government. Even though by then the MB had adopted a non-violent, gradualist approach to achieving its goals, Mubarak regularly imprisoned members along with other ultra-violent jihadist groups. His policy was a kind of zero tolerance policy towards Islamist groups, although the banned MB was still allowed to operate in one of those paradoxical political arrangements Egyptians manage to negotiate.
The Brotherhood and al-Qaeda are political enemies. Al-Qaeda has not been a factor in any of the MB’s actions during the recent days of anger across the Egyptian landscape. Ayman al-Zawahiri wrote a bitter book covering 60 years of history of the MB, entitled The Bitter Harvest, containing over 200 pages of vitriolic attack on the Brotherhood. The Brotherhood regularly publishes anti-al-Qaeda articles on its official website. The MB General Guide signed a statement after 9/11 that condemned “in the strongest terms and sorrow, these events, which are against all human and Islamic values” (Quds al-Arabi, London, September 14, 2001, in Arabic). The Arabic word translated as “events” in the statement is very weak and the MB placed its signature among many. Nevertheless, the organization went on the record against attacks on innocents. One of the characteristics of the Brotherhood in Egypt that most infuriates al-Qaeda is its willingness to participate in the democratic process. In a slight nod toward political reform by President Mubarak, 2005 marked the first time Egyptians could vote for more than one candidate. In the election for parliament, MB members running as independents captured approximately one-fifth of the seats (88 out of 444). Banned as a political party, the Brotherhood was the only opposition party to be organized in every region of Egypt.
The Bad
Although the MB has adopted a non-violent policy in Egypt, its strict Islamist goals resemble al-Qaeda’s goals. They have never abandoned their original jihadist slogan: “Allah is our objective, the Quran is our constitution, the Prophet is our leader, struggle is our way and death for the sake of Allah is the highest of our aspirations.” It is slogans like this and other inflammatory goals that have allowed the Mubarak government to consistently argue that fully free elections in Egypt could mean one vote for one man, one time. In addition, the MB has supported (at least in rhetoric) violence against American troops in Iraq and opposes American foreign policy in the Middle East. The MB has never accepted the peace treaty with Israel or accepted Israel’s right to exist. Hamas is an offspring of the Brotherhood and the MB has always given Hamas support, at least morally. Finally, most Americans would find the MB’s stance on the role of women in society and societal freedoms in general to be unacceptable if they were implemented in their most extreme form.
The Good
There is no doubt that the MB in Egypt is patriotic and supports the aspirations of a large number of Egyptians. It is not corrupt and has provided charitable works including education and medical services to the poorest in Egypt. It is pragmatic and modern in its approach to problems. Muhammad Badie, the current General Guide of the MB in Egypt, is a modern man who has played a pragmatic role since his election in 2009. For example, after his election he stated: “We believe in gradual reform, which can only be achieved through a peaceful and constitutional struggle based on persuasion and dialogue…hence we reject violence in all its forms by either governments or individuals” (Al-Shorfa.com, 1/18/2010). He has also consistently recognized the role and rights of Christians in Egypt. The Brotherhood’s official website, at least the English version, on February 1 declared that the MB recognized all treaties signed by the Egyptian government, signaling that it does not advocate abrogating the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. The MB has also made statements in the past to the effect that it opposes Israel but does not want to go to war.
The Uncertain
If the MB were to join a democratically elected government, which Brotherhood would appear: the moderate organization of recent times or the extremist movement of the past? For sure, the MB has kept a relatively low profile during the demonstrations and has tried to play a positive, disciplined role. It is certainly aware that to push too hard would harm its long-term interests in Egypt because it does not represent the majority of the people and the popular revolution is not likely to support MB rule. It is, therefore, not difficult to envision the MB agreeing to support a religiously conservative candidate that would be acceptable to the respected Egyptian military. It is easy to see the Brothers participating honestly according to the rules laid out for a democratic parliamentary election because of their likely success. Even in a minority role, however, we should expect difficult (but perhaps not disastrous) relations with Israel, especially where policy concerning Gaza is concerned. The MB has waited for this opportunity in Egypt and it is highly unlikely to do anything that would harm its future prospects. It is the long run that holds the most uncertainty about the Brotherhood’s role in Egyptian political affairs. It is much more likely to take Turkey as a role model than Iran. At the same time, no one can predict with certainty, not even the members of the Brotherhood itself, as they argue internally about their future policies. One thing is for sure, however; engaging the MB in dialogue now is not really a choice, it is a necessity if there is to be any hope of a peaceful transition in Egypt.
Dr. Michael W.S. Ryan is currently a Senior Research Associate at The Jamestown Foundation, a former senior vice president at The Middle East Institute and has held senior positions in the U.S. Departments of State and Defense. He is currently writing a book on the grand strategy of al-Qaeda based on Arabic source documents.
Michael W.S. Ryan, Special Commentary, Jamestown Foundation – February 2, 2011
On January 25, 2011, the Egyptian people took to the streets in sustained protest against the 30-year rule of Hosni Mubarak. One week later, President Obama declared that the orderly transition to real democracy including free and fair elections “must begin now.” Any such transition must include Mubarak’s long-time Islamist nemesis, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). By definition, free and fair elections will result in a significant role in government for the MB if the organization decides to participate, which is highly likely. Should the United States be concerned about what kind of role the MB would play?
Background
Founded in 1928 in Egypt as a Muslim revivalist organization devoted to education and charitable works, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is the oldest and most successful Islamist organization in the world. It was never simply a group for preaching Islam, however. Early in its history, it developed a secret apparatus as a military wing, which engaged in acts of terrorism against the colonial government of the time. The colonial government arranged for the Brotherhood’s founder to be murdered in 1949 apparently in retaliation for the violence of the secret apparatus, including the murder of Egypt’s prime minister in December 1948. In 1954, the Egyptian government banned the Brotherhood for attempting to assassinate the Republic’s second president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, once the Brotherhood recognized that the president had no intention of establishing a Muslim state according to MB principles. The MB was not responsible for the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981. Military officers who carried out the attack were members of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ). The EIJ, whose members included Ayman al-Zawahiri, considered the MB compromised. At that point, Hosni Mubarak, who just barely avoided being killed with Sadat, became the President of Egypt. He took office with the clear concept that Islamist groups of all stripes posed existential threats to his government. Even though by then the MB had adopted a non-violent, gradualist approach to achieving its goals, Mubarak regularly imprisoned members along with other ultra-violent jihadist groups. His policy was a kind of zero tolerance policy towards Islamist groups, although the banned MB was still allowed to operate in one of those paradoxical political arrangements Egyptians manage to negotiate.
The Brotherhood and al-Qaeda are political enemies. Al-Qaeda has not been a factor in any of the MB’s actions during the recent days of anger across the Egyptian landscape. Ayman al-Zawahiri wrote a bitter book covering 60 years of history of the MB, entitled The Bitter Harvest, containing over 200 pages of vitriolic attack on the Brotherhood. The Brotherhood regularly publishes anti-al-Qaeda articles on its official website. The MB General Guide signed a statement after 9/11 that condemned “in the strongest terms and sorrow, these events, which are against all human and Islamic values” (Quds al-Arabi, London, September 14, 2001, in Arabic). The Arabic word translated as “events” in the statement is very weak and the MB placed its signature among many. Nevertheless, the organization went on the record against attacks on innocents. One of the characteristics of the Brotherhood in Egypt that most infuriates al-Qaeda is its willingness to participate in the democratic process. In a slight nod toward political reform by President Mubarak, 2005 marked the first time Egyptians could vote for more than one candidate. In the election for parliament, MB members running as independents captured approximately one-fifth of the seats (88 out of 444). Banned as a political party, the Brotherhood was the only opposition party to be organized in every region of Egypt.
The Bad
Although the MB has adopted a non-violent policy in Egypt, its strict Islamist goals resemble al-Qaeda’s goals. They have never abandoned their original jihadist slogan: “Allah is our objective, the Quran is our constitution, the Prophet is our leader, struggle is our way and death for the sake of Allah is the highest of our aspirations.” It is slogans like this and other inflammatory goals that have allowed the Mubarak government to consistently argue that fully free elections in Egypt could mean one vote for one man, one time. In addition, the MB has supported (at least in rhetoric) violence against American troops in Iraq and opposes American foreign policy in the Middle East. The MB has never accepted the peace treaty with Israel or accepted Israel’s right to exist. Hamas is an offspring of the Brotherhood and the MB has always given Hamas support, at least morally. Finally, most Americans would find the MB’s stance on the role of women in society and societal freedoms in general to be unacceptable if they were implemented in their most extreme form.
The Good
There is no doubt that the MB in Egypt is patriotic and supports the aspirations of a large number of Egyptians. It is not corrupt and has provided charitable works including education and medical services to the poorest in Egypt. It is pragmatic and modern in its approach to problems. Muhammad Badie, the current General Guide of the MB in Egypt, is a modern man who has played a pragmatic role since his election in 2009. For example, after his election he stated: “We believe in gradual reform, which can only be achieved through a peaceful and constitutional struggle based on persuasion and dialogue…hence we reject violence in all its forms by either governments or individuals” (Al-Shorfa.com, 1/18/2010). He has also consistently recognized the role and rights of Christians in Egypt. The Brotherhood’s official website, at least the English version, on February 1 declared that the MB recognized all treaties signed by the Egyptian government, signaling that it does not advocate abrogating the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. The MB has also made statements in the past to the effect that it opposes Israel but does not want to go to war.
The Uncertain
If the MB were to join a democratically elected government, which Brotherhood would appear: the moderate organization of recent times or the extremist movement of the past? For sure, the MB has kept a relatively low profile during the demonstrations and has tried to play a positive, disciplined role. It is certainly aware that to push too hard would harm its long-term interests in Egypt because it does not represent the majority of the people and the popular revolution is not likely to support MB rule. It is, therefore, not difficult to envision the MB agreeing to support a religiously conservative candidate that would be acceptable to the respected Egyptian military. It is easy to see the Brothers participating honestly according to the rules laid out for a democratic parliamentary election because of their likely success. Even in a minority role, however, we should expect difficult (but perhaps not disastrous) relations with Israel, especially where policy concerning Gaza is concerned. The MB has waited for this opportunity in Egypt and it is highly unlikely to do anything that would harm its future prospects. It is the long run that holds the most uncertainty about the Brotherhood’s role in Egyptian political affairs. It is much more likely to take Turkey as a role model than Iran. At the same time, no one can predict with certainty, not even the members of the Brotherhood itself, as they argue internally about their future policies. One thing is for sure, however; engaging the MB in dialogue now is not really a choice, it is a necessity if there is to be any hope of a peaceful transition in Egypt.
Dr. Michael W.S. Ryan is currently a Senior Research Associate at The Jamestown Foundation, a former senior vice president at The Middle East Institute and has held senior positions in the U.S. Departments of State and Defense. He is currently writing a book on the grand strategy of al-Qaeda based on Arabic source documents.
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