30 avril 2011

Gadhafi son, grandkids killed in NATO strike - World news - Mideast/N. Africa - msnbc.com

PhiGéo

D'après les informations transmises par MSNBC, le drame qui se joue en Libye prend des proportions de plus en plus alarmantes. Pendant que le fils du colonel Kadhafi est tué pendant un bombardement, le port de Misrata est bloqué à l'aide humanitaire par des mines...

  • "Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi survived a NATO missile strike Saturday that killed his youngest son and three grandchildren and wounded friends and relatives, Libya's spokesman said."
  • "NATO said Friday pro-Gadhafi forces had laid mines on the approach to the harbor, under siege for weeks, and forced a temporary halt in humanitarian shipments."
Gadhafi son, grandkids killed in NATO strike - World news - Mideast/N. Africa - msnbc.com

Attentat de Marrakech: Reportage après l'attaque qui a fait 16 morts - leJDD.fr


Marrakech
Victime innocente de l'attentat de Marrakech
PhiGéo

Le royaume chérifien est attaqué de l'extérieur par AQMI. Du moins, c'est une hypothèse raisonnable si l'on tiens compte de la situation géopolitique du Maroc. La succursale d'Al-Quaida s'en prends à un régime qui lui résiste et qui passe plutôt bien à travers le vent de révolte qui souffle sur le monde arabe et, au-delà du Maroc, elle s'attaque aussi à la France. Elle ferait donc, si l'on peut tristement dire, d'une pierre deux coups... Espérons que le Maroc tiendra bon encore une fois et que les réformes actuelles dans ce pays suivront leurs cours malgré les interférences de ceux qui ne voudraient surtout pas qu'elles réussissent.


Attentat de Marrakech: Reportage après l'attaque qui a fait 16 morts - leJDD.fr

26 avril 2011

Editor's Notes: The moralist

PhiGéo

Interview d'Asa Kasher sur l'éthique du contre-terrorisme. À la question de savoir si le renoncement aux règles morales que les attentats terroristes contres les victimes civiles supposent peut justifier le recours par les autorités politiques des régimes démocratiques à des moyens que la morale réprouve, le professeur insiste sur l'importance de respecter les normes que nous nous sommes fixées. Il discute aussi de l'importance de protéger les citoyens des États démocratiques. À lire.

Editor's Notes: The moralist

L'armée libyenne se retirerait de Misrata - Kadhafi retranché

PhiGéo

Les choses se gâtent sur le terrain pour le chef du gouvernement libyen Mouamar Kadhafi. Les bombardements de l'OTAN ciblent maintenant les membres de son entourage et son propre bureau. L'attaque d'hier ne l'aurait pas atteint directement mais à tout de même suffit pour que son représentant se plaigne officiellement de "tentative d’assassinat".

La situation ressemble de plus en plus au "commencement de la fin". L'espace de mouvement du colonel se rapetisse et, à moins d'une négociation de la dernière chance, il sera difficile pour lui de se maintenir même partiellement en Libye. Peut-être qu'une partition, de moins en moins probable, pourrait lui laisser une sphère d'influence directe. Un exil semble maintenant inévitable. C'est aussi la seule issue raisonnable.

25 avril 2011

Whereabouts of al-Qaeda leaders on 9/11 - Ben Laden juste après le 11 septembre

PhiGéo


Un document rendu public par les soins de WL révèle le désespoir des dirigeants de Al-Quaida après les attentats du 11 septembre 2001. L'écrivain et stratège Abu-Musab al-Suri a très bien décrit dans son Appel à la résistance mondial de 2005 le terrible choc qu'a été pour les moudjahidins la contre-attaque américaine en Afghanistan. D'après al-Suri la chasse à l'homme planétaire qui a suivi 9/11 a conduit à la destruction de 80% du leadership des combattants de d'Allah et à la ruine quasiment complète de toute organisation structurée (au sujet d'al-Suri, voir sur ce blog: The Moral Implication of the Ultimate War, colonne de droite).

Les articles du Washington  Post et du Figaro reproduit ci-dessous décrivent plus en détails ce qui est arrivé à Oussama Ben Laden et aux principaux chefs d'Al Quaida dans les semaines suivants les attentats les plus célèbres de l'histoire.

WikiLeaks discloses new details on whereabouts of al-Qaeda leaders on 9/11

By Peter FinnSunday, April 24, 9:13 PM

On Sept. 11, 2001, the core of al-Qaeda was concentrated in a single city: Karachi, Pakistan.

At a hospital, the accused mastermind of the bombing of the USS Cole was recovering from a tonsillectomy. Nearby, the alleged organizer of the 2002 bombing in Bali, Indonesia, was buying lab equipment for a biological weapons program. And in a safe house, the man who would later describe himself as the intellectual author of the Sept. 11 attacks was with other key al-Qaeda members watching the scenes from New York and Washington unfold on television.
Within a day, much of the al-Qaeda leadership was on the way back to Afghanistan, planning for a long war.
A cache of classified military documents obtained by the anti-secrecy organization WikiLeaks presents new details of their whereabouts on Sept. 11, 2001, and their movements afterward. The documents also offer some tantalizing glimpses into the whereabouts and operations of Osama bin Laden and his Egyptian deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri.
The documents, provided to European and U.S. news outlets, including The Washington Post, are intelligence assessments of nearly every one of the 779 individuals who have been held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, since 2002. In them, analysts have created detailed portraits of detainees based on raw intelligence, including material gleaned from interrogations.
Detainees are assessed “high,” “medium” or “low” in terms of their intelligence value, the threat they pose while in detention and the continued threat they might pose to the United States if released.
The documents tend to take a bleak view of the detainees, even those who have been ordered released by the federal courts because of a lack of evidence to justify their continued detention. And the assessments are often based, in part, on reporting by informants at the military detention center, sources that some judges have found wanting.
In a statement, the Pentagon, which described the decision to publish some of the material as “unfortunate,” stressed the incomplete and snapshot nature of the assessments, known as Detainee Assessment Briefs, or DABs.
“The Guantanamo Review Task Force, established in January 2009, considered the DABs during its review of detainee information,” said Pentagon press secretary Geoff Morrell and Ambassador Daniel Fried, the Obama administration’s special envoy on detainee issues. “In some cases, the Task Force came to the same conclusions as the DABs. In other instances the Review Task Force came to different conclusions, based on updated or other available information. Any given DAB illegally obtained and released by Wikileaks may or may not represent the current view of a given detainee.”
Regardless of how detainees are currently assessed, many of the documents shed light on their histories, particularly those of the 14 high-value detainees whose assessments were made available. When pieced together, they capture some of the drama of al-Qaeda’s scattering in the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks. They also point to tensions between certain members of the terrorist group.
Among other previously unknown meetings, the documents describe a major gathering of some of al-Qaeda’s most senior operatives in early December 2001 in Zormat, a mountainous region of Afghanistan between Kabul and Khost. There, the operatives began to plan new attacks, a process that would consume them, according to the assessments, until they were finally captured.
A hectic three months
According to the documents, four days after the Sept. 11 attacks, bin Laden visited a guesthouse in Afghanistan’s Kandahar province. He told the Arab fighters gathered there “to defend Afghanistan against the infidel invaders” and to “fight in the name of Allah.”
It was beginning of a peripatetic three months for bin Laden and Zawahiri. Traveling by car among several locations in Afghanistan, bin Laden handed out assignments to his followers, met with some of the Taliban leadership and delegated control of al-Qaeda to the group’s Shura Council, presumably because he feared being captured or killed as U.S. forces closed in.
At some point, bin Laden and Zawahiri used a secret guesthouse in or relatively near Kabul. The al-Qaeda leader welcomed a stream of visitors and issued a series of orders, including instructions to continue operations against Western targets. He dispersed his fighters from training camps and instructed women and children, including some of his wives, to flee to Pakistan.
In October, bin Laden met in Kabul with two Malaysians, Yazid Zubair and Bashir Lap — both of whom are now at Guantanamo Bay — and lectured them on history and religion. On the day that the U.S.-led coalition began bombing Afghanistan, bin Laden met in Kandahar with Taliban official Mullah Mansour. Bin Laden and Zawahiri also met that month with Taliban leader Jalaluddin Haqqani, who continues to lead a deadly insurgency against the United States and its allies in Afghanistan.
Bin Laden, accompanied by Zawahiri and a handful of close associates in his security detail, escaped to his cave complex in Tora Bora in November. Around Nov. 25, he was seen giving a speech to the leaders and fighters at the complex.
He told them to “remain strong in their commitment to fight, to obey the leaders, to help the Taliban, and that it was a grave mistake and taboo to leave before the fight was completed.”
According to the documents, bin Laden and his deputy escaped from Tora Bora in mid-December 2001. At the time, the al-Qaeda leader was apparently so strapped for cash that he borrowed $7,000 from one of his protectors — a sum he paid back within a year.
Internal tensions
In December, al-Qaeda’s top lieutenants gathered in Zormat. They included Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the self-described mastermind of the Sept. 11 attacks; Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, the alleged planner of the USS Cole attack; and Abu Faraj al-Libbi, a key facilitator for bin Laden.
The place was teeming with fighters who were awaiting for al-Qaeda to return their passports so they could flee across the border to Pakistan.
Mohammed later stated that while he and the others were in Zormat, they received a message from bin Laden in which he delegated control of al-Qaeda to the Shura Council. And the senior operatives began to plan new attacks.
Nashiri reported that while at Zormat he was approached by two Saudi nationals who wanted to strike U.S. and Israeli targets in Morocco. Nashiri said he had been considering an operation in the Strait of Gibraltar and thought that the British military base there, which he had seen in a documentary, would be a good target.
Nashiri’s willingness to approve a plot on his own was later the source of some tension within the organization, particularly with Mohammed.
In May or June 2002, Mohammed learned of the disrupted plan to attack the military base in Gibraltar and was upset that he had not been informed of it.
Nashiri separately complained that he was being pushed by bin Laden to continue planning aggressive operations against U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf region without much regard for his security.
It was an unusual complaint for someone who was so committed to al-Qaeda. According to documents, to avoid the distraction of women, he “reportedly received injections to promote impotence and recommended the injections to others so more time could be spent on the jihad.”
Back in Pakistan
After the Zormat conclave, Mohammed and other senior al-Qaeda figures began to return to Karachi.
The documents state that Mohammed “put together a training program for assassinations and kidnappings as well as pistol and computer training.” It was not intended for specific operations but to occupy the bored fighters stuck in safe houses.
At the time, money was flowing into the country for Mohammed, according to the documents, allowing him to acquire safe houses and fund operations.
In November 2002, his nephew Baluchi took a delivery of nearly $70,000 from a courier. Mohammed, at one point, gave $500,000 to a Pakistani businessman, who is also being held at Guantanamo Bay, for safekeeping, much of it wrapped in cellophane and inside a shopping bag. Mohammed also gave Riduan Isamuddin, the Indonesian known by the nom de guerre Hambali, $100,000 to congratulate him for the Bali bombing.
Gradually, Mohammed and the other operatives were picked off by Pakistanis working with the CIA and the FBI. When Ramzi Binalshibh, a key liaison between the Sept. 11 hijackers and al-Qaeda, was arrested at a safe house in Karachi on the first anniversary of the Sept. 11 attacks, there was a four-hour standoff while the Yemeni and two others held knives to their own throats and threatened to kill themselves rather than be taken.
There are few geographic references in the documents for bin Laden after his flight into Pakistan.
He apparently sent out letters from his hiding place through a trusted courier, who then handed them to Libbi, who had provided the secret guesthouse in Kabul immediately after the Sept. 11 attacks.
After the capture of Mohammed in March 2003, Zawahiri fled from the house where he had been staying. The documents state that Zawahiri left on his own and sought out an Afghan, who delivered him to Libbi.
In May 2005, while waiting for bin Laden’s courier at a drop point, Libi was arrested by Pakistani special forces.
Zawahiri, in response, moved again. His residence, documents state, “was changed to a good place owned by a simple old man.”
He remains at large.
Staff researcher Julie Tate contributed to this report.


Ben Laden pensait être tué ou capturé

AFP
25/04/2011 | Mise à jour : 17:45 
Réactions (8)

Oussama Ben Laden s'attendait à être tué ou capturé lors de l'offensive des Etats-Unis en Afghanistan à l'automne 2001 et avait transmis à cet effet ses pouvoirs aux talibans, selon des documents américains rendus publics par le site WikiLeaks.

Selon ces documents fondés sur des interrogatoires de détenus de Guantanamo, le chef d'al-Qaida a passé les trois mois consécutifs aux attentats du 11 Septembre à parcourir l'Afghanistan afin de préparer ses troupes au combat contre les Américains.

Lors d'une rencontre avec des talibans, "il a transmis la direction d'al-Qaida au Conseil de la choura (l'organe suprême des talibans, ndlr), vraisemblablement parce qu'il craignait d'être capturé ou tué à mesure que les Américains se rapprochaient", écrit aujourd'hui le Washington Post, qui a étudié les documents transmis par WikiLeaks.

Les Etats-Unis ont lancé une offensive en Afghanistan le 7 octobre 2001 dans l'espoir de démanteler la direction d'al-Qaida qui s'était appuyée sur le régime des talibans afin de préparer les attentats du 11 Septembre.

De passage dans une auberge de la province de Kandahar quatre jours après les attentats, il appelait des combattants arabes à "défendre l'Afghanistan contre les envahisseurs infidèles", selon le quotidien américain. Dans une autre auberge, à Kaboul ou dans sa région, il a ensuite reçu de nombreux visiteurs à qui il a ordonné de poursuivre les opérations contre des cibles occidentales. Puis il a dispersé ses combattants et ordonné aux femmes et aux enfants, y compris à certaines de ses épouses, de fuir au Pakistan.

A la mi-novembre, Ben Laden se réfugiait lui-même dans un complexe de grottes montagneuses près de Tora Bora, avant de fuir pour le Pakistan vers la mi-décembre.
"A cette époque, le chef d'al-Qaida était tellement à court de fonds qu'il a emprunté 7.000 dollars à l'un de ses protecteurs, une somme qu'il a remboursée avant un an", écrit le Washington Post. Début décembre, d'autres dirigeants d'al-Qaida, capturés depuis, se réunissaient encore dans les montagnes afghanes pour évoquer des attentats contre des cibles américaines et israéliennes au Maroc, et contre l'armée britannique à Gibraltar, selon le journal.


Sources :

Gadhafi compound hit by NATO bombs / La bataille de Misrata et le bombardement chez Kadhafi

PhiGéo


Misrata 23 avril 2011 (MSNBC)
Pendant que les uns croient qu'il suffit d'offrir des négociations aux dictateurs pour secourir les peuples opprimés, d'autres assument les risques de l'action et obtiennent des résultats. L'article de la MSNBC auquel mène le lien ci-dessous décrit le bombardement d'un bâtiment utilisé par le colonel Kadhafi à Tripoli ainsi que le dénouement de la bataille de Misrata où les troupes de l'ancien homme fort de la Libye se sont retirées récemment suite aux efforts combinés des rebelles au sol et des frappes aériennes de l'OTAN.
Image: Destroyed building
Tripoli 24 avril 2011

Source : Gadhafi compound hit by NATO bombs - World news - Mideast/N. Africa - msnbc.com

20 avril 2011

Two Professors in Senegal and Mali / Deux professeurs au Sénégal et au Mali

PhiGéo

Two Professors in Senegal and Mali


Larger image 
Mr. Marc Imbeault, Rear Admiral Ousmane Ibrahima Sall and Mr. Danic Parenteau.
Danic Parenteau - Co-Chair of the Office of External Relations
Two professors from the Royal Military College Saint-Jean (RMC Saint-Jean) went on a mission to Senegal and Mali from 22 to 31 March to meet the directions of the National Academy of Regular Officers located in Thies (Senegal) and the Allied Military School located in Koulikoro (Mali).
Dr Marc Imbeault, Director of the Division of Continuing Studies and Dr Danic Parenteau, Co-Chair of the Office of External Relations have been warmly welcomed by their African hosts. On this occasion, they were able to discuss the possibilities of partnership between RMC Saint-Jean and these two West-African schools.
The RMC Saint-Jean welcomes this year's second-lieutenants Baffing Diarra and Ayouba Guindo, two recent graduates from the Allied Military School and Senegalese second-lieutenant Abdou Sacor Diagne. During this short stay, Dr Imbeault and Dr Parenteau were also received in Dakar by the Deputy Chief of Staff Army General, Rear Admiral Ousmane Ibrahima Sall.

Deux professeurs en mission au Sénégal et au Mali


Agrandir l'image 
M. Marc Imbeault, le sous-chef d’état-major général des armées, le contre-amiral Ousmane Ibrahima Sall et M. Danic Parenteau.
Danic Parenteau - Coprésident, Bureau des relations externes
Deux professeurs du Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean (CMR Saint-Jean) se sont rendus en mission au Sénégal et au Mali du 22 au 31 mars dernier pour rencontrer les directions de l’École nationale des officiers d’active de Thiès (Sénégal) et de l’École militaire inter-armes de Koulikoro (Mali).
Marc Imbeault, directeur de la Division des études permanentes, et Danic Parenteau, coprésident du Bureau des relations externes, ont été chaleureusement accueillis par leurs hôtes africains. À cette occasion, ils ont pu discuter de possibilités de partenariats entre le CMR Saint-Jean et ces deux écoles de l’Afrique francophone.
Le CMR Saint-Jean accueille cette année les sous-lieutenants Baffing Diarra et Ayouba Guindo, tous deux diplômés de l’école de Koulikoro et le sous-lieutenant sénégalais Abdou Sacor Diagne. Lors de ce court séjour, les professeurs Imbeault et Parenteau ont également été reçu au camp militaire Dial Diop de Dakar par le sous-chef d’état-major général des armées, le contre-amiral Ousmane Ibrahima Sall.

15 avril 2011

Pakistan, Democracy and Terror / Pakistan, démocratie et terreur

Pervez Musharraf
PhiGéo 


Compte rendu d'un livre s'adressant à un large public sur l'histoire politique du Pakistan d'hier et d'aujourd'hui. Le livre fournit un résumé de la situation politique au Pakistan, ainsi que des points de repères historiques utiles. Il propose aussi une analyse des luttes qui déchirent ce pays depuis son indépendance. La plus importante contribution de ce livre est toutefois l'interprétation qu'il propose des événements récents comme, par exemples, l'assassinat de B. Bhutto ou le départ du président Musharraf. Ces événements sont situés dans le contexte de l'alternative qui caractérise l'action politique au Pakistan depuis l'indépendance et dont les deux branches sont la démocratie et la violence. 

Iftikhar Haider Malik. Pakistan after Musharraf: Democracy, Terror and the Building of a Nation. London: New Holland, 2010. 208 pp. GBP 9.99 (paper), ISBN 978-1-84773-453-2.
Reviewed by Robert Nichols
Published on H-Asia (April, 2011)
Commissioned by Sumit Guha

Pakistan Today
When the assassin of Salman Taseer, governor of the Punjab, who had been killed on January 4, 2011 was brought before a magistrate in Islamabad, Pakistan, dozens gathered outside the court supported the accused with rose petals and garlands. The crowd apparently included activist lawyers, many of whom perhaps had participated in the earlier lengthy movement to restore the Pakistan Supreme Court chief justice to his position after he had been dismissed by the former authoritarian leader Pervez Musharraf. In this accessible and current book, author Iftikhar Malik offers a historian’s perspective on the many conflicted and competing issues important to an understanding of this response and responses to other contemporary events in a nation in crisis.
Successive chapters are written from a perspective that combines journalism, political science, and history. They trace the particularly Pakistani details of wider postcolonial themes of struggles between authoritarianism and democracy; political dynasties and broad representation; and secular visions and Islamist agendas (including disputed blasphemy laws claimed as the cause of Salman Taseer’s murder). There is the rise of a middle class, one not necessarily unified in the pursuit of Western-oriented modernization, and ongoing critical external relations, especially with India, Afghanistan, the United States, and China.
The publisher and author, noted here as a “South Asian politics expert,” have created this useful volume for a general reading audience, one that would include undergraduates, drawn by dramatic headlines to seek deeper understanding and analysis of the country and region. Scholar Iftikhar Malik has offered previous writings on the dilemmas of post-1947 Pakistan state-building and the tensions between differing national visions, including those framed in terms of constitutional modernity, Islamic politics, and regional or ethnic identities. In this new book he continues as a valuable guide to a national history of recurring periods marked by struggling democratic institutions and military interventionism, both simultaneously challenged and often informed by internal Islamist advocacy, and always in the context of unsettled foreign affairs.
This latest work tries to situate in the context of national and regional history the recent overwhelming cascade of dramatic political events. These include Musharraf’s dismissal of the Supreme Court chief justice (March 2007), Benazir Bhutto’s return to Pakistan from political exile (October 2007), Musharraf’s declaration of a state of emergency (November 2007), Bhutto’s assassination (December 27, 2007), the following national election (February 2008), Musharraf’s resignation from the presidency (August 2008), Bhutto’s widower, Asif Zardari, being sworn in as president (September 2008), the terrorist bombing of the Islamabad Marriott Hotel (September 2008), and the complex politics and violence that continued through 2009.
The author’s fourth title since 2005, the current book begins with a prologue summarizing recent headlines and then an introduction that offers basic information about geography, provinces, religion, culture, language, and history. The brief historical survey covers the rise of the Indus valley civilization (3300-1200 BCE) to 1948 in five succinct pages, then to 2002 in five more pages. The volume at times reads as a bit of an encyclopedic attempt to mention and discuss all recent notable and interconnected personalities, organizations, and events. It concludes with an informative glossary of “Political Parties and Players” and a four-page bibliography.
As the book details and explores the interactions between political, military, religious, and economic interests within Pakistan, the author offers his observations about a society undergoing complex processes of stress and change. He suggests that national processes are slowly having a defusing effect on ethno-nationalist movements, and so, “A similar economic and professional integration of the urban NWFP into the mainstream Pakistani economy and state structures has also reduced ethnic separatism there. However, it has also escalated a tribal backlash against this imbalanced modernity” (p. 117). He notes, “the early traces of a middle class can be found amongst the smaller sections of society existing between the two extremes of rural landed gentry and landless peasantry,” though this “is itself criss-crossed by varying levels of economic prosperity and a multitude of ideological viewpoints” (p. 115). These emerging middle interests have rallied to party, regional, and religious agendas, using modern media and public mobilization. This includes religiously conservative urban, educated professionals seeking familiar goals of validation and social mobility.
The volume’s closeness to current events is most clear in chapter 6, “Islamist Politics.” In this chapter, the success of the February 2008 election is cited as evidence of renewed promise for a way forward. In defeating religious parties at the polls, “the mainstream parties regained the centre-stage, espousing global and secular solutions, preferring dialogue and democracy over violence and intolerance. These elections proved that democratic processes rather than coercion were the best antidote to religious militancy” (p. 139). In a concluding chapter, “Awaiting a Breakthrough,” Malik writes that “the elections of 2008 demonstrated that Pakistanis are ready to make a new, democratic and forward-looking start, although…, optimism is qualified with caution” (p. 142). Those looking for some insight into the latest political events and violence in Pakistan will find it here. No simple optimist, the author is fully aware of the challenges ahead. Still, his last sentence reflects a vision past immediate crises to a time when maturing national interests might recognize that “Democracy, dialogue and distributive justice are the keys to a bright future for Pakistan” (p. 170).

13 avril 2011

Faire le plein...

PhiGéo



Lors d'un séjour récent au Mali j'ai filmé cette scène où un jeune malien a fait le plein de notre camion à l'ancienne... (Si vous avez de la difficulté à lire la vidéo, essayez le plein écran.)

10 avril 2011

Introduction to the Study of War course outline

McMaster UniversityPhiGéo


Un cours d'introduction à l'étude de la guerre de l'université McMaster de Hamilton, Ontario, utilise notre texte intitulé "Noble Ends: Torture and the Ethics of Counter-Terrorism" (reproduite dans ce blog). 
"Noble Ends" est étudié dans la leçon 10 ayant pour thème : "New War Theory and The War on Terror". Les principales questions à l'étude sont les suivantes : les guerres d'aujourd'hui sont-elles différentes de celles d'hier ? avons-nous besoin de nouvelles théories pour les comprendre et expliquer les raisons pour lesquelles nous les faisons ? Quelles sont les implications et les défis du discours sur la guerres dans le monde contemporain ?
Source:
PEACE ST 2BB3: Introduction to the Study of War (2010/11) course outline

9 avril 2011

The Inheritance of Rome

PhiGéo
Une histoire de Rome et du Moyen-âge qui met en perspective l'oeuvre de Charlemagne et celle de Mahomet. 


Times Higher Education
Books by academics reviewed by academics

Book of the week: The Inheritance of Rome 

05 February 2009 

Power, Tom Palaima learns, was easily gained but damned hard to keep

In The Inheritance of Rome, the latest volume in the Penguin History of Europe series, Chris Wickham lays out, in 23 chapters, 600 years of early medieval political, social, economic and religious history. He begins with a concise description of the culture and belief systems of the late Roman Empire and the crises that led to its dissolution, then goes on to cover post-Roman Western Europe between 550 and 750, the Byzantine and Arab empires between 550 and 1000, and Carolingian and post-Carolingian Europe between 750 and 1000.
Realising that the early Middle Ages offer "few household names for a wider public", Wickham provides "political narratives" for each subperiod and explores "the social and cultural (including religious) environment[s] inside which men and women made political choices". He gives us a good feel for these environments by making the most of the uneven evidence for economic exchange networks, political and social hierarchy, religious beliefs and practices and intellectual life.
By judicious selection of primary texts and by paying attention to the increasingly sophisticated interpretation of material remains, Wickham places us in many different early medieval worlds. In chapter ten, which he calls the book's central chapter, he studies the political messages of Emperor Justinian's church of Hagia Sophia in Constantinople (537), Caliph al-Walid I's Great Mosque in Damascus (716), the Northumbrian palace at Yeavering (c600), Pope Paschal I's church of Santa Prassede in Rome (c820) and the Carolingian palaces at Aachen and Ingelheim in the late 8th and 9th centuries.
Wickham then takes up archaeological evidence for the other end of the social spectrum, how village layouts attest to what he later calls "the caging of the peasantry" between 800 and 1000. His phrase for this process of trapping lowly land-workers within the self-contained power structures of local regions is a translation of the French term encellulement. He uses a pejorative image because of his sympathy for the nameless human beings in medieval times who never wrote or read a word, who never fought in aristocratic armies, who never designed or visited palatial buildings.
Wickham draws on Beowulf, the Deeds of Charlemagne, accounts of visitors to Damascus and an 11-page eulogy of Hagia Sophia in Prokopios' On Buildings to explain the ceremonial uses of his culture-defining buildings and their effects on visitors. Rome, Constantinople and the West used these structures in connection with wide streets, forum areas, theatres, amphitheatres, "processions and public participation". Arab states "did not use processions as a major part of their political legitimisation", opting for the "relatively unhierarchical space" of the mosque's courtyard with its "emphasis on the community of believers".
Of course, as Wickham points out, al-Walid was asserting Muslim supremacy by building the Damascus mosque on top of the demolished cathedral of the largely Christian city. The Deeds of Charlemagne describes imaginatively a visit of Byzantine ambassadors to the palace of the emperor. Its spatial layout, furniture and wall decorations asserted Carolingian supremacy to outsiders. Paschal I, too, was "reasserting papal centrality... inside and against a world with different political configurations".
Wickham drives home the lesson that power is not so hard to get, if you are intelligent, observant, ruthless and lucky, but it is damned hard to sustain and pass on. This holds true for individuals and for the elites who control the fates of cities, regions, nation-states or empires.
A second lesson is that those who acquire power must be ingenious at justifying their right to keep and use it. However this is done, in each era the anonymous masses suffer the consequences. The third lesson is that power is a zero-sum game. Wickham admits that The Inheritance of Rome offers "less about the peasant majority than there might have been", but is clear on how those with power extract it from others.
There are historical surprises. Constantinople, thanks to its massive fortifications facing the Balkans and the protection the Bosphorus Strait provided against land attacks from Anatolia, managed to retain its eastern empire in some form throughout the period. The empire lost "two thirds of its land and three quarters of its wealth" between 610 and the 630s. With the loss of Egypt to Persian and then Arab armies, Constantinople no longer could provide free grain to its people. Its population fell from about 500,000 to between 40,000 and 70,000. It was still the largest city in Europe. Where did all those people go?
But less is sometimes more. Between 669 and 687, the Anatolian imperial heartland was reorganised into four military districts called "themes". Soldiers were rewarded with land, and their produce was their pay. Cities were weakened or vanished altogether in outlying areas subject to raids. Social status outside Constantinople was determined not so much by wealth or birth, but by "office in the army or administration".
Constantinople itself gained in relative importance. During the period of Byzantine revival (850 to 1000), its elites reinforced their power in ceremonies so elaborate that Wickham asks, "Can all this really have taken place, for every feast in every year, with all these people^^?" The answer is "yes", and these displays validated the political and religious hierarchies.
As a scholar interested in kingship ideology and the power structures of Greek Bronze Age palatial societies, I found chapter 16, "The Carolingian century, 751-887", especially interesting because of Wickham's analysis of how power in the Carolingian state was formed, increased, conveyed and eventually lost.
First, Pippin gained power by force, but only after securing the nihil obstat of Pope Zacharias and later a public ritual legitimisation by Pope Stephen II. Both popes served as vital sources of what Wickham calls "external, non-Frankish, moral power".
Second, Charlemagne's aggressive military campaigns generated the wealth he needed to act as king and then emperor. He acquired booty from the pagan cult-site of Irminsul in Saxony and revenues from Lombardy, and absorbed Bavaria by threat of force. Lastly, he attacked the Avars on the Hungarian plain and brought back enormous riches from their royal residence.
Third, Charlemagne consolidated and controlled power by distributing honores, offices and land allotments. He granted use of land as beneficia, keeping ownership so he could reclaim it if the recipient acted contrary to royal wishes.
Fourth, he instituted a cultural programme through legislative acts aimed at correctio, the cultivation of cultivated, restrained behaviour by those in power. Justice, harmony and the avoidance of hatred were key public virtues.
Fifth, he promoted reciprocal gift exchanges. And sixth, he sent out royal agents, missi, to correct abuses. Charlemagne's son and successor, Louis the Pious, placed strong emphasis on the moral behaviour of aristocrats and public officials.
The Carolingian system did not recreate Gibbon's happy age of the Antonines. Wickham points out that missi were often sent out to put a stop to abuses by other missi, and judicial corruption was widespread. Yet, as Wickham explains, aristocrats "are always violent, corrupt and greedy, but they were at least aware of public responsibility [and]... linked it to their desire for personal salvation after death". The peasantry had hope of protection because local powers had to pay attention to kings. For les miserables, this period was probably better than most, and then the cage doors were slammed shut.
When I finished The Inheritance of Rome, which Wickham dedicates to the students with whom he studied ancient and medieval history at the University of Birmingham from 1976 to 2005, I thought, "Lucky students" and "Lucky us now, too."
The Author
Chris Wickham is the Chichele professor of medieval history at the University of Oxford and fellow of All Souls College.
Prior to this, he spent nearly 30 years at the University of Birmingham. Wickham says that although academia was not a conscious career choice for him, he "fell quite quickly" into it, and was always aware that his specialist subject would be "something that wasn't Britain".
He specialises in medieval Italy, in particular Tuscany and central Italy, but he is also very interested in comparative history.
When asked what he enjoys about Italy, he says that it has "an interesting political engagement". He also takes pleasure in travelling around the Mediterranean in general, and particularly likes the region's landscape.
Back at home, he has three cats, Fluffy, Wamba and Victoria, who have had one of Wickham's books dedicated to them, "to the great amusement of the Italians".
The Inheritance of Rome: A History of Europe from 400 to 1000
By Chris Wickham
Allen Lane, 688pp, £35.00
ISBN 9780713994292
Published 29 January 2009
Reviewer :
Tom Palaima is professor of Classics, University of Texas at Austin.

Source
Times Higher Education - Book of the week: The Inheritance of Rome

8 avril 2011

Relais pour la vie / Relay for Life

PhiGéo



Dear Friends,

Join me in the fight against cancer by pledging me for my participation in the Canadian Cancer Society Relay For Life!
The Canadian Cancer Society Relay For Life is an overnight non-competitive relay that celebrates cancer survivors and pays tribute to the lives of loved ones. It involves teams of 10 people who take turns walking, running or strolling around a track to raise money to support the work of the Canadian Cancer Society. It's a night of fun, friendship and fundraising to beat cancer. Every step you take in Relay raises money to help the Canadian Cancer Society save lives.
Funds raised through Relay For Life make a difference. They help the Canadian Cancer Society fund the most promising research projects in the country, provide information services and support programs in the community and advocate for public policies that prevent cancer and help those living with it. Join the Fight by pledging my participation in Relay For Life – just click the link at the bottom of this message to view my personal page and look for the blue button to support me in this event. Online pledging is secure and it saves the Society money by reducing administrative costs. No amount is too small, or too big. And with a donation of $10 or more, you will receive a tax receipt immediately by e-mail.

Thanks,

M.I.

Chère amies,


Participez avec moi à la lutte contre le cancer en commanditant ma participation au Relais pour la vie de la Société canadienne du cancer!
Le Relais pour la vie de la Société canadienne du cancer est un relais amical de nuit qui rend hommage aux survivants du cancer ainsi qu'aux êtres chers qui ont été emportés par la maladie. Il réunit des équipes de 10 personnes qui se relaient en marchant autour d'une piste afin de soutenir la cause de la Société canadienne du cancer. C'est un événement sous le signe du plaisir et de l'amitié qui permet d'amasser des fonds pour vaincre le cancer. En prenant part au Relais, d’une manière ou d’une autre, vous contribuez à recueillir des fonds qui permettront à la Société canadienne du cancer de sauver des vies.
Les fonds recueillis grâce au Relais pour la vie font une différence. Ils permettent à la Société canadienne du cancer de financer les projets de recherche les plus prometteurs, d'offrir des services d'information et des programmes de soutien dans la communauté, et de promouvoir l'adoption de politiques en vue de réduire le risque de cancer et d'améliorer la qualité de vie des personnes touchées par la maladie. Joignez-vous au combat en commanditant ma participation au Relais pour la vie –  il suffit de cliquer sur le lien au bas de ce courriel pour accéder à ma page personnelle; recherchez le bouton bleu afin d’appuyer ma participation à l’évènement. Les dons en ligne sont sûres et permettent à la Société canadienne du cancer d’économiser en réduisant ses frais d’administration. Aucun montant n’est trop petit ou trop élevé. Et pour tout don de 10 $ ou plus, vous recevrez immédiatement un reçu officiel par courriel.
Merci,


M.I.



http://www.facebook.com/marc.imbeault


http://convio.cancer.ca/site/PageServer?pagename=RFL_CAN_home_accueil&s_locale=en_CA

6 avril 2011

Revue Défense Nationale / On Command

PhiGéo

La Revue Défense Nationale vient de faire paraître un article de Marc Imbeault et Michel Maisonneuve intitulé : "Du commandement : approche philosophique".


This is the first part of a Canadian study of command, initially based on philosophical notions of hierarchy, power, willingness and cohesion. The concept is then interpreted in the context of the professional military ethic. Finally, the authors examine the notion of authority based on the concept of recognition.


Il s’agit de la première partie d’une étude sur le commandement d’abord défini philosophiquement à partir des notions de hiérarchie, de puissance, de volonté et de cohésion. Il est situé et interprété ensuite dans le contexte de l’éthique professionnelle militaire. La notion d’autorité est examinée enfin à partir du concept de reconnaissance.




Revue D�fense Nationale

3 avril 2011

Les armes des anti-kadhafistes pourraient finir dans les mains d'al-Qaida

PhiGéo
Le colonel Kadhafi n'avait peut-être pas tort lorsqu'il affirmait que les "rebelles" étaient en réalité des militants d'Al-Qaïda...
Source : Le PointLes armes envoy�es aux anti-kadhafistes pourraient finir dans les mains d'al-Qaida, actualit�A ou�dire : Le Point

Libye et Côte d'Ivoire dans une perspective historique

PhiGéo

Dans ce texte de Bernard Lugan, les événements qui se déroulent actuellement en Libye et en Côte d'Ivoire sont analysés par un spécialiste de l'histoire de l'Afrique. L'angle sous lequel l'auteur aborde ces questions révèle des enjeux que le public en Occident n'a pas souvent l'occasion de considérer.

SAMEDI 2 AVRIL 2011


Libye et Côte d’Ivoire : « bons » démocrates contre « méchants » dictateurs ?

Communiqué de Bernard Lugan du 2 avril 2011


En Côte d’Ivoire comme en Libye, ce ne sont pas de « bons » démocrates qui combattent de « méchants » dictateurs, mais des tribus ou des ethnies qui s’opposent en raison de fractures inscrites dans la longue durée.


La Libye est essentiellement constituée de deux provinces désertiques, la Tripolitaine et la Cyrénaïque reliées par une route côtière le long de laquelle ont lieu des escarmouches sans contact direct que les journalistes qualifient pompeusement de « combats ». Dans chacune des deux provinces domine une coalition tribale. De l’indépendance acquise en 1951 jusqu’à la prise du pouvoir par le colonel Kadhafi en 1969, ce fut la Cyrénaïque qui exerça le pouvoir. La Tripolitaine domina ensuite.


La révolte est un soulèvement ancré en Cyrénaïque, plus particulièrement autour des villes de Benghazi et de Dernah. Les autorités françaises ont reconnu ses dirigeants comme les seuls représentants du « peuple de Libye ». Un peu comme si la Catalogne s’étant soulevée contre Madrid, Paris reconnaissait les délégués de Barcelone comme seuls représentants du peuple espagnol…


Réduits à leurs seules forces, les rebelles de Cyrénaïque ont montré qu’ils sont incapables de conquérir la Tripolitaine et même de tenir leurs positions. Il n’y a donc que deux solutions à cette guerre :


1) La « coalition » intervient en force, jusqu’à terre, comme le font actuellement les forces spéciales américaines et cela pour permettre aux rebelles d’avancer afin d’en finir avec le colonel Kadhafi. Le problème est que le mandat de l’ONU n’autorise pas les « puissances du bien et de la morale » à s’immiscer aussi profondément dans la guerre civile libyenne.


2) Comme le demande l’Union africaine depuis le premier jour, une négociation devra débuter car l’aviation de l’Otan interdira de toutes les façons aux forces du colonel Kadhafi de reconquérir la Cyrénaïque.


En Côte d’Ivoire où l’affrontement n’est pas tribal mais ethnique, le pays est plus que jamais coupé en deux et, comme il fallait hélas s’y attendre, les massacres y prennent une ampleur cataclysmique. Une offensive éclair dont on connaîtra bientôt les détails et les parrains a permis aux forces nordistes d’arriver jusqu’à Abidjan. Cependant, même si l’avantage militaire des partisans d’Alassane Ouattara était confirmé, la crise ivoirienne n’en serait pas réglée pour autant. En effet, si pour la presse occidentale cette victoire annoncée est vue comme celle du président « démocratiquement élu » contre le président illégitime, pour les 46% de la population ayant voté Laurent Gbagbo, l’explication est autre : aidé par la France et les Etats-Unis, l’ensemble nordiste musulman a repris vers l’océan une expansion bloquée durant la parenthèse coloniale.


De fait, la coupure Nord-Sud entre le monde sahélien, ouvert et traditionnellement structuré en chefferies d’une part, et le monde littoral, forestier à l’Ouest, lagunaire à l’Est, peuplé d’ethnies politiquement cloisonnées d’autre part, est la grande donnée géopolitique régionale. L’actualité confirmant la géographie et l’histoire, les solutions qui ne prendraient pas en compte cette réalité ne sauraient régler la crise en profondeur.
SourceLe blog officiel de Bernard Lugan

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